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The central focus of this thesis is how strategic coupling between latecomer regions and 
the global economy affects local industrial upgrading and how institutional and spatial 
conditions matter during the process of local upgrading. My motivation derives from 
dissatisfaction with the contemporary literature of global value chain and regional 
development in explaining industrial upgrading in the Pearl River Delta (PRD) in China. 
This thesis argues that latecomer regions strategically couple with the global economy in 
different ways which lead to dynamic outcomes of local upgrading. In order to explain the 
dynamics, this thesis conceptualizes a fourfold typology of strategic coupling including: 
captive, cooperative, reciprocal and absorptive coupling. The variety results from different 
configurations of knowledge gaps and power relations between local actors in latecomer 
regions and foreign firms in the global economy. This thesis further argues that these 
knowledge gaps and power relations are not only influenced by inter-firm governance patterns, 
but also subject to changing capabilities of local firms and institutional-spatial contexts in 
which they are embedded. The more developed is synergy within strategic coupling, the more 
upgrading will occur. 
This thesis empirically investigates into the development of the PRD from the 1980s to 
the 2000s and finds that the region has been upgraded from an agricultural backwater into one 
of the worlds’ leading manufacturing hubs. Starting with captive coupling, the PRD’s regional 
trajectory of upgrading has gradually become divergent among different industries. 
In the electronics industry, captive coupling has been developed and reinforced whereby 
foreign invested enterprises (FIEs) dominate the pace of upgrading and the achievement of 
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local upgrading is limited. In the apparel industry, captive coupling has evolved into 
cooperative coupling in which local private enterprises have taken over the dominant role of 
FIEs and achieved substantial upgrading. In the automotive industry, reciprocal coupling has 
been developed in the form of joint ventures between local state owned enterprises and global 
automakers under strong national intervention. Process upgrading has been significantly 
achieved in the joint ventures and their local suppliers. This thesis has yet to identify the 
formation of absorptive coupling in the PRD, but it would probably be developed in the 
apparel industry in future. The PRD case demonstrates that the domestic market, regional 
supply networks and competitive dynamics within global production networks (GPNs) are the 
most important assets for fostering local upgrading. Successful cases of local upgrading 
largely derive from the synthesis of various assets, rather than relying on one single type of 
assets. 
The key contribution of this thesis is the conceptualization of causality between strategic 
coupling and local upgrading based on the case of the PRD. It provides a geographical 
interpretation of value chain governance and offers a typology of strategic coupling as a 
critical complement to the GPN framework. The end of this thesis suggests policy makers to 
devote more attention to local upgrading which should be treated as an ultimate solution for 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Why study industrial upgrading in the Pearl River Delta? 
Industrial upgrading has been acknowledged as one of the most critical issues for 
latecomer firms to improve their competitiveness and succeed, when they enter the global 
economy. As a latecomer region, the Pearl River Delta (PRD) in the People’s Republic of 
China (hereafter China) has been integrated into the global economy since the national 
'open-door' reform1 in 1978. From 1979 to 2009, GDP in this region increased by about 15 - 
17% annually (GDSY, 2010).2 This record has far surpassed that of the four Asian Dragons: 
Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan, which grew at around 7% - 8% per year 
during their economic take-off in the 1960s and the 1970s. The PRD has thus been considered 
as the fifth Dragon (Chui et al., 1997; Clark and Kim, 1993; Sung et al., 1995). However, 
whether the region has achieved industrial upgrading is in question. Are local firms upgraded 
or marginalized over time? How do they get upgraded or fail to upgrade? Theoretically, why 
should we study industrial upgrading in such a latecomer region and what have we not known 
yet? A recent episode helps contextualize the importance of these questions. 
In February 2011, when Barack Obama met Silicon Valley’s top luminaries in a dinner 
party in California, each guest was asked to come with a question for the President. But when 
Steven Jobs of Apple spoke, President Obama interrupted and asked a question of his own: 
                                                              
1 It refers to the program of economic reforms called "Socialism with Chinese characteristics" in China that was 
started in December 1978 by reformists within the Communist Party of China led by Deng Xiaoping. 
2 The GDP data are at current prices adjusted according to GDP index of Guangdong province in statistics 
yearbook with 1980 as the base year. 
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“what would it take to make iPhones in the United States?” Mr. Jobs replied briefly and 
negatively: those jobs were not coming back. Eleven months after the meeting, a New York 
Times report entitled How the U.S. Lost Out on iPhone Work detailed the answer of Mr Jobs 
(Duhigg and Bradsher, 2012).3 The report showed that lower wage was no longer the key 
reason that Apple’s products had to be made overseas. It was the speed, flexibility, supply 
networks and a large amount of engineers (with more than high school but not necessarily a 
bachelor’s degree) that the U.S. plants could not match. 
In the beginning of the 2000s, Apple products were largely made within the United 
States. But by 2004, Apple had turned to overseas manufacturing. By 2011, almost all of the 
70 million iPhones, 30 million iPads and 59 million other products Apple sold were 
manufactured outside the United States. The components of these products were procured 
from about 160 suppliers, many of which were located in Japan, Korea, Singapore, Taiwan 
and China.4 Eventually, these components were assembled by a few contract manufacturers 
(CMs), particularly by two Taiwanese firms - Foxconn and Quanta in the PRD. 
Cited in the New York Times report, a former high-ranking Apple executive commented 
that “the focus of Apple’s works in Asia came down to two things: factories in Asia can scale 
up and down faster and Asian supply chains have surpassed what’s in the United States. The 
result is that we can’t compete at this point”. The reason was also pointed out by another 
former high-ranking Apple executive that the whole supply chains are in China now and the 
speed and flexibility of Foxconn’s manufacturing capabilities are ‘breathtaking’. The 
                                                              
3 The New York Times report on 21 Jan 2012, available at:  
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/22/business/apple-america-and-a-squeezed-middle-class.html?_r=2&ref=gener
al&src=me&pagewanted=all 
4 Apple’s Report of Supplier Responsibility in 2011, available at: http://www.apple.com/supplierresponsibility/ 
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comments imply that the story is not all about the manufacturing capabilities of Foxconn, but 
also involves the supply chains and networks behind it in the PRD. 
When Apple delivered their orders to suppliers in Asia, Apple’s American suppliers were 
also moving to Asia as well. Corning Inc. is an American-based supplier of Apple which 
manufactures large panes of strengthened glass. In the past few years, Corning continued 
employing more than 1,000 Americans to satisfy the flood of orders for iPhones. But Corning 
now decided to establish new factories in South Korea and China. Hence Corning could get 
closer to the assembly plant and save production and logistic costs; and more importantly get 
closer to its Asian clients which are imitating Apple by using large panes of strengthened 
glass from Corning. But this relocation did not guarantee Corning’s success (Duhigg and 
Bradsher, 2012). 
A local firm in the PRD has been upgraded and is now challenging Corning’s position. 
Competition has arrived from the Lens One Technology Co. (LOT) collocating with Foxconn 
in Shenzhen. The owner of the LOT is a Chinese engineer who has been working in the glass 
pane industry in the PRD for about twenty years. Before serving Apple, the LOT was making 
panes for watches, clockers or components used in electronics products. By learning from 
Foxconn, the LOT has developed an integrated production system in its relatively smaller 
industrial parks. Meanwhile, it has heavily invested in precision technologies in strengthened 
glass making and cutting. These efforts have qualified the LOT’s competence. When Apple 
was developing iPhone 4, the LOT pro-actively contacted Apple and eventually won over 
large orders of strengthened glass from Corning. By the end of 2010, the LOT had made over 
40 million pieces of glass for iPhones 4. Corning’s managers complained that Chinese 
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governments did everything for firms like the LOT and even subsidized all the R&D 
expenditures. This comment might be exaggerated, but the worry was true.5 
While the New York Times report reflected the anxiety of the American President and 
manufacturers over the loss of competiveness, the PRD’s media and authorities also showed 
great anxiety over the sustainability of the region. Since the mid-1980s, the PRD has been 
critiqued for over dependence on labor-intensive industries and lacking in industrial 
upgrading (Li, 1997; Liang, 1989; Yan et al., 2008). Shenzhen’s municipal leaders have 
repeatedly claimed that the city is facing four challenges of sustainability: land, energy, 
environment, and population, and thus they must promote industrial upgrading that may not 
favor labor-intensive firms like Foxconn.6 A recent local news report argued that the PRD 
was seriously losing competitiveness due to raising labor wages and living costs.7 One 
important sign was that Vietnam replaced the PRD as the largest subcontracting base for 
Nike’s products in 2010. There are also new challenges to PRD’s industrial growth, such as 
shortages of land resources, raising labor wages, environmental degradation and increasing 
raw material costs and so on (Huang and Chen, 2009). All these problems point to industrial 
upgrading as an ultimate solution (Yu and Zhang, 2009). Pressures for industrial restructuring 
and upgrading also increased after the string of suicides in Foxconn’s industrial town in 
2010.8 
To mitigate these pressures of restructuring and upgrading, the Guangdong government 
                                                              
5 Source of LOT’s information: a Chinese news analysis from 21 Century Economic Broadcast published on 17 
Sep 2010, at: http://www.21cbh.com/HTML/2010-7-19/4MMDAwMDE4NzM4MQ_3.html 
6 News reports from Shenzhen’s official website, available at: 
http://www.sznews.com/zhuanti/content/2009-04/21/content_3710541.htm 
7 Yangchen Evening Paper, news report on 4 July 2011, available at: 
http://news.iqilu.com/china/gedi/2011/0704/500882.html 
8 The Foxconn suicides occurred between January and November, 2010, when eighteen Foxconn employees 
attempted suicide with fourteen deaths. See a detail analysis on Financial Times by John Gapper on 21 Sep 
2011, at: http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/9f0fb872-d88e-11e0-8f0a-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1lhi1lwn9 
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has tried to transform the PRD from a low-cost manufacturing site into a high-end 
manufacturing zone since the mid-2000s. In 2008, a policy named ‘dual transformation’ was 
launched specific for promoting regional upgrading.9 It aims to relocate low value-added 
industries from the PRD to peripheral areas within Guangdong Province; and to attract higher 
value-added industries and talents to the PRD. This policy is informally phased as the strategy 
of ‘emptying the cage for new birds’.10 For the first time, industrial upgrading officially has 
become a regional political imperative. Although doubting ‘where the new birds are’, local 
cadres have actively enforced this policy for seeking the alleged ‘good sake’ of regional 
economy, as well as the advancement of local cadres’ own political careers. By March 2011, 
official reports had asserted that the progress of regional upgrading was ‘satisfactory’. 35 
designated industrial parks in Guangdong had been built in the past three years which 
accommodated about 2,000 firms relocated from the PRD. These firms produced a total 
industrial output of 200 billion yuan in 2010. A large area of land was vacated to create space 
for establishing new industries, but the actual figure was not disclosed.11 
The above episode implies that, during the restructuring of Apple’s global production 
network, the PRD has improved its regional manufacturing capabilities by developing certain 
competitive edges beyond the advantages of lower wage costs. This improvement has enabled 
the region to manufacture some high value-added products like iPhone, rather than processing 
only cheap and undifferentiated components. However, this contrasting view of the 
competitiveness of the PRD has opened up some critical questions. How does the PRD 
                                                              
9 It means moving low skilled labor out and attracting new talents in. see: 
http://www.gd.gov.cn/gdgk/gdyw/201106/t20110617_144739.htm 
10 It means releasing lands from low value-added manufacturing to accommodate more high value-added 
industries (see http://www.gd.gov.cn/ghgy/ywsd/201108/t20110831_148650.htm).  




manage to develop such competitiveness? Are foreign firms (e.g. Foxconn) the key 
contributors to this accomplishment? Is local upgrading (e.g. the LOT) significant? Do 
regional policies play a positive or negative role during the upgrading process? 
Before answering these questions, a common thread should be pointed out that: 
industrial upgrading in the PRD is not a self-contained process within a single firm, but 
involves firms and non-firm actors at different geographical scales. There are foreign firms 
like Apple’s subcontractors, Foxconn and Corning that have further embraced developing 
regions as an important part of their business. There are local firms like the LOT that has 
experienced upgrading through working for foreign firms. There are also pro-active local and 
regional states that try to accelerate the pace of regional upgrading by manipulating 
territorialized resources, such as land and policies. The engagement of these actors becomes 
as a critical context in which industrial upgrading should be reexamined. Will the engagement 
produce a different outcome of upgrading comparing with the circumstances in developed 
regions? How does this difference inform us about existing theories and research in economic 
geography? All these questions become my primary motivation for investigating into 
industrial upgrading in such a latecomer region in China. 
1.2 Missing links in the literature of industrial upgrading 
Industrial upgrading refers to a process that firms move from processing simple items to 
conducting higher value-added activities in their portfolio of operations such as 
manufacturing complex parts and products, constructing integrated production systems, 
conducting research and development activities, brand creation or marketing and so on. 
Examining the progress of latecomer (local) upgrading is a critical issue because it determines 
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whether a latecomer firm can sustainably survive in intensifying global competition. If the 
firm fails to upgrade, it tends to be marginalized at a truncated position making 
undifferentiated and low value-added products. Sooner or later, it will be replaced by other 
low-cost producers. 
There are four types of upgrading: product, process, functional and sectoral upgrading 
(Humphrey and Schmitz, 2002b). Recent studies, mainly in the global value chain (GVC) 
literature, argue that the mechanism of local upgrading is related to a process of knowledge 
diffusion from global lead firms to their suppliers. Global lead firms have dominant 
governance power over suppliers in their value chains. They tend to offer limited upgrading 
opportunities in order to prevent nurturing suppliers that may mature and become their new 
competitors (Gereffi et al., 2005; Humphrey and Schmitz, 2001). Under this asymmetrical 
power relationship, local firms are at a disadvantaged position. But they may launch 
collective action to increase bargaining power or to pursue indigenous innovation with the 
help of state institutions (Giuliani et al., 2005; Hobday and Perini, 2005; Lundvall, 2007; 
Schmitz, 2004; Viotti, 2003). Is this the necessary destiny of latecomer firms in the pursuit of 
upgrading? By probing into both geographical and non-geographical studies, this thesis has 
identified some important missing links in the existing literature that can shed light on an 
alternative understanding of latecomer upgrading (Chapter 2). 
Within the discipline of economic geography, there is a wide range of studies that have 
already documented (dis)industrialization, regional development, industrial clustering, global 
industrial shifts and the changing geographies of production (see the series reviews in Bathelt, 
2003, 2006; Bathelt and Glückler, 2005; Reimer, 2007; Yeung, 2000, 2001, 2002b). However, 
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none of these analyses takes industrial upgrading as the central analytical concern, but instead 
tackles some related issues such as learning, innovation and industrial restructuring. They also 
do not bring together intra- and extra-forces that shape regional development to examine the 
process of upgrading in the context of global integration. 
Beyond the discipline of geography, industrial economics, economic sociology and 
development studies have paid tremendous attention to revealing the typologies, mechanisms, 
trajectories and politics of upgrading with both empirical and theoretical depth (Gereffi, 1999; 
Gereffi and Frederick, 2010; Gereffi et al., 2005; Giuliani et al., 2005; Humphrey and 
Schmitz, 2002b; Ozawa, 2005; Schmitz, 2004). However, these studies tend to hold a either 
firm-centric or state-centric view toward industrial upgrading and explain it under a rigid 
analytical trajectory. Scholars in the GVC literature argue that local upgrading is ultimately 
determined by the patterns of inter-firm governance whereby global lead firms define the 
local upgrading of their suppliers. Development studies keep emphasizing the role of states in 
promoting indigenous innovation against the control of lead firms. But in what ways will 
different inter-firm or firm-state relations impact local upgrading? More importantly, these 
studies have yet to acknowledge the influence of geographical factors, such as local (social or 
cultural) contexts, regional assets (labor, nature resources and markets), and competitive 
dynamics in the global economy. In other words, this thesis finds that the analytical driver of 
the geography of industrial upgrading is unclear (Chapter 2). Geography here does not mean 
the spatial structure of industrial upgrading, but rather refers to the ongoing process in which 
multi-scalar forces produce an outcome of upgrading under certain economic and institutional 




First, in the context of a globalizing region, industrial upgrading is not a purely 
autonomous or self-contained action of a single firm, but should be related to the collective 
endeavor of a group of actors which are interconnected through the process of global 
integration. However, we have not known much about how different patterns of integration 
between latecomer regions and the global economy would affect the outcomes of local 
upgrading. 
Second, the earlier works have found the power asymmetry between lead firms and local 
suppliers within value chains, but these works have yet to recognize influences from the 
institutional and spatial contexts in which the value chains are embedded. These 
institutional-spatial conditions may underpin local firms and reshape their asymmetrical 
power relations. The power dynamics of local upgrading remains unclear.  
How can these missing links be resolved? I argue that a broader analytical framework is 
needed. For this purpose, this thesis draws upon an analytical framework in recent 
geographical studies which attempt to identify the right balance of the internal and external 
forces that shape regional development in globalization (Coe et al., 2004; Henderson et al., 
2002; Pike, 2007; Poon et al., 2006). These efforts have conceptualized the integration 
between latecomer regions and the global economy as a process of strategic coupling, 
referring to “a mutually dependent and constitutive process involving shared interests and 
cooperation between two or more groups of actors who otherwise might not act in tandem 
for a common strategic objective” (Yeung, 2009a: 332). This strategic coupling is considered 
as a key mechanism to the rapid growth of latecomer regions in East Asia in which local 
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firms and nation states coordinate, mediate, and arbitrage regional assets to meet TNCs’ 
demands (Coe et al., 2004; Yang, 2009; Yeung, 2009a). This concept enables this thesis to 
analyze both economic and institutional (political or social) influences from firms or 
non-firm actors (state institutions) in the process of local upgrading. However, its current 
conceptualization is a bit fuzzy. The typology of strategic coupling remains ambiguous and 
we have not known sufficiently how local upgrading occurs in strategic coupling. Situated in 
such an intellectual context, my thesis attempts to fill in a theoretical gap in the 
understanding of the casual relations between strategic coupling and industrial upgrading. 
1.3 A relational perspective on industrial upgrading 
The key research question driving this study is how strategic coupling between latecomer 
regions and the global economy affects local upgrading. Drawing upon the empirical case of 
the PRD, my research objectives are threefold. First, I examine how industrial upgrading 
takes place in the region through the process of strategic coupling and who the key drivers 
are. Second, I identify the types and evolution of strategic coupling developed through 
multi-scalar forces. Finally, this thesis attempts to explain the outcomes of local upgrading in 
relation to the variety of coupling as well as the alternative pathways of local upgrading 
under different institutional-spatial conditions. 
The analytical tool this study deploys is a relational perspective in economic geography 
(see Chapter 3). The relational perspective focuses on the role of networks (actors and 
structures), relationality and power relations between economic actors in shaping the 
organization of economic activities over places (Bathelt and Glückler, 2003, 2011; Boggs 
and Rantisi, 2003; Jones, 2009; Yeung, 2005). The process of upgrading is relational because 
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when and where a firm decides to upgrade is subject to diverse influences embedded in 
intra-, inter- and extra-firm relations. On the one hand, these relations provide various 
channels for firms to accumulate the necessary resources for upgrading. On the other hand, 
implementing an upgrading action may receive supports or constraints from other 
stakeholders that may be suppliers, customers, strategic partners or other institutional actors 
(e.g. governments). Studying these relational features is not novel in economic geography. 
My effort is to examine especially the influences of these relational effects on local 
upgrading. 
The relational perspective is an appropriate analytical tool for this study. It highlights 
actor specificity, relationality and the embeddedness of economic relations in 
institutional-spatial contexts. Hence, it enables this study to consider extra-firm influences 
together with inter-firm governance conceptualized in the GVC literature. Meanwhile, the 
relational perspective does not treat power in an absolute or pre-determined manner, but 
rather views it as a relational effect subject to different conditions or contexts embedded in 
economic, social or political fabrics. More specifically, it is subject to the mutual interests 
and possessed resources of actors. In such a way, this perspective guides my study that 
considers the influences from multi-scalar forces and power dynamics among different 
actors for pursuing respective aims of upgrading. Adopting this perspective, however, we 
should be aware of two potential problems. On the one hand, networks per se do not lend to 
causal explanation. On the other hand, students of this perspective should avoid being 
preoccupied by network-privilege analysis (see a detail critique in Sunley, 2008). 
This thesis proposes the central argument that industry upgrading in a globalizing region 
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is mainly driven by strategic coupling which in turn is constituted by the interactive effects 
among local firms, foreign firms and regional institutions. The upgrading outcomes depend 
on the evolutionary patterns and power dynamics of strategic coupling. A fourfold typology 
of strategic coupling is conceptualized as the explanatory variable for understanding 
upgrading, including captive coupling, cooperative coupling, reciprocal coupling and 
absorptive coupling. This variety of strategic coupling is derived from the different 
configurations of technology and market gaps between local firms and foreign firms: 
 When both technology and market gaps are large, captive coupling tends to be 
developed whereby foreign firms fully define local upgrading. The deeper local 
firms are captive to foreign partners, the faster will upgrading be facilitated.  
 When technology gap becomes small but market gap is still large, cooperative 
coupling is formed through which local firms work for foreign firms under 
moderate power relations. The more developed are their complementarity and 
mutual interests, the higher is the potential for upgrading. 
 When market gap becomes small but technology gap remains large, reciprocal 
coupling can be developed. Firms couple for exchanging technology and market 
resources possessed exclusively by each partner. Under this nuanced situation, the 
more balanced are power relations, the more synergy is there for upgrading. 
 When both gaps are small, absorptive coupling can possibly take place in which 
local firms work with foreign firms to absorb knowledge and implement local 
upgrading autonomously. The more capable are local firms of multi-tasking within 
GPNs, the more will upgrading occur. 
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The primary concern of local firms is to reduce the gaps with foreign firms so that they 
can move away from captive coupling and eventually achieve absorptive coupling. However, 
as interpreted in the last section, previous studies mainly believe that lead firms have 
overwhelming power in defining the pattern of governance and the gaps (Bair, 2005; Gereffi 
et al., 2005; Pietrobelli and Rabellotti, 2011). Local firms have little power to bargain with 
lead firms, unless they invest heavily in indigenous innovation or launch joint actions (Clark 
and Kim, 1995; Giuliani et al., 2005; Hobday, 1995; Schmitz, 1999, 2004). Contrary to this 
over-deterministic view of governance and upgrading, this thesis offers an alternative 
understanding by examining the casual relations between coupling and upgrading. 
Although the governance pattern is defined and enforced by global lead firms, local 
firms may mobilize resources embedded within specific institutional-spatial contexts to 
leverage the control of lead firms. This local initiative does not necessary challenge the 
power of lead firms. In contrast, local firms may bypass the power or leverage the power by 
fostering more synergy with lead firms. Hence lead firms may be willing to share more or 
co-develop knowledge with local firms. Therefore, although the pattern of industrial 
governance does not change, local firms may be able to develop different types of strategic 
coupling, thus achieving various forms of industrial upgrading, particularly functional 
upgrading. The possibility depends on the availability of assets at different scales (local, 
regional, national and global). This thesis aims to exemplify this mechanism of local 
upgrading. 
There are two main empirical tasks for this study to accomplish: (1) to examine the 
formation of strategic coupling in the PRD and the correspondent outcomes of upgrading; (2) 
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to identify the institutional-spatial conditions that enable local firms to leverage the 
governance power of lead firms. In doing so, this thesis contributes to the literature in three 
ways (see details in Chapter 9). First, the relational framework provides a more realistic 
account for investigating into the geography of industrial upgrading beyond the GVC 
literature. Second, the typology of strategic coupling serves as a critical supplement to the 
GPN studies as well as relational economic geography. Last but not the least, this thesis 
offers alternative strategies of upgrading beyond the limited options provided in the 
governance literature and development studies. 
1.4 Empirical contexts 
The PRD is the largest alluvial delta in Guangdong Province in China (see Figure 1.1). 
In 1985, the PRD area was officially named as an economic-open zone with specific 
economic privileges, including 4 cities and 13 counties. In 1994, the PRD was extended to 9 
cities and 6 counties. The Greater-PRD (GPRD) was conceptualized later referring to the 
PRD plus Hong Kong and Macao. In 2003, Guangdong provincial governments proposed a 
concept of the “Pan-Pearl River Delta” (PPRD) to represent a much broader economic area 
which includes eight provinces, one autonomous region, Hong Kong and Macau which are 
connected by the drainage area of the Pearl River. In this thesis, the PRD only refers to its 
economic definition as the area of the Delta in 1994. After rounds of adjusting administrative 
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The PRD had a long tradition as a national window of foreign trading for hundreds years 
due to its geographical location: close to Southeast Asia and far from the political center of 
China. It was a national foreign trading port and also the origin of the Chinese diaspora 
widely scattered in North America, Europe, and South East Asia (Cartier, 2001; Johnson and 
Peterson, 1999; Lin, 2004; Skinner, 1985). However, during the period of Mao Zedong 
(1949–1976), the PRD was disfavored by the central government in terms of state 
investments and other preferential industrial policies. The main reason was because of its 
location at a vulnerable costal frontier with undesirable proximity to the capitalist’s enclaves 
of Hong Kong and Macao. Moreover, this region lacked basic industrial and natural resources 
to support heavy industries which were selected as strategic industries in national 
development schemes at that time (Yang, 1990). From 1949 to 1979, state owned enterprises 
(SOEs) in Guangdong only received 2.2% capital investments from the central government 
(Sit and Yang, 1997: 195). These deliberate policy actions of the central government resulted 
in the PRD’s lack of regional assets, such as a strong industrial base, at the eve of the 
Open-Door reform in 1978. 
After 1978, the central state strategically turned to reshape the PRD into a vanguard of 
China’s national economy for export-orientated industrialization. Most of the marketization 
policies were implemented here first and then transferred to inner regions once the policies 
worked well (Enright et al., 2005; Wu, 2005). 
At a national scale, instead of giving financial or material supports, China’s post-reform 
regime gave the PRD greater leeway than its peer regions to practice market forces, attract 
foreign direct investment (FDI) and promote exports, thus integrating with the global 
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economy. This institutional leeway satisfied both the interests of local initiatives and global 
capitalists so that they could practice capitalism without violating relevant laws about public 
ownership in China (Chen and Pu, 1999; Enright et al., 2003; Ning, 1998; Xu, 1988). This 
national liberalization policy was framed as the ‘Lead One Step Ahead’ policy and resulted in 
a specific form of ‘Red Capitalism’ in China in which market logics of capitalism were 
practiced in the name of market socialism (Lin, 1997; Vogel, 1989). As shown in Table 1.1, 
the liberalization policy decentralized great autonomous power to Guangdong, particularly to 
the PRD in a very flexible manner, such as the central-local fiscal arrangement (Sung et al., 
1995). 




 fixed sum of 1 billion yuan per year, while all the remaining revenues are kept 
for its own use; 
 self-reliant in respect of investment; 
 a bigger share of foreign exchange earnings; 
 renewed annually with minor changes 
Power 
decentralization 
 greater planning power at provincial level 
 allowed to access the global economy via Hong Kong connections; greater 
authority to approve foreign investment projects; 
Special economic 
zones 
 Shenzhen and Zhuhai; 
 lower taxation for foreign firms; 
 larger jurisdiction in policy reform; 
Financial system  allowed to set up independent provincial investment company, greater 
authority in commerce; 
Labor  greater power in labor management including reforming its labor system and 
the power to raise bonuses above the national level; 
Price system  greater power in pricing at provincial and urban levels; 
Corporation  encouraging the development of township-village enterprises; 
Sources: Chen and Pu, 1999; Vogel, 1989; Sung et al., 1995. 
 
Another reason for the PRD to be chosen for economic reform is its geographical 
location and underdeveloped industries base. As locating far away from the political center, 
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which was regarded as a disadvantage before the opening reform, the PRD was considered as 
an appropriate place for practicing marketization within the socialist state of China. Any 
possible failure of the reform within this region would not generate devastating effects on the 
mainstay of China’s economy. The region also has geographical proximity to the capitalists’ 
enclaves of Hong Kong and Macao located in the edges of the PRD. This locational 
advantage makes it easier to attract foreign investments. The insignificance of the PRD’s 
industrial base was also an advantage. Because the PRD almost had no heavy or complex 
industries, attracting foreign investments would not create much pressure for local economic 
restructuring. Moreover, to a certain degree, the PRD is not as indispensable as other regions, 
such as the Yangzi River Delta (YRD) which was regarded as the economic center of China, 
the industrial heartland in North East China (e.g. heavy industrial base in Manchuria), and 
even the inland industrial base in South West China (Xu and Li, 1990). Apart from these 
institutional and geographical factors, the existing overseas social connections also served as 
a regional asset that facilitated the industrialization of the PRD. These connections had been 
constrained before 1978. Encouraged by both central and local authorities, these social 
networks had effectively brought in foreign investments after the 1978 reform. These 
investments were mediated by oversea Chinese residing mainly in Hong Kong, Taiwan, South 
East Asia and North America (Hsing, 1996; Lin, 1997; Sung et al., 1995). 
After three decades of rapid industrialization, the PRD was transformed from an 
agricultural backwater into one of the world’s leading manufacturing hubs. Dozens of 
industrial clusters have been developed in various sectors, such as electronics, home 
appliance, telecommunication equipment, toy, automobile, watch and clock, textile, apparel, 
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footwear, plastics, ceramics and biochemical and so on (Enright et al., 2005; Sung et al., 
1995). 
Table 1.2 Economic profile of the PRD in China 
Items PRD Percentage of GD Percentage of China  
Land Area (km2)  54733 30% 0.57% 
GDP (billion, yuan)   
1980 12 48% 2.6% 
1990 101 65% 5.4% 
2000 842 78% 8.5% 
2009 3215 81% 9.5% 
Utilized foreign investments (billion, USD)  
1980 0.1 46% 4.8% 
1990 1.3 61% 12% 
2000 10.4 72% 17% 
2009 17.5 90% 19% 
Export Value (billion, USD)  
1980 0.6 28% 3.4% 
1990 18 80% 29% 
2000 85 92% 34% 
2009 342 96% 28% 
Total population (million, persons)  
1990 23.7 40% 2.1% 
2000 42.9 57% 3.3% 
2009 47.9 50% 3.6% 
Total employed labor(million, persons) 
2000 19.1 48% 2.6% 
2009 32.6 58% 4.2% 
Total Retail Sales of Consumer (billions, yuan) 
2009 1084 73% 8.2% 
Sources: Guangdong Statistic Yearbook in 2010, 2001, 1995; the Pearl River Delta and the Yangzi 
River Delta Statistic Yearbook 2010; National Statistic Yearbook of China in 2009, 2001. 
 
The achievement of industrial growth is significant. Indicators in Table 1.2 above show 
that the PRD has become a frontier of the national economy. In the terms of GDP, the PRD’s 
share in Guangdong Province increased from 48% in 1980 to 81% in 2009 and from 2.6% to 
9.5% share in China. During this process, the PRD served a key platform of foreign 
investment and trading of the country. Most of the foreign investments of Guangdong 
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agglomerated in the PRD: from 41% in 1980 to 90% in 2009. The tendency of 
export-oriented industrialization was apparent. The export value of the PRD sharply increased 
in the past decades. By 2009, the PRD had accounted for almost the entire export (96%) of 
the province and some 28% of the national export value at the same time. 
Along with the remarkable economic growth, the industrial structure of the PRD has 
been changed in favor of industries with higher value added, such as information and 
communication technology, electronic machinery and equipment, electronics and 
transportation equipment (see Figure 1.3). During the 1980s, the PRD mainly relied on light 
and traditional manufacturing industries to kick-start industrialization such as the textile, 
apparel, footwear, toy or electronics industries. Since 1990s, three key industries showed the 
tendency of regional restructuring and sectoral upgrading. As the cornerstone of the regional 
economy, the electronics industry (including electronics product, ICT and electronic 
machinery) became more dominant over time. Its regional share grew continuously from 22% 
in 1991 to 38% in 2009. Meanwhile, the influence of traditional industries (textile and apparel) 
was reducing. Their regional shares of industrial output decreased from 13% in 1991 to 5% in 
2009. In contrast to this decline, the transport equipment industry achieved the most 
significant growth from 2.8% in 1991 to 7% in 2009. The growth of this industry was mainly 
contributed by the rise of the automotive industry through specific national support (see 
details in Chapter 8). Apart from these three major industries, some new- or high-tech 
industries were emerging in the region as well, such as aerospace, biomedical, nuclear-power 
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analytical toolkits in the previous literature of economic geography are insufficient to explain 
the dynamics in the PRD. The PRD does not own promising regional/relational assets which 
have sustained industrial upgrading and growth in developed regions, such as thick 
institutional networks (Amin and Thrift, 1994), abundant associational economies (Cooke and 
Morgan, 1998), strong untraded interdependencies (Storper, 1997b), regional innovation 
systems (Cooke et al., 1997; Scott, 1998) or regional learning networks (Hassink, 2005; 
Hudson, 1999; Morgan, 1997).  
What then are the regional assets that the PRD’s firms utilize in their pursuit of 
upgrading? What would the local upgrading trajectories be? Compared with Asian NIEs 
which went through rapid industrialization in an earlier stage (Beeson, 2004; White, 1988), 
will the PRD case offer a different story or new theoretical insights in terms of upgrading 
studies? Bearing these questions in mind, this thesis considers the PRD as an appropriate case. 
The region deserves more scrutiny of its upgrading beyond rapid industrial growth. 
1.5 Thesis structure 
The thesis is organized into 9 chapters. This chapter has provided an overview of the 
research questions, objectives and the intellectual contexts of the thesis. The empirical field 
has also been introduced. Chapter 2 critically reviews the multi-disciplinary base of literature 
on industrial upgrading, including economic geography, economic sociology, industrial 
economics, development studies and business studies. This effort situates this study in a solid 
ground for answering a question that why is this study of the geography of industrial 
upgrading needed and what we have not known yet. 
Chapter 3 proceeds with an analytical framework drawing upon an analytical perspective 
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in relational economic geography, specifically related to the GPN studies. Based on this 
framework, I elaborate on the formation, typology and power dynamics of strategic coupling 
and how the variety of coupling produces the dynamics outcomes of upgrading. Chapter 4 
lays out the methodology that has guided the operationalization of this study. After a brief 
justification of methodological commitment, I introduce the contexts of conducting 
fieldworks in China and the PRD and then detail methods and the implementation, including 
data collection, research sampling, a questionnaire survey, interviews and participation 
observation. In this study, I conducted 110 interviews and received 69 sets of completed 
questionnaires. A discussion of research ethics is provided at the end of this chapter. 
As the first empirical chapter, Chapter 5 examines the extent of industrial upgrading and 
the formation and transformation of strategic coupling in the PRD. This work shows how 
huge knowledge gaps and highly asymmetrical power relations form captive coupling in the 
1980s. Since 1980s, the PRD has started to move away from captive coupling. This tendency 
is illustrated by the divergent performances of key actors, changing trading partners, the 
fading role of Hong Kong firms and emerging new regional assets in the PRD. During this 
process, various types of coupling are developed or reinforced. Even decoupling has emerged 
in a few cases. 
The main empirical analyses of this thesis are developed in Chapters 6, 7 and 8 which 
delineate different scenarios of strategic coupling and the corresponding outcomes of 
upgrading. These empirical chapters examine three key industries that represent regional 
industrial change: electronics, apparel and automotive (see section 1.4). The constellation of 
these industries demonstrates upgrading through different industrial specificities in terms of 
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knowledge complexity (from low to high), industrial organizations (from simple to 
sophisticated) and governance types (from relational to modular). 
Chapter 6 is about the electronics industry in which local firms and TNCs constitute to 
the main story. The chapter begins with a discussion of the global industrial tendency and the 
features of modular governance in the electronic industry. The central analysis rests in the 
formation and retention of captive coupling in this industry. This phenomenon is explained by 
the knowledge gaps, strategies and power relations between foreign firms and local firms 
under the modular governance. By demonstrating three case studies, this chapter shows 
various local upgrading strategies in captive coupling and the potential formation of 
cooperative coupling. 
While captive coupling is reinforced in the electronics industry, Chapter 7 delineates an 
impressive scenario of local upgrading in the apparel industry. The analytical focus is placed 
on how local firms manage to move away from captive coupling to cooperative coupling. 
Two industrialized towns and two local firms are used to illustrate this upgrading trajectory. It 
further explains why changing power relations and synergy within cooperative coupling is the 
key to understand local upgrading trajectories that constitutes the ‘changing rules of the 
game’. 
Different from previous two chapters, Chapter 8 tackles the automotive industry in 
which firm-state relationships are the primary determinant of industrial upgrading. These 
firm-state relationships are essential to the formation of reciprocal coupling. By interpreting 
the current debate, this chapter examines the role of state power and corporate power in the 
automotive industry. It shows how reciprocal coupling is formed in the automotive industry in 
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the PRD based on the interplay among strong interventions from Chinese central state, 
pro-active SOEs and global lead firms (automakers). Drawing upon a comparative study 
between two joint ventures, this chapter demonstrates how synergy is better developed within 
a balanced power relation and how it influences local upgrading within the joint ventures and 
their regional supply networks. 
As a conclusion, Chapter 9 provides a heuristic summary of key findings, theoretical 
contributions and policy implications of this study. A self-assessment points out the main 




Chapter 2 Towards the geography of industrial upgrading? A 
critical review 
 
There is a gap [in the studies of industrial upgrading] as many of us have seen. But in 
what ways and to what extent does geography matter? We are still not clear about it 
(Timothy Sturgeon1, on 1 Dec 2011). 
2.1 Introduction 
Since decades ago, mainstream economic geographers have devoted tremendous efforts 
to investigate regional development in relation to (dis)industrialization, global industrial shift, 
agglomeration and production organization, as well as recent research focuses such as 
institutional influences, clustering, innovation and networked regional economies. However, 
these studies have yet to place the issue of industrial upgrading as the central analytical 
concern. To a large extent, industrial upgrading is treated as equal to a process of industrial 
growth or development without its distinct economic-geographical features. 
In the era of globalization, to a late-comer, attracting foreign investments or 
export-oriented industrialization has become a well-known pathway of promoting regional 
economic development. Particularly in East Asia, these strategies have been adopted and 
significantly boosted regional industrial growth since the second half of the 20th century 
(Clark and Kim, 1995; Gereffi, 1999; Hobday, 2001; Webber, 1994). However, when a 
latecomer region has achieved substantial industrial growth, whether industrial upgrading is 
accompanied is in question. On the one hand, the prosperity of regional economy as a whole 
                                                              
1 Currently as a senior research affiliate in the Industrial Performance Center of the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology, Timothy Sturgeon is one of the leading scholars in the studies of industrial upgrading. This 
comment was made during the workshop on Value Chains, Production Networks, and the Geographies of 
Development in Singapore, December 2011. 
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does not guarantee benefits for all stakeholders. Local firms may not be able to catch up with 
transnational corporations (TNCs) and hence can only earn marginal profits. TNCs capture 
and distribute most of the value created within the region. Under this shallow forms of 
industrial growth and global integration, local firms in latecomers regions may be stuck in 
low value-added and undifferentiated manufacturing works (see critiques in Dicken, 2007; 
Steinfeld, 2004). If the firm fails to upgrade, it will be technologically and organizationally 
marginalized at a truncated position within GPNs. Sooner or later, it will be replaced by other 
low-cost producers. In this sense, examining the progress of late-comers (local) upgrading is a 
critical issue. How does industrial upgrading, particularly local (firm) upgrading, happen? 
What are the geographical conditions that may facilitate or hinder the process of local 
upgrading? Economic geographers have yet to answer these questions. 
This chapter provides a critical assessment of the contemporary literature on industrial 
upgrading. It covers a multi-disciplinary base, including economic geography, economic 
sociology, industrial economics and development studies. The assessment is organized into 
two sections according to geographical and non-geographical studies. The next section 
reviews geographical studies. It shows how geographers have implicitly tackled different 
dimensions of industrial upgrading and the missing links. The third section focuses on 
non-geographical studies including two main strands of literature (1) the GVC approach; (2) 
latecomer economies in development studies. These studies have been the mainstream of 
contemporary upgrading research for almost two decades. A thematic summary of these two 
sections is showed in Table 2.1. Critical assessments are developed for each of the two 
sections in which important missing links are identified. This chapter ends with a discussion 
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of the ways in which a synthesis of both geography and other discipline can shed light on the 
study of industrial upgrading. 
Table 2.1 Research Themes and Insights in Studies of Industrial Upgrading 
Research 
themes 




 Allan Scott 
 Ash Amin 
 Doreen Massey 
 Eric Schoenberger 
 Gorden Clark 
 Meric Gertler 
 Michael Storper 
 Ray Hudson 
 Richard Walker 
 Imperatives of capitalism 
 Spatial fixes and 
accumulation 
 Industrial reallocation 
 Spatial division of labor 
 New industrial space, 
Neo-Marshallian nodes 
 Flexible/Lean / Post-Fordism 
production system 
 Industrial restructuring cost  
 Internationalization of firms 
 Incentives of 
capitalists 
 Structural forces of 
upgrading 
 Patterns of global 
shifts 
 Industrialization as 





 Allan Scott 
 Anders Malmberg 
 Ash Amin 
 Nigel Thrift 
 Michael Storper 
 Phil Cooke 
 Peter Dicken 
 Peter Maskell 
 Richard Florida 
 Ron Boschma 
 Ron Morgan 
 Embeddedness 
 Pro-active states & 
associational economies 
 Relational assents 
 Institutional thickness 
 Learning regions & collective 
learning 
 Regional innovation system 
 Untraded interdependency 
 Economies of agglomeration 
& clustering 
 Horizontal production 
networks 




 the embeddedness 
of firms 
 Synthesis of cluster 








 AnnaLee Saxenian 
 Harald Bathelt 
 Henry Yeung 
 Nebahat Tokatli 
 Neil Coe 
 Peter Dicken 
 Philips Kelly 
 Ron Boschma 
 Formation and dynamics of 
global production networks 
 Strategic coupling 
 Network and scale of 
innovation 
 Pro-active states & 
transnational corporations 
 Home-base advantages of 
local firms the global 
economy 
 Global integration 
of regional 
economies 
 Upgrading as a 
form of network 
restructuring 
 Reposition through 
upgrading 





 Alice Amsden 
 Bengt-Åke Lundvall
 Chalmers Johnson 
 Flying geese paradigm 
 Sequences of domestic 
industrial upgrading; 
 Bargaining power 
of states; 
 National strategies 
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economy  Christopher Freeman 
 Gordon White 
 Kaname Akamatsu 
 Shigehisa Kasahara 
 Terutomo Ozawa 
 Export-oriented 
industrialization 
 Roles of developmental states
 Firm-state relations 
 National innovation system 
of upgrading 
 Networks and 




 Gary Gereffi 
 Hubert Schmitz 
 Jennifer Bair 
 John Humphrey 
 Khalid Nadvi 
 Peter Gibbon  
 Rapheal Kaplinsky 
 Stafano Ponte 
 Timothy Sturgeon 
 Commodity chain/Global 
Value Chain 
 Value chain governance 
 industrial standard 
governance 
 Asymmetrical power 
relations in value chains  
 Collective efficiency and 
joint action  










 Upgrading as a 
governance issue 






 Carlo Pietrobelli 
 Dieter Ernst 
 Elisa Giuliani 
 Hubert Schmitz 
 John Humphrey 
 Michael Hobday 
 Michael Porter  
 Roberta Rabellotti 
 Industrial specificity of 
upgrading 
 Local resistance to 
governance 
 Latecomer strategies 
 Catching-up politics for 
developing economies  
 Industrial policy and regional 
politics 
 Competitiveness of clustering
 Global governance 
and local resistance 
 Protectionism for 
domestic upgrading
 Local strategies for 
upgrading 
Source: author’s summary. 
2.2 Industrial change and regional development 
In the geographical literature, the issue of industrial upgrading is normally subsumed in a 
wide range of work related to global industrial restructuring and the changing geographies of 
production (see a series of reviews in Bathelt, 2003; Bathelt, 2005, 2006; Reimer, 2007; 
Yeung, 2000, 2001, 2002b). This section reviews this strand of literature including: the new 
spatial division of labor, global industrial relocation, capitalist imperatives, debates about 
flexibility, the new regionalism, clustering economy, and learning/innovation in production 
networks. Industrial upgrading is implicitly addressed in these studies, such as adopting new 
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organization forms or production modes; developing new technologies or products; as well as 
functional restructuring in the forms of vertical integration or specialization. 
2.2.1 Industrial change and capitalist’s imperatives 
Earlier works on industrial change in regional development were focusing on 
deindustrialization in developed regions. Capitalists’ imperatives and capital-labor relations 
were considered as driving forces in shaping the spatial reorganization of production in which 
firms exploited maximum usage of their labor with lower costs among various regions 
(Harvey, 1982; Hudson, 1988; Massey, 1979, 1995).  
By investigating the spatial restructuring of British regional economies in the 1960s, 
Massey (1979, 1995) argued that this relocation did not result from regional industrial policies, 
but from the locational behaviors of capitalists. The behaviors changed as a response to 
geographical inequality in different conditions of production. Rounds of industrial changes 
constructed an uneven economic landscape so as to sustain industrial growth. This view was 
considered as a Marxist view in contrast to the neo-classical industrial location theory. It 
explained the new spatial division of labor by three conditions (Dicken, 1976; Frobel et al., 
1980; Hudson, 1988). First, inexhaustible disposable labor became available in South/East 
Europe and other developing countries. Second, the standardization of technologies enabled 
production disintegration in which less sophisticated segments were separated from the core 
manufacturing activities. Third, the available of modern transport and communication 
technologies enabled the dispersion of production segments among distant places at a global 
scale. In Harvey (1982)’s account, this process was driven by the imperative of accumulation 
(e.g. decreasing profits) through two forms of spatial fixes: new investments in the built 
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environment (temporal deferral) and new investment in new production sites (spatial 
displacement). In these studies, industrial growth was related to the changing capitalists’ 
imperatives as a renewal process of accumulation regimes. These production regimes were no 
longer constrained within an isolated place with endowed technical, organizational and cost 
factors, but evolved into a networked spatial organization operating in different regions. 
Storper and Walker (1989) also attributed the underlying forces of industrial 
transformation to the capitalist’s imperatives and the rise of new industries, new products or 
new production skills. Radical technological upgrading served as breaking points which led to 
a series of periodic industrial shifts in the centers of industrial growth, such as the shift from 
UK to the United States, from West Europe to East and South Europe, or the shift from the 
Northeast to the Southwest of the United States. These industrial changes embodied a sense of 
upgrading referring to the improvement of “capacity to control the pattern of economic events 
but that these events represent opportunities to restructure the inherited system of production” 
(Clark and Kim, 1993:1). 
In general, studies of industrial changes in economic geography shared a common 
understanding that the capitalist imperatives played a dominant role at a global scale. 
Considered as a Marxist view, the imperatives of industrial change were mainly tied to 
organizational skills for the control of labor and the profit-seeking nature of capitalists. This 
view was revisited in recent studies about Thailand’s economic recovery (Glassman, 2001, 
2007). In the case of Thailand, the renewal of spatial fixes (industrial restructuring and asset 
reinvestments) was driven by the capitalist logic of accumulation based on a combination of 
home-country and host-country contexts. 
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Although the Marxist approach has articulated the capitalist imperative in driving 
industrial change, it tended to hold an essentialist view on the fundamental conflict of 
capitalism, and focused more on global or structural forces without recognizing forces at 
other geographical scales (Jessop et al., 2008). As Storper (2001:158) argued, “[t]he strong 
point of Marxism is that it considers capitalism as a system…But this has also become its 
greatest limitation: it has never been able to go beyond large-scale descriptions to 
cause-and-effect analyses of the detailed internal dynamics and processes of capitalism…[and 
never] being able to analyze the real margins of variation which are possible within the 
system”. 
2.2.2 Adopting new production organizations: the ‘flexibility’ debate 
Along with the ebb tide of Marxist geography in the late 1980s and the early 1990s, 
economic geographers gradually turned to focus on diverse industrial shifts and the changing 
organization of production at the global scale. New patterns of production organization 
emerged, such as the ‘flexible production’ or the lean production system, to replace mass 
production hitherto known as ‘Fordism’ in the contemporary world economy (Amin and 
Thrift, 1992; Gertler, 1988; Schoenberger, 1988; Scott, 1988a, b; Walker, 1988). Proponents 
in this strand of literature emphasized the improvement of efficiency by upgrading production 
systems in a more flexible manner. But the opponents argued that this type of systematic 
upgrading would have negative impacts to the stability of production and labor management, 
thus reducing efficiency (Gertler, 1988). The shared understanding in this debate was that 
networked forms of production organization were becoming prevalent and replaced the 
traditional production modes of Fordism and Taylorism. This shift can be considered as 
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process upgrading in Schmitz’s (2002b) account. 
One of the well-known studies was the case of ‘Third Italy’ where a large group of small 
and medium-size enterprises (SMEs) agglomerated and developed dense horizontal 
production relations in the pursuit of flexile specialization (Piore and Sabel, 1984). The 
prosperity of Third Italy was considered as the ‘second industrial divide’ that represented an 
episodic upgrading of industrial system from mass production to flexible specialization, in 
contrast to the previous ‘first’ industrial divide that referred to the shift from craft production 
to mass production since the 1900s. Based on the study of Silicon Valley, Scott (1988b) added 
further weight to the heated debate on flexible production as new industrial spaces in which 
high-tech enterprises agglomerated and specialized in certain component production for lower 
transaction costs and better interactive learning. Firms in the information and communication 
technology (ICT) industries were the main forces in constructing this kind of new industrial 
spaces. The automotive industry was also revealed as another representative industry adopting 
this change (Hudson, 1994, 1997; Schoenberger, 1987). Many automotive manufacturers in 
North America and Eastern/Western Europe upgraded their production systems by adopting 
the ‘just-in-time’ production or the ‘lean’ production system which was derived from Japanese 
automotive assemblers such that Toyota and Honda.  
During adopting the flexible production system, firms also improved their managerial 
skills to cope with new systems (Gertler, 1993). Experiences from industries in EU regions 
showed that new investments were put into automated production technologies and research 
and development (R&D) for reducing employment and improving efficiency in processing 
materials (Hudson, 1997; Rainnie, 1993). Meanwhile, various rounds of corporate merger and 
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acquisition activities were conducted so that firms could concentrate their governance power 
to control globally decentralized production sites. Scholars also documented this change in 
traditional industries such as the apparel industry (Essletzbichler, 2003; Essletzbichler and 
Rigby, 2001; Park, 1994). Instead of following this shift towards flexible production systems, 
latecomer firms in East Asia mainly relocated mass production to places with lower 
production cost, such as from Japan to South Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan and then China. 
Rather than using labor-saving technologies, these East Asian firms tended to adopt different 
employment strategies such as hiring illegal foreign workers, recruiting part-time workers, 
training highly skilled employees, and substituting labor with automation (Hsu and Chiang, 
2001; Kim, 1993; Leung, 1993; Tsay, 1993). 
In explaining the mechanism of this organizational upgrading, geographers argued that 
the motivation for adopting the ‘flexible’ production system came from the internal limits of 
Fordism due to its fixed-purpose and dedicated machinery system. It also resulted from the 
increasing demands for a quicker response to changing market conditions (Schoenberger, 
1988, 1989). However, being flexible was not the universal solution for all firms, and was 
only suitable in certain industries and regions. In the case of the chemical industry in Teesside, 
North England, Chapman (2005) pointed out flexible specialization was not be a proper 
strategy for the technological improvement of local firms, because they suffered from the 
heave burden of sunk costs through investing in new production lines. Consequent critiques 
also pointed out that successful cases of adopting flexibility actually covered just a small 
range of places, such as South Italy, Silicon Valley and East Europe. Moreover, the flexible 
production model was mainly related to small firms in infant industries (Glasmeier, 1994; 
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Schoenberger, 1989; Storper, 1995). 
Although adopting flexible production has its own limits, geographers have recognized 
the significance of this emerging network form of production organization at both regional 
and global scales. Region was conceptualized as a crucial platform for a new round of vertical 
or horizontal integration among firms with tighter inter-firm relationships and greater 
demands of proximity and trust (Amin and Robins, 1990; Harrison, 1992). Moreover, 
different regions were seen as interconnected, thus generating neo-Mashallian nodes of 
production spaces (Amin and Thrift, 1992). The flexibility debate has indeed shed important 
light on the geography of industrial restructuring by articulating a process of regionalization 
when firms and regions adopt new production system. 
2.2.3 Intra-regional foundations of industrial growth: an institutional perspective 
Since the mid-1990s, geographers’ interests gradually moved from the ‘new industrial 
space’ to institutional factors that facilitated regional development, such as relational assets, 
institutional thickness, associational economies, learning networks, regional innovation 
system and the untraded interdependency of firms (Amin and Thrift, 1994; Cooke et al., 1997; 
Cooke and Morgan, 1998; Florida, 1995; Morgan, 1997; Saxenian, 1994; Storper, 1997b). 
This strand of literature was termed new regionalism in Lovering (1999). The proliferation of 
these studies showed a distinctive shift from the earlier concern with input-output relations 
and transaction costs to non-cost-based factors within a region, such as institutional 
environment/arrangement, inter- or extra- firm networks and state institutions. These factors 
influenced the strategies and behaviors of economic actors due to the ‘embeddedness’ of 
economic actions in political/social/cultural contexts (Dicken and Thrift, 1992; Granovetter, 
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1985; Park, 1996). These institutional factors did not directly increase profits or reduce 
production costs for in situ enterprises, while playing an important role in facilitating learning 
and innovation, fostering collaboration and cultivating mutual trust. In the era of globalization, 
these factors were considered as new assets to sustain regional competiveness (Amin, 1999; 
Barnes and Gertler, 1999; Boschma, 2004; Maskell and Malmberg, 1999a; Storper, 1995).  
There was a wide range of studies recognizing the importance of regionalized inter-firm 
collaboration, networking policies and associational economies since the early 1990s. Many 
of these works were related to the literature of regional innovation systems (Bergman and 
Feser, 2001; Christopherson and Clark, 2007; Cooke, 2008; Cooke et al., 1998; Hobday, 
2008). An effective regional innovation system would be a self-organizing, open system 
which translates ‘exploration' knowledge from inside or outside the system, through 
examining the performance and commercialization of knowledge/technologies (Cooke et al., 
1997). Continuous innovation as well as upgrading thus can be fostered within such a system. 
The components of regional innovation systems include regional production structures and 
supportive knowledge exploitation/generation sub-systems which consist of public/private 
research laboratories, universities and colleges, technology transfer agencies, vocational 
training organizations (Asheim and Coenen, 2005). Apart from governmental agencies and 
organizations, key actors which operationalize these intermediary sub-systems are the so 
called knowledge entrepreneurs. They solve problems or seek solutions, financial engineers 
like venture capitalists, business angels and management accountants, and varieties of 
specialist consultants, incubator and accelerator managers, even well-functioning knowledge 
transfer offices in universities (Kenney, 2000). 
37 
 
Scholars in this vein considered various ties of proximity, mutual interaction, and 
associational economies as the positive channels and facilitators of knowledge sharing, 
spillover and learning (Amin, 1999; Boschma and Lambooy, 1999; Cooke, 2008; Martin, 
2000). In the investigation of some developed regions, such as Baden-Württemberg in 
Germany and Emilia-Romagna in Italy, Cooke and Morgan (1993) revealed the network 
relations between firms and public or quasi-public intermediary agencies had contributed to 
substantial regional economic growth. Cooke and Morgan (1998) further explained that 
pro-active associational economies were the key actors in cultivating inter-firm cooperation, 
public-private networks, and public welfare (e.g. education or infrastructures) which 
contributed to regional prosperity. Based on the cases of regional development in EU and 
Wales, scholars pointed to the important role of pro-active regional institutions in transferring 
micro-level innovation into meso-level innovation, underpinning the so called ‘learning 
regions’ (Florida, 1995; Hassink, 2005; Hudson, 1997; Hudson, 1999; Morgan, 1997). 
In contrast to looking at specific institutional arrangements, another group of studies 
conceptualized the importance of the ‘untraded interdependencies’ (Scott and Storper, 2003; 
Storper, 1995, 1997b). This concept served as a critique of the previous flexibility debate that 
focused only on trade-based relations and transaction costs. Examining regions in 
Emilia-Romagna, Tuscany, Veneto and Marches in Italy; Silicon Valley, Orange County and 
Hollywood in the United States, Stoper (1997) argued that regions has become a nexus of 
untraded interdependencies in global capitalism. In those regions, conventions of production 
were developed to reduce uncertainty, to facilitate technological upgrading and to foster 
innovation. The case of British Motorsport Valley provided a vivid example of the benefits of 
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untraded interdependency existing among hundreds of small firms within a radius of 50 miles 
area (Henry et al., 1996; Pinch and Henry, 1999).  
Geographers further focused on clusters and innovation since the late 1990s. In these 
studies, cognitive and cultural approaches were applied to unpack the pattern of learning, 
knowledge diffusion and innovation within regions (Malmberg and Maskell, 1999, 2002, 
2006; Maskell, 2001; Maskell and Malmberg, 1999b, 2007; Scott, 2006; Todtling and Trippl, 
2004). The analytical origin of these studies derived from an evolutionary approach and a 
resource-based view of firms in institutional economics (Barney, 1991; Nelson, 1994; Nelson 
and Winter, 1982). According to these studies, “sustainable competitiveness of firms and 
regions is built on specialized learning capabilities and continuous upgrading of an existing 
knowledge base” (Maskell and Malmberg, 1999b:181). 
Examining industrial clusters in fifty largest metropolitan regions in North America, 
Florida (2002) demonstrated a positive relation between the spatial clustering of diverse 
industries and the outputs of innovation. The cases of Silicon Valley and Hollywood in the US 
illustrated how successful clusters were sustained by intensive interactive learning activities 
within localized business networks (Scott, 1998, 2005). Trippl and Otto (2009) investigated 
the restructuring process of old clusters in Styria and Saarland, and pointed out that 
knowledge-intensive-oriented adjustment was one of the most effective ways to vitalize 
clusters. In Cambridge’s biotechnology cluster, firm-university relations became vital because 
they fostered technological upgrading and commercialization within the cluster (Casper and 
Karamanos, 2003). In Italian textiles and clothing clusters, Dunford (2006) identified a 
‘magic circle’ of mutual learning and innovation. The circle was formed by a large group of 
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interdependent clusters surrounding Milan as the center where knowledge about technologies 
and managerial skills were highly circulated. Channels of knowledge diffusion could be 
frequent staff turnover, shared suppliers, informal collaboration (e.g. collective discussion), 
industrial gossip and trackside observation. 
In sum, the analytical focus of cluster studies rested in the articulation of various types of 
learning mechanisms, such as interactive innovation, diffusion of tacit knowledge, 
face-to-face communication and knowledge spillover derived from the economies of 
agglomeration and the localization of learning activities (Boschma, 2004; Hudson, 1999; 
Maskell et al., 2006; Maskell and Malmberg, 2007; Scott, 1998; Scott and Storper, 2003). A 
basic typology of knowledge channels is summarized according to formal/traded and 
informal/untraded relations (see Table 2.2).  
 
Table 2.2 Types of linkages to external sources of knowledge and partners 
Source: Figure 2 in Trippl et al. (2009:448). 
 
Indeed, the ‘new regionalism’ approach has demonstrated a solid account of 
intra-regional factors that sustain regional industrial growth. But this approach has two 




• contract research 
• consulting 
• licenses 
• buying intermediate goods 
 
Formal networks 
• R&D collaborations 




• recruiting specialists 
• monitoring competitors 
• participating in fairs, 
conferences 
•reading scientific literature, 
patent specifications 
Informal networks 
• informal contacts 
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fundamental limits. On the one hand, it tends to be inward-looking and treats region as an 
analytical entity, thus neglecting exogenous forces beyond regions (see detail critiques in 
Lovering, 1999; MacKinnon et al., 2002). On the other hand, the causality between 
institutional influences and regional growth is still unclear. Dense institutional environment 
does not necessarily lead to better performance of firms. Over institutionalized environment 
may produce lock-in effects to reduce the competitiveness of firms over time (Grabher, 1993). 
2.2.4 (Global) Networks of production and innovation 
While the institutional approach holds a more intra-regional perspective, some 
geographers have highlighted the role of exogenous forces in shaping regional industrial 
development and upgrading. In line with development studies, geographers have devoted 
substantial efforts to documenting the rise of many latecomer regions that have benefited 
from their integration into the global economy (Clark and Kim, 1993, 1995; Huchet, 1997; Sit 
and Yang, 1997; Yeung.G, 2001; Young and Lan, 1997). Since the 2000s, drawing upon a 
network approach, economic geographers have further refined their analytical focuses on the 
mechanisms of global integration in terms of global-local relations, network structure and the 
embeddedness of firm networks (Bathelt et al., 2004; Boschma and Wal., 2007; Bunnell and 
Coe, 2001; Coe et al., 2008b; Dicken et al., 2001; Henderson et al., 2002; Hsu et al., 2008; 
Todtling and Trippl, 2005). Scholars in this vein have argued for two propositions. First, the 
global economy is contributed by TNCs embedded in GPNs which integrate different regions 
at a global scale. Hence, plugging into GPNs is a necessary step for a region to achieve 
continuous and substantial industrial growth (Coe et al., 2004). Knowledge diffuses within 
production networks, rather than circulates within a region. Second, local factors (e.g. 
41 
 
economic, social or political) can play a significant role in facilitating the integration process, 
while stronger regional capacities would benefit more from the integration (Amin and 
Cohendet, 1999; Fan, 2011). 
The propositions above have been partly verified based on the experiences in East Asian 
regional development. In the case of Hsinchu Science-based Industrial Park in Taiwan, it kept 
upgrading with technological edges based on the efforts of an international technological 
community. Comprising Taiwanese business elites and overseas returnees, this technological 
community has provided a flexible and responsive channel for long-distance knowledge 
transfer between Taiwan and Silicon Valley (Hsu, 2004; Hsu et al., 2008; Saxenian, 2002; 
Saxenian and Hsu, 2001). In other industrial parks in Taiwan, Tainan and Taichung industrial 
parks, significant industrial upgrading was sustained by intensive technological transfer from 
Japanese electronics lead firms to Taiwanese partners/manufacturers within the same GPNs in 
the LCD and machinery industries (Yang et al., 2009).  
A nuance contribution was made by Coe et al. (2004) which conceptualized the 
integration between latecomer regions and the global economy as a process of strategic 
coupling. Drawing upon the automobile industry in Thailand, the authors illustrated how local 
firms achieved substantial growth and upgrading by plugging with the GPN coordinated by 
BMW in German. Yeung (2009a) provided a heuristic account towards different approaches 
of strategic coupling among East Asian latecomer regions including: the Yangzi River Delta 
and the PRD in China; Seoul and Gyeonggi-do areas in South Korean; Taipei-Hsinchu area in 
Taiwan; Penang, Selangor and Johor regions in Malaysia; Bangkok and Eastern region in 
Thailand. Through the process of strategic coupling, local firms in these regions gained access 
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to advanced technology and market resources embedded in various GPNs. Some local firms 
in these regions even upgraded into new lead firms (Yeung, 2007a). In China, similar cases 
studies were also conducted in such diverse industries (the automotive, ICT and textile 
industries) among different cities, such as, Beijing, Shanghai, Wenzhou, Suzhou and 
Dongguan (Depner and Bathelt, 2005; Liu and Dicken, 2006; Wei et al., 2007; Wei et al., 
2009a; Yang, 2007). 
Although local firms received significant growth among these latecomer regions, 
geographers also critically pointed out the potential of shallow upgrading, because the 
channels of knowledge diffusion were mainly controlled by global lead firms. They tended to 
develop certain technological enclaves (Wang and Lin, 2008; Wang and Lee, 2007); or 
exclusively transferred technologies through backward-linkages which connected with their 
home countries, rather than the host countries (Xiao and He, 2010; Yang and Liao, 2009). To 
overcome these problems, strong local initiatives and home-base advantages were suggested 
as a complement, such as state efforts, low R&D costs or local cultural and social advantages 
(Wei, 2002, 2010; Yeung, 2007a; Zhou, 2008b; Zhou and Tong, 2003). In Turkey’s apparel 
industry, geographers identified another strategies specific to industrial upgrading: plugging 
into different GPNs and exploiting less-regulated markets by trading ‘imperfect products’ 
(Tokatli, 2003, 2007; Tokatli, 2008; Tokatli and Kizilgun, 2004). This strategy enabled 
Turkish firms to earn sufficient profits and critical time for knowledge accumulation. They 




2.2.5 Critical assessments: where is the geography of industrial upgrading? 
This section has so far reviewed sequentially four strands of literature that are considered 
as relevant studies of industrial upgrading. Although they have different limitations, their 
common problem is that the geography of industrial upgrading is unclear or implicit. As 
stated in Chapter 1, geography here does not mean the spatial structure of industrial upgrading, 
but refers to the ongoing process in which actors strategize and implement industrial 
upgrading in a locality with specific economic, institutional, and spatial contexts. On the one 
hand, industrial upgrading has not been well studied yet in mainstream economic geography. 
By and large, industrial upgrading is treated synonymous as industrial growth, learning or 
innovation, while some of it distinctive features, such as conducting high-value added 
activities or diversifying corporate functions through organizational learning, are neglected. 
On the other hand, the analytical perspectives of earlier studies tend to rest at a single spatial 
scale, either global or regional, while lacks a multi-scalar perspective for investigating how 
actors from different scales implement the strategies of upgrading in a latecomer region.  
In a globalization era, industrial upgrading has become an increasingly critical issue, 
particularly for latecomer regions and firms. However, the prosperity of a latecomer region 
does not guarantee benefits for all stakeholders. Although a latecomer region can achieve 
substantial industrial growth through export-oriented industrialization, this major growth may 
be contributed by TNCs at the same time when local firms are further marginalized. Even 
though local firms manage to experience significant industrial growth, the overall 
achievement may still be shallow. Local firms may focus narrowly in low value-added 
segments that produce undifferentiated products based on labor-intensive modes of 
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production. In other words, though local firms actively participate in value creation, they may 
be excluded from much of the value distribution and capture. Even worse, firms may be 
technologically and organizationally locked into a peripheral position within a particular GPN. 
In this circumstance, local firms are highly uncompetitive and powerless. They will be easily 
replaced by the subsequent relocation of TNCs, the discrimination of policy makers or the rise 
of other low-cost producers. Therefore, industrial upgrading can serve as a useful lens for 
investigating the detail mechanisms of regional development and the evolutionary dynamics 
of the global economy. However, situated in such a context of globalizing regional 
development, the analytical insights and toolkits in the existing geographical literature are 
insufficient to explain the dynamics of industrial upgrading. 
The literature on capitalist industrial change and the flexibility debate renders a sense of 
systematic imperatives to industrial growth in terms of profit-seeking accumulation regime 
and production efficiency. Whenever a region is losing competitiveness, the solution would be 
either relocation, or adopting flexible production. But these interpretations are too narrow for 
explaining the varieties of industrial development in today’s global economy. In the literature 
on new regionalism and industrial clusters, scholars either praise positive institutional factors 
or attribute the failure of regional economic growth to institutional lock-in. These 
intra-regional factors are related to learning or innovation and have not examined upgrading 
activities per se. Moreover, many of these East Asian regions do not develop similar kinds of 
institutional thickness, associational economies, strong untraded interdependencies and 
regional innovation systems. In those regions, there is a relative absence of substantial 
relational assets and learning regions capable of generating indigenous technologies and 
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innovation (Yeung, 2009a). Therefore, the distinctive contexts of Asian regions further 
legitimize the necessity of studying industrial upgrading. 
In the past decades, the analytical focus on regional industrial change has gradually 
shifted from a global level to a meso level (regional, industrial); from the societal structure to 
the local institutional conditions of networked economies. But these studies tended to explain 
industrial change through the imperatives of capitalists and the need of adopting new 
production organization. Many other influential factors were absent in their analyses, such as 
proactive state institutions and institutional environment. In the literature on new regionalism, 
scholars tended to focus on the meso-level analysis in which most of their attentions were 
rested in many institutional factors in terms institutional environment and arrangement. An 
actor-less view tended to be developed in which some basic features and practices of firms 
were omitted, such as strategies and performance and. This actor-less view also overlook the 
dark sides of networking which may generate conflict, tension, misinterpretation or distrust in 
an over-socialized region (Grabher, 2006; Lowe, 2009). 
As a complement to previous studies and premised on a network approach, the GPN 
studies develop a more balanced analytical framework which recognizes multi-scalar force in 
shaping regional development. One key contribution of this approach is the conceptualization 
of strategic coupling as a crucial mechanism to explain the globalizing process of latecomer 
regions. The GPN framework captures the changing pattern of global integration and shows 
the value of actor specificity in conducting economic geographical research. However, this 
approach has yet to place the topic of industrial upgrading as their central analytical focus. A 
latecomer region can achieve substantial industrial growth by taking industrial opportunities 
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provided by lead firms within GPNs. But how and why will local upgrading happen? Will 
different types of coupling produce a different outcome of upgrading? What are the 
geographical conditions that may facilitate or hinder the process of local upgrading? 
Economic geographers have yet to provide answers to these questions. Particularly, at a 
micro-level analysis, the typology of upgrading and the strategies of local firms in upgrading 
have not been well examined (I detail the critique and conceptualize of strategic coupling in 
Chapter Three). 
In sum, the issue of industrial upgrading is seldom examined directly in the existing 
geographical studies. While the geography of industrial upgrading remains unclear, scholars 
outside geography have devoted remarkable efforts in revealing the mechanisms of industrial 
upgrading. 
2.3 The latecomer economy: mechanisms, governance and politics of industrial 
upgrading 
In non-geographical studies, there are plenty of sound works about industrial upgrading 
among the disciplines of economic sociology, institutional economics and other development 
studies (see table 2.1). The first part of this section reviews main theories tackling the divers 
of latecomer economy pertinent to upgrading, including the ‘flying geese’ (FG) paradigm, the 
developmental state literature, the national innovation system (NIS) literature. These three 
theories are considered as state-centric approaches. I then present a firm-centric approach in 
the GVC literature. It is probably the most influential field in the contemporary studies of 
upgrading. While the first two sections illustrate the role of more powerful actors (nation 
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states and global lead firms), the penultimate part of this section reviews the upgrading of less 
powerful actors (local firms or suppliers). Overall, these studies articulate the mechanisms of 
upgrading in terms of incentives, strategies, driven forces, typologies, trajectories, barriers, 
governance and politics. 
2.3.1 The drivers of national upgrading: the state-centric approaches 
The upgrading of global lead firms is mainly related to the literature of innovation. My 
specific attention of this thesis is on the upgrading of latecomer economy, rather the global 
economy as a whole. The common thread of the FG, developmental state, and NIS literature 
is that nation states can be pro-active actors in stimulating domestic industrial upgrading 
through direct intervention or providing institutional supports. The key is to facilitate 
knowledge sharing, diffusion and reproduction. However, they either over emphasize the 
effectiveness of state capacity, and regard states as the key actors while not firms in private 
section during the process of upgrading. 
As many latecomer regions have acquired unprecedented degree of openness and 
growth, such as the ones in East Asia, firms and states in those regions find themselves are 
competing in a common platform but under unequal terms. The latecomer economy thus 
bears a special meaning in the era of globalization not as just simple as economic 
development (Storper et al., 1998). Plenty of studies have been devoted to identify 
nation-states as a key driver to industrial upgrading in East Asia. The FG paradigm was a 
much earlier influential work developed in the 1930s and popularized in the 1960s 
(Akamatsu, 1961; Kasahara, 2004; Ozawa, 2002, 2005). The first generation of FG 
paradigm concerned the state-led industrial development as a process of moving from import 
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substitution to export orientation. The second generation of FG paradigm proposed an 
industrial sequence of upgrading on the basis of shifting comparative advantages under 
strong state intervention.  
Akamatsu’s (1961) FG paradigm was considered as the third version of FG that 
identified the international division of labor in East Asia as an unbalanced growth model. 
This model was “aligned successively behind the advanced industrial nations according to 
their different stages of growth” (Ozawa, 2005:9). The postulated logic was that the 
production of commoditized goods would continuously move from the more advanced 
countries to the less advanced ones. Ozawa (2002, 2005) updated the FG model into an 
industrial-specific sequential development in the forms of various spatial clustering among 
Asian countries (see Figure 2.1). In Ozawa’s account (2005:28), the latecomer upgrading 
was an outcome of “incessant learning which has been made possible in terms of crafting 
economic policies and pre-arranging the requisite institutions designed to make the best use 
of the prevailing politico-economic conditions both at home and overseas at each stage of 
catch-up”. However, the FG paradigm tended to hold an over-optimistic view to the 
upgrading of the East Asian late-comers. It predicted that Japan would continuously be the 
leading economic power in East Asia dominating the sequence of industrial upgrading in 
other Asian countries. It neglected influences from other forces, such as various regionalized 
forces based on class-divided systems (Hart-Landsberg and Burkett, 1998). Moreover, the 
mechanism of technological transfer in the FG paradigm was over simplified as a process of 




Figure 2.1 Sequences of industrial upgrading in East Asian NIEs 
 
Source: adapted from Figure 7.1 in Ozawa (2005:141). 
 
Sharing many similarities with the FG paradigm, scholars developed another strand of 
literature termed as a ‘developmental state’ mode of capitalism for explaining the rise of East 
Asia in the late twenty century (Amsden, 1989, 1997; Bagchi, 2000; Huff, 1999; Johnson, 
1982; Wade, 1990; White, 1988). The main characteristics of a developmental state were: 
being a ‘rational planed’ state, autonomous bureaucracy, close firm-state relationships and 
strategic preferential industrial policies. These characteristics were considered as effective 
institutional infrastructures for developmental state institution to achieve domestic upgrading 
against competitive pressure and the external control of TNCs in market-led countries, such 
as the United States. A key prerequisite for fulfilling this upgrading process was the 
existence of a ‘pilot agency’ (Chu, 2002; Douglass, 1994; Huff, 1999; Kohli, 1994). In 
Japan’s context, it was the celebrated Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) 
the main focus in Johnson (1982) and Ozawa (2005). In their explanations, the successful 
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upgrading of Japan highly depended on the consistency of industrial planning in which the 
MITI played the role as both a protector and a promoter. However, the key problem with the 
developmental state approach was that it overemphasized the significance of state capacity 
and close firm-state relations. In fact, these institutional infrastructures might go wrong and 
cause serious negative impacts to domestic economies. Moreover, state supports might be 
limited. They were effective in boosting technological imitation, transfer or diffusion, but 
did not necessarily do better than the private sector in stimulating innovation (Beeson, 2004; 
Ozawa, 2005). 
More recent studies extended analytical scopes from nation-states to a national 
innovation system since the late 1980s and the early 1990s. The NIS literature implied the 
issue of upgrading by articulating interactions and synergy within national production 
systems, industrial complexes and inter-firm networks that shape domestic technological 
innovation and diffusion (Lundvall, 1985, 1992, 2007). This concept was widely diffused 
through the study on the NISs of Japan and South Korea (Freeman, 1987, 1994, 1995). 
Scholars in this vein proposed that state institutions should focus on constructing knowledge 
infrastructures (universities and research institutes) and wider institutional settings including 
the national education systems, labor markets, financial markets, intellectual property rights, 
market regulations and welfare regimes. These factors are deemed as determinant factors to 
the innovation/upgrading capability of states (Lundvall, 2007). Nevertheless, there were 
insufficient empirical evidences to support and legitimate the NIS framework as a system. 
As Ernst (2007) has argued, a NIS is hardly considered as nationally bounded system, while 
it is permeated with each other through the international linkages of knowledge diffusion, 
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particularly upon GPNs. 
2.3.2 A firm-centric approach in studies of global value chain 
In contrast to the state-centric approaches, the GVC approach in economic sociology and 
development studies rests its analytical focus on corporate actors in value chain governance. 
It has become the most influential work in the contemporary studies of industrial upgrading. 
The GVC approach derives from the commodity chain research. A commodity chain was 
originally defined as a network of labor and production process whose end result was a 
finished commodity (Gereffi and Korzeniewicz, 1994a). It was then conceptualized as a 
GVC (Gereffi, 1999; Gibbon, 2001; Kessler, 1999). Based on empirical studies from 
developing countries, the GVC proponents shared similar understandings as below (Bair and 
Gereffi, 2001; Dunn et al., 2006; Gereffi, 1999; Gereffi et al., 2005; Humphrey and Schmitz, 
2002b; Pomerleano and Shaw, 2005; Schmitz, 2004; Staritz et al., 2011; Sturgeon and 
Kawakami, 2011). 
Upgrading is a general nature of firms to secure survival and competitiveness through 
innovation, learning or acquisitions. There are generally four types of firm-level upgrading 
(Humphrey and Schmitz, 2000, 2002a, b; Schmitz, 2004): 
(1) Process upgrading: transforming inputs into outputs more efficiently by 
reorganizing production systems or introducing superior technologies, e.g. installing 
new processing lines or improving processing skills; 
(2) Product upgrading: moving into more sophisticated product lines in terms of 
increased unit values, e.g. making better products, adopting new design, adding new 
component into the products; 
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(3) Functional upgrading: acquiring new, high value-add or superior functions, such as 
from simple processing into full package production, from OEM to ODM/OBM2, or 
adding other functions like design, marketing, management, branding and retailing; 
(4) Sectoral (Chain) upgrading: applying the competence acquired in a particular 
function to move to a new sector which is more skilled, complicated or higher 
value-add, so as to reap the economies of scopes. 
Lead firms, suppliers and the patterns of value chain governance constitute the scenario 
of upgrading in which lead firms play a determinant role with strong bargaining power over 
their suppliers. The bargaining power of lead firms originates from their market and 
technological advantages. Suppliers tend to be less powerful because they are substitutable. 
Suppliers can initiate local joint actions or increase the capability of integrated production in 
order to increase their bargaining power, but these efforts cannot fundamentally reshape the 
asymmetrical power relation. 
To maintain production stability and industrial standards, lead firms would help local 
suppliers in product and process upgrading, but they tend deliberately to block functional 
upgrading because this upgrading will challenge their market positions. In other words, lead 
firms define the content and extent of local upgrading. Hence, by inserting into value chains, 
producers in developing countries can experience fast product and process upgrading. But 
they will make little progress in functional upgrading, while developed country producers 
engage less difficulty in these two kinds of upgrading. 
                                                              




By investigating into how the US lead firms shaped their offshore production networks 
and fostered upgrading in East Asia, studies found a dichotomy pattern of governance known 
as buyer-driven and producer-driven value chains (Gereffi, 1996, 1999). In the apparel 
industry in East Asia, which represented the buyer-driven mode of governance, lead firms 
were the gate keepers of upgrading opportunities. Whether East Asian 
suppliers/subcontractors could upgrade was determined by their abilities to establish close 
linkages with a diverse array of lead firms from the United States and West Europe. Empirical 
studies of Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore supported this argument 
that lead firms were the primary sources of material inputs, capital, technologies and 
managerial knowledge in those chains. The dichotomy between the buyer-driven and 
producer-driven mode of governance was consequently critiqued to be oversimplified in 
understanding the global economy (Gereffi, 2001a; Humphrey and Schmitz, 2001).  
As a response, Gereffi et al. (2005) developed a five-fold governance framework based 
on three variables: complexity of information and knowledge transfer, extent of knowledge 
codification, and supplier capabilities (see Figure 2.2). The various configurations of these 
variables reflect different extent of transaction costs that lead to the formation of five types of 
governance including market, modular, relational, captive and hierarchy. The more are local 
suppliers depended on buyers, the less power will they have in the partnerships with global 
buyers. Vice versa, the more powerful are global buyers, they would be more able to control 





Figure 2.2 Five types of global value chain governance 
 
Source: adapted from Figure 1 in Gerreffi et al. (2005:89). 
 
Based on this topology, the GVC approach highlights the strength of governance power 
in explaining the possibility of upgrading in respective types of chains. In traditional 
industries where technologies are simple and increasingly become standardized and matured, 
like the bicycle, toy, bag, textile and apparel industries, the governance pattern tends to be 
captive, while is changing into relational governance more recently (Bair and Gereffi, 2001, 
2003; Frederick and Gereffi, 2011; Galvin and Morkel, 2001; Gereffi, 1999, 2001b; Gereffi et 
al., 2005; Morris et al., 2011). Lead firms subcontract most of the manufacturing works and 
become global buyers which local suppliers or subcontractors are captive to. This is because 
the most important competitive edges in those industries are no longer production 
technologies, but design, marketing and distribution capabilities. Latecomer upgrading in 
these industries tends to be achieved through learning by doing, organizational acquisition 
and technological assistance from global buyers. The captive governance would be changed 
into relational governance when local suppliers manage to develop strong capabilities of 
integrated production. In this case, local suppliers reduce dependency on a single lead firm, 
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but are still under global industrial governance. Global buyers reinforce the parameters set 
within value chains and extend the parameters as industrial standards for suppliers to follow 
at a global scale (Nadvi, 2008; Nadvi and Wältring, 2004). 
Among industries with highly sophisticated and rapidly changing technologies, such as 
the electronics and other high-tech industries, the governance pattern tends to be modular. 
Due to high technological and capital entry barriers, firms in these industries progressively 
prefer technological modularization and standardization that integrates a customer’s needs for 
direct monitoring and control. Hence lead firms may concentrate on maintaining their 
technological cutting edges by adopting industrial specialization and outsourcing strategies 
simultaneously in fierce market competition (Cattaneo et al., 2010; Gibbon and Ponte, 2008; 
Nadvi and Halder, 2005; Principe and Honday, 2003; Sturgeon and Kawakami, 2011). 
Suppliers tend to develop strong technological competences and become quick followers of 
global lead firms. Otherwise, they would be marginalized into manufacturing peripheral parts 
or products with trivial profits. The recent emergence of platform developers diversifies the 
modular governance at a global scale which provides more upgrading opportunities to 
suppliers, while also increases the risk of technological lock-in (Chesbrough and Kusunoki, 
2001; Sturgeon and Kawakami, 2011). I will further explain this dynamics in section 6.2 in 
Chapter 6. 
In some industries with sophisticated technologies and complex production networks 
such as the automotive industry, upgrading opportunities for suppliers are fewer under the 
captive and modular governance. As the GVC scholars have argued, this is because 
technologies are too complicated to be fully codified; meanwhile transaction costs and asset 
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specificity are also high due to the consolidation of global lead firms (Freyssenet and Lung, 
2000; Gereffi, 2001b; Gereffi et al., 2005; Kaplinsky, 2004; Sturgeon and Biesebroeck, 2011). 
A small group of global auto assemblers play a dominant role in supervising their production 
bases in different clusters at a global scale. Even their key suppliers, which have strong 
technological cutting edges in certain components, are subject to this governance mode. 
2.3.3 Local upgrading in the global economy  
The above two sections review the important role of global lead firms and nation states 
in the process of local upgrading. In contrast to them, there is a growing body of literature 
investigating how local firms (or suppliers) struggle for upgrading through various means. 
Three groups of studies are presented. 
The first group of studies comes from Hobday’s works on the trajectories of latecomer 
upgrading in Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, and other East Asian NIEs 
(Hobday, 1995, 1998, 2001, 2008; Hobday and Perini, 2005; Hobday and Rush, 2007). 
Lessons from East Asian NIEs show some common characteristics. Most of the successful 
cases of upgrading came from the firms which served as ‘quick followers’ of their lead-firm 
counterparts. This view resonated with the GVC literature. Local suppliers did not heavily 
rely on indigenous innovation, but learned and acquired advanced technologies through 
various forms of cooperation with lead firms, such as joint ventures, technological licensing, 
subcontracting and strategic alliance. A general trajectory was summarized in Figure 2.3. 
Latecomers firms are narrowed to occupying simple production segments at the earlier stage. 
Product upgrading was driven by lead firms. Process upgrading tended to come later than 
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clusters and forty firms in seven countries, including Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Peru, Mexico, 
Costa Rica, Giuliani et al. (2005) identified that sectoral specificity had significant influence 
on the content and extent of upgrading (see Table 2.3). Pietrobelli and Rabellotti (2011) 
examined the learning opportunities diffused from GVC to domestic markets and how 
national innovation systems reacted to facilitate this process. Collective action among local 
firms was revealed as an important ways of facilitating local upgrading. 
 
Table 2.3 The sectoral specificity of industrial upgrading 
Industries Types of Upgrading Rationale 
traditional 
manufacturing 
Active product and 
process upgrading; rare 
functional upgrading 
Knowledge circulation within clusters, vertical 
joint actions among suppliers and buyers and 




Process and product 
upgrading, rare 
functional upgrading 
Intensive application of advanced technologies, 
public research institutes and the horizontal 
joint actions of local associations; rare 
functional upgrading because of the strict 








Active product,  
process upgrading and 
Functional upgrading 
Thick horizontal cooperative relations and 
active associational economies, collective 
initiatives, such as joint R&D activities, joint 
participation to trade fairs. 
Source: adapted from Giuliani et al. (2005). 
 
The third group of studies focuses on local response as a resistance to the governance 
imperatives of lead firms (Humphrey and Schmitz, 2002a; Schmitz, 2004). The governance 
power of lead firms is endowed by their capabilities in production-parameter setting in their 
value chains. The purpose of enforcing parameter setting is to maintain product definition3 
and avoid the risk of supplier failure4 (Humphrey and Schmitz, 2002b). A fundamental 
                                                              
3 It means that lead firms tend to provide precise product specification to suppliers and monitor them. 
4 It means the situation that suppliers fail to follow product definition and make their buyers become vulnerable. 
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imperative of chain governance was identified based on industrial clusters in Mexico, Brazil, 
Italy, Span, German, Taiwan, Pakistan, India and other developing regions (Humphrey, 2003; 
Humphrey and Schmitz, 2001, 2002a, 2008; Schmitz, 1999, 2004; Schmitz and Knorringa, 
2000). Global lead firms would help local firms to upgrade in order to serve them better. 
However, these lead firms would impede upgrading whenever they felt competitive pressures 
from their local suppliers. As a response, local firms launched joint actions to bargain with 
lead firms. For instance, in the blue Jeans clusters in North America (e.g. Paso and Torreon in 
Mexico), local manufacturers were seriously confined to translating buyer’s specifications 
into practical knowledge even though that knowledge was necessary for production (Bair and 
Gereffi, 2001, 2003; Bazan and Navas-Alemán, 2004; Navas-Aleman and Bazan, 2005). In 
the literature on competitiveness and corporate restructuring, scholars suggested that probably 
the most valuable strategy for local firms to leverage the governance power of lead firms was 
to agglomerate together and plug into multiple value chains (Hoskisson et al., 1994; 
Kaplinsky, 2000; Porter, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2003). For instance, investigating into the local 
automobile-industry in Brazil and India, Quadros (2004) demonstrated that local firms 
developed certain tolerance to strict governance by inserting into multiple value chains which 
connected to North America and Europe. 
2.3.4 Critical assessments: whether the geography of industrial upgrading? 
This section has shown how non-geographers have articulated the mechanisms of 
upgrading in the global economy. These studies have informed our understandings of how 
late-comers pursue industrial upgrading through various means. The state-centric approaches, 
represented by the studies of FG paradigm, developmental state and NIS, have demonstrated 
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the important role of nation-states in upgrading in terms of planning preferential industrial 
policies, forming specific institutions and cultivating indigenous innovative environment. 
Premised on a firm-centric approach, the GVC literature has revealed dynamics between 
inter-firm organizations and upgrading in relation to transaction costs and the power of 
corporate governance. This strand of literature makes significant contributions by leading us 
to appreciate the importance of value chain governance that brings upgrading opportunities 
for late-comers. As a complement, studies of latecomer economies show us the trajectory, 
industrial specificity and local resistance in upgrading. These studies have reaffirmed my 
concern that industrial upgrading is a crucial issue that constitutes the ongoing dynamics of 
the global economy. According to these studies, the upgrading process apparently cannot be 
simplified into a trade-based process of development. It involves changes of technological 
capacities and corporate functions. It is also more than a process of innovation, as latecomer 
firms may upgrade through a deliberate strategy of learning that focuses on the mastering and 
improving of the absorbed technologies from their partners (Viotti, 2003). More importantly, 
the dynamics of strategic actions and power relations is involved during the process of 
upgrading. With respect to these contributions, I offer two critiques from a geographical 
perspective.  
First of all, these studies have yet to articulate the spatiality of industrial upgrading and 
thus do not help us appreciate the influences of geographical factors, such as local contexts, 
regional assets and resources embedded in GPNs. 
In the state-centric approaches, scholars adopted the ‘nation-states’ as an analytical unit, 
while neglected the geographical heterogeneity at sub-national scales (regional and local). In 
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other words, these studies are embedded in methodological nationalism. These scholars 
tended to treat domestic economic environment as homogenous territories and considered the 
environment as a nationally bounded system. Hence they argued for the ‘national stages of 
development’ as a reproducible model. But this assumption would be highly problematic 
when applied to a large territorial country, like China, India and the United States (Chan, 
1993). As Bernard and Ravenhill (1995:171) argued, “rather than Japan's development 
trajectory being replicated in country after country, industrial diffusion [in East Asia] has been 
characterized by shifting hierarchical networks of production and partial diffusion into diverse 
politic-economic contexts at differing historical junctures”. In studies of NIS, scholars 
critiqued that the ‘national systems’ were seldom nationally bounded, but were interwoven by 
the transnational production networks composed by TNCs and suppliers (Ernst, 2002; Ernst, 
2005; Ernst and Kim, 2002). Empirical studies from East Asian regions also affirmed that the 
diverse trajectories of regional development were produced by regionalizing production 
networks arching over the globe rather than by nationalized production systems (Kim, 1993; 
Lüthje, 2004; Yeung, 2007a; Yeung, 2009a). 
The GVC approach is also insufficient in explaining latecomer upgrading because of its 
vague spatial ontology. The value chain is conceptualized as a global-local dichotomy of 
linear structure without contexts. The rationale of the GVC approach lies on sectorally and 
organizationally specific realities which are the distinctive features of the chain metaphor. 
Hence it overlooks a critical issue that the embeddedness of value chains. It neglects a fact 
that the strategy of firms is not fully autonomous, but embedded in spatial contexts in terms of 
institutional conditions and territorialized assets (Hess, 2004). To this point, Bair (2005:153) 
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argued that “closer attention to the larger institutional and structural environments in which 
commodity chains are embedded is needed.” (see more detail critiques in Coe et al., 2008a). 
Moreover, the GVC approach premises on the determinant power of global lead firms and 
tends to hold a view that local upgrading, particularly functional upgrading, will necessarily 
challenge the power of lead firms. Although scholars in the GVC approach have pointed out 
the efforts of clustering and joint actions from local firms to increase their bargaining power, 
the global-local nexus still gives no place for analyzing regional and national influences. I 
argue that incorporating regional and national forces into upgrading studies is important, 
because these forces may enable local firms either to leverage the power of global lead firms, 
or to nurture more mutual interests with them. In doing so, local upgrading may not 
necessarily create tension within the value chain. Even more synergy can be identified once 
local firms develop certain competitive advantages by utilizing institutional assets embedded 
at regional and national scales. This critical potential has been identified in recent works 
adopting the GPN approach and I will detail the potential of power dynamics in the next 
chapter. 
Second, these studies of upgrading prefer to be either state-centric or firm-centric in 
investigating upgrading. This mono-actor perspective has failed to appreciate the synergy 
among all stakeholders. 
The state-centric approaches largely focus on the roles of national institutions and pay 
insufficient attention to the actual process of technological transfer and absorption at a 
firm-level analysis. As I have pointed out in section 2.3.1, most of their analyses are quite 
partial because of their methodological nationalism, while the actual performances of firms 
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are often neglected. These studies often take upgrading for granted because they consider 
knowledge spillover would happen alone with the prosperity of foreign investment and 
international trade, but few of empirical surveys are provided to verify this mechanism 
(Kasahara, 2004). To this point, geographers have shown some evidence pointing to the 
disappointed outcomes of knowledge spillover from foreign investments (Wang and Lin, 
2008; Wang and Lee, 2007; Young and Lan, 1997). The GVC approach explicitly articulates 
the performance of firms in upgrading, while it is premised on a firm-centric approach as I 
have critiqued in section 2.3.2. Institutional-spatial influences are absent in the value-chain 
analyses. How can the problem of mono-actor perspectives be overcome? I would argue that a 
broader analytical framework is needed to incorporate both approaches. This work can lead us 
to appreciate the synergy among all key actors, such as global lead firms, platform developers, 
CMs, local suppliers and various state institutions and so on.  
2.4 Conclusion: Whither the geography of industrial upgrading?  
   This chapter provides a critical review of the contemporary studies of industrial upgrading 
in both geographical and non-geographical literature. The review helps me position the entire 
thesis upon a solid ground for answering two basic questions: why studying industrial 
upgrading is needed; and what we have not known yet. I have summarized the main content 
of this chapter in Figure 2.4. 
In relation to the geographical literature, I post a ‘where’ question in the sense that the 
issue of upgrading is hardly found in mainstream economic geography. It tends to be 
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When looking for insights outside geography, I propose a ‘whether’ question. 
Non-geographical studies have unpacked the mechanisms of upgrading in three different 
approaches: state influence, lead-firm governance and local practices. But the geography of 
these studies is ambiguous. These studies guide me to appreciate the power dynamics and 
upgrading strategies within various types of value chains. But is industrial upgrading 
replicable among developed and developing regions? What are the geographical conditions 
that facilitate or hinder the process of upgrading? How will different institutional-spatial 
contexts reshape the power, as well as the strategies of upgrading? 
By recognizing both insights and limitations of the precedent studies above, I propose a 
‘whither’ question of how a geographical investigation can shed light on the study of 
industrial upgrading. According to the synthesis of intellectual insights in Figure 2.4, this 
study identifies two critical missing links pertinent to the geography of upgrading. 
First of all, in the context of a globalizing region, latecomer upgrading is not a purely 
autonomous or self-contained action of a single firm, but is produced by lead firms, local 
firms and state institutions through the process of global integration. The earlier works have 
informed us the features of global forces and regional forces respectively. But we have not 
known much about how different patterns of integration between latecomer regions and the 
global economy would affect the outcomes of local upgrading. 
Second, coming from different scales, these actors are not just rooted in various value 
chains, but are also embedded in respective institutional-spatial relations. Due to such 
institutional-spatial embeddedness, the process of local upgrading is neither a purely 
autonomous process of indigenous learning, nor a pre-determined outcome under different 
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governance patterns. Instead, local upgrading is also subject various institutional-spatial 
conditions. The earlier works have informed the powerful role of global lead firms and the 
problems of the external dependence of local firms. But we have not known much about how 
those institutional-spatial conditions would enable local firms to leverage the power of lead 
firms. In other words, the power dynamics of local upgrading is unclear.  
In order to fill in these gaps, a broader analytical tool is needed that can incorporate both 
firms and non-firm actors from different scales; and then involve economic, institutional and 
spatial relations within one single analytical framework. I argue that the relational perspective 
in economic geography can serve this purpose. Derived from relational thinking in regional 
development in the 1980s, this perspective focuses on revealing the “complex nexus of 
relations among actors and structures that effect dynamic changes in the spatial organization 
of economic activities” (Yeung, 2005:37). The preoccupation of the next chapter is to develop 








In an era of globalization, the territorial ensembles of economic development, such as 
places, cities and regions, are interconnected into complex production networks (Amin, 1998, 
2002). What makes globalization different from earlier stages is that the global shift of 
production networks breaks up a commodity chain into many segments which are 
geographically separated among different while interconnected sites. By plugging into these 
overarching production networks, firms in latecomer regions can receive the opportunities of 
upgrading to learn from TNCs. To many latecomer economies presently, attracting foreign 
investment or export-oriented industrialization has become a well-known tool for promoting 
economic growth. However, whether latecomer firms are able to catch up with foreign firms 
and achieve industrial upgrading is in question. Without upgrading, local firms are not 
competitive and highly substitutable. 
In order to upgrade, the GVC literature suggests latecomer firms to insert into value 
chains as the quick followers of global lead firms. Latecomer firms have a chance to climb up 
the value-added ladder step by step, if they fulfill all requirements set by lead firms (Gereffi et 
al., 2005; Schmitz, 2004; Sturgeon and Lester, 2004a). But the problem is that local upgrading 
is limited because the content and extent is defined by the governance patterns of TNCs. As a 
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response, development studies suggest that national forces (e.g. state intervention) can be a 
key ingredient for promoting domestic industrial upgrading against the control of TNCs. 
Economic geographers contribute to the debate by pointing out various regional and local 
factors that shed light on the regional pathways of industrial upgrading. The common thread 
of development studies and economic geography is the belief that institutional factors, such as 
states and associational economies, can be pro-active actors in facilitating the process of 
industrial upgrading. 
How can these two strands of literature be reconciled? One emphasizes the dominant 
role of lead firms and the other highlights institutional influences. According to my critical 
review in Chapter 2, a broader analytical framework is needed to incorporate three key actors 
(global lead firms, state institutions and local firms) and their contexts into analyses (see 
Figure 2.4). This chapter provides a means of doing this. Instead of focusing on corporate 
power or state power alone, this study investigates into the interaction among key actors to 
explain the dynamics of local upgrading. This attempt is built on the concept of strategic 
coupling. In the context of globalizing regional development, it represents to the pattern of 
integration between latecomer regions and the global economy. The central research question 
driving this study is how different patterns of strategic coupling affect local upgrading. This 
research question is resonated with Hubert Schmitz who has argued that the pattern of global 
integration is the focus of latecomer development:  
 
A key concern in industrial policy [for developing countries] is how to configure the 
relationship with the global economy…the choice open to them [developing countries] is 
not therefore whether to integrate into the global economy, but how: fast or slowly, 
comprehensively or selectively, taking the low or the high road (Schmitz, 2007:417).  
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My research question includes three issues: (1) how does industrial upgrade happen 
within the process of strategic coupling and who are the key drivers; (2) how does strategic 
coupling evolve and lead to upgrading; (3) in what ways can geographical factors, such as the 
institutional-spatial contexts of firms, reshape power relations and local strategies within the 
coupling relationships, thus facilitating or hindering upgrading. Through examining these 
issues, I argue that industry upgrading in a globalizing region is mainly driven by strategic 
coupling which in turn is constituted by the interactive effects among local firms, TNCs and 
regional institutions. This central argument helps readers understand the ongoing dynamics of 
upgrading in latecomer economies, rather than deem it as a pre-determined trajectory based 
on stylized governance patterns or a necessary outcome of industrial promotions assisted by 
state institutions.  
To legitimize my central argument, this chapter is organized into five sections. The next 
section elaborates on my epistemological selection of the relational perspective in economic 
geography. It articulates how the relational perspective leads us to reinterpret industrial 
upgrading. The third section develops a relational framework for conceptualizing casual 
relations between strategic coupling and industrial upgrading in the context of globalizing 
regional development. Actors’ strategies, relations, power, knowledge gaps are key factors 
that shape the formation of strategic coupling. The penultimate section theorizes four types of 
strategic coupling that produce local upgrading in different ways. Four propositions are 
developed for empirical examination. In conclusion, I discuss how my analytical framework 
and conceptualization contributes to the literature. 
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3.2 A relational perspective on industrial upgrading 
This section reviews the debate about relational economic geography and articulates why 
a relational perspective is suitable and needed for this study. A further discussion interprets 
the relational fabric of upgrading on the basis of the previous conceptualization of industrial 
upgrading in the literature of industrial governance and strategic management. 
3.2.1 The perspective of relational economic geography 
The original idea of relational economic geography (REG) can be dated back to the late 
1970s according to the relational thinking and the discussions of extra-regional processes in 
understanding regional development (Dicken, 1976; Massey, 1979). These works were 
gradually developed into a new strand of conceptual work known as the ‘relational turn’ in 
economic geography (Amin, 1998; Bathelt and Glückler, 2003; Boggs and Rantisi, 2003; 
Ettlinger, 2001; Jones, 2009; Yeung, 1994, 2005). Since the 2000s, this perspective has been 
deployed by geographers to articulate the formation of the network forms of production and 
innovation in the process of globalization, such as the GPN literature (see Chapter 2). The 
analytical focus of the relational perspective is the “complex nexus of relations among actors 
and structures that effect dynamic changes in the spatial organization of economic activities” 
(Yeung, 2005:37). Scholars have debated about this relational perspective in recent studies. 
From a proponent’s sympathetic critique, contemporary works in REG are not ‘relational 
enough’. Most of the works are only conducted in a “thematic sense, focusing on various 
themes of socio-spatial relations without theorizing sufficiently the nature of relationality and 
its manifestation through power relations and actor-specific practice” (Yeung, 2005:37). 
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Bathelt and Glucker (2003:125) located the essence of REG in analyzing “intensions and 
strategies of economic actors and ensembles of actors and the patterns of how they behave”. 
Yeung (2005) argued that, in order to operationalize a ‘relational thinking’, geographers 
needed to move from focusing on relations per se to unraveling the fabrics of relations. For 
instance, further efforts are suggested to examine relationality and different types of emergent 
power in a relation. 
From an opponent’s view, the REG approach tends to be too ‘relational’ and too abstract 
so that it has a risk of losing much of its content and analytical capability (Sunley, 2008). The 
general critique is that REG focuses on relations per se and does not identify causal 
mechanisms. It thus becomes ‘immune’ to empirical evaluation. The REG approach is also 
characterized as preferring a loose analytical framework and privileging a network-centric 
view. Therefore REG may lack a coherent research agenda and tends to restrict on a 
micro-level analysis that acts like a post-essentialist or post-scale approach based on a flat 
spatial ontology. 
This thesis does not read these two views as hostile, but as complimentary. Both the 
opponents and proponents have recognized the weaknesses of the REG approach in 
identifying causal mechanisms, whereas their prescriptions for overcoming this limit are 
different. Yeung (2005:48) argued to “unpack relational geometries1 imbued with causal 
power capable of producing spatial change”, whereas Sunley (2008:19) suggested to 
recognize the durability of economic habits and routines which rendered the patterns of 
economic relations as the “reproduction and transformation of sets of rules and conventions”.  
                                                              
1 This refers to the spatial configurations of heterogeneous relations among actors and structures through which 
power and identities are played out and become efficacious (Massey, 1979; Yeung, 2005:38). 
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Sunley’s (2008) suggestion points to an evolutionary approach in economic geography 
which focuses on revealing differentiated spatial systems that cause the evolution of economic 
actors (Boschma and Frenken, 2006; Boschma and Lambooy, 1999; Martin and Sunley, 2006). 
However, the evolutionary approach has difficulty in explaining economic behaviors within a 
shorter time span. So far, it still has difficulties in operationalizing empirically key concepts, 
such as routines, path dependency and lock-in (see the debates in a special issue lead by 
Boschma and Frenken, 2009). To this point, the REG approach provides a more realistic and 
feasible epistemological toolkit for examining upgrading in a latecomer region which is under 
rapid industrialization. The merits of the relational perspective are that it does not privilege 
any forces and actors at different scales; it highlights various relational factors, but not solely 
looks at network forms of organization per se. Hence the REG approach can incorporate both 
firms and non-firm actors from different scales; and then involve economic, institutional and 
spatial relations within one single analytical framework. More importantly, adopting the 
relational perspective enables this study to bridge REG with the GVC literature, because 
network/chain analysis is a common thread in these two strands of literature. In doing so, this 
study is capable of analyzing value chain governance, inter-firm networks and the 
embeddedness (institutional-spatial contexts) of these networks within a single analytical 
framework. 
3.2.2 Conceptualizing industrial upgrading: in what sense is it relational? 
Through this epistemological lens of REG, the phenomenon of industrial upgrading is 
reinterpreted as a group of interconnected firms and non-firm actors which cooperate and 
compete with each other for their own upgrading strategies in a specific spatial context. The 
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question is in what sense industrial upgrading is relational. 
In a simplest way, industrial upgrading is “to make better products, make them more 
efficiently, or move into more skilled activities” (Schmitz, 2004:1). More specifically, 
industrial upgrading is “a process of improving the ability of a firm or an economy to move to 
more profitable and/or technologically sophisticated capital and skill-intensive economic 
niches” (Gereffi, 1999:52). There are four general types of firm-level upgrading including 
process, product, functional and channel upgrading (see section 2.3 in Chapter 2). At an 
aggregated level, such as a regional scale, industrial upgrading would have two forms 
(Boschma, 2004; Gereffi, 1999). First is the improvement of regional competiveness through 
the development of vertical integration and the intra-regional division of labor. Second is the 
renewal of regional economies through establishing new industries. The second type of 
regional upgrading could be shallow because new industries can be directly transplanted from 
elsewhere through the relocation of multi-plant firms and/or TNCs. During such a process, 
firm may not upgrade at all. This study uses the term of local upgrading to refer the 
upgrading of local firms at either the firm level or the regional level so as to distinguish it 
from regional upgrading contributed by TNCs. 
The process of upgrading involves relational features. The decision and implementation 
of upgrading is subject to diverse influences from intra-, inter- and extra-firm relations. These 
relations provide various channels for firms to accumulate necessary resources for upgrading. 
Meanwhile, when a firm implements an upgrading action, it may receive supports or 
resistances from other stake holders which can be suppliers, strategic partners, customers or 
other in situ institutional actors (e.g. governments). These relational features are not novel in 
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contemporary studies. The GVC literature has articulated various inter-firm relations within 
value chains and how these relations influence upgrading (Gereffi, 1999; Gereffi et al., 2005; 
Staritz et al., 2011). Development studies have revealed firm-state relations which channel 
state supports and assistance to domestic firms for upgrading (Beeson, 2004; Cammett, 2007; 
Evans, 1995; Meyer-Stamer et al., 2004). Geographers have also revealed various 
inter-organizational relations that construct regional innovation and learning networks 
(MacKinnon et al., 2002; Morgan, 1997; Trippl et al., 2009). These relations, linkages or 
external connects are important because these channels not only circulate resources for firms 
to upgrading, but also serve as a platform where power relations and interactions affect the 
outcomes of upgrading. 
3.3 An analytical framework for understanding strategic coupling and industrial 
upgrading 
The aim of this section is to operationalize the relational perspective in the investigation 
of industrial upgrading. Anchored in the GPN approach, the analytical framework of this 
study is to examine the network relationships of both firms and non-firms actors and more 
importantly, the mechanisms of industrial upgrading enact within these relationships. Situated 
in the context of globalizing regional development, the concept of strategic coupling is 
applied and further conceptualized as the key variable to explain upgrading in latecomer 
regions. By tracing these casual mechanisms rather than network structure per se, this study 
avoids the problem of network privilege pointed out by Sunley (2008). It also attempts to 
resonate with Yeung (2005) by unpacking power dynamics within the process of coupling 
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which produces spatial changes. 
3.3.1 Global production networks and strategic coupling 
A global production network is defined as a globally organized nexus of interconnected 
functions and operations by firms and non-firm institutions through which goods and services 
are produced and distributed (Coe et al., 2004; Henderson et al., 2002). The framework of 
GPN “aims to reveal the multi-actor and multi-scalar characteristics of transnational 
production systems through intersecting notions of power, value and embeddedness” (Coe et 
al., 2008a:267). The GPN approach moves beyond the GVC approach in three ways. First, it 
is more realistic in its analytical commitment to the network form, not linear structure. 
Second, the GPN analysis involves non-firm actors, institutional arrangements and 
environment. It is not limited to cost-based transactions, while open to other non-cost-based 
interactions, such as untraded interdependency, dedicated commitment, complementarity or 
the social mechanisms of network governance (Jones et al., 1997; Storper, 1997b; Yeung, 
2005). Third, the GVC approach tends to assume a pre-determined asymmetrical power 
relation that lead firms have dominant power over local firms. In contrast, the GPN 
framework has a more flexible understanding of power which treats power in as a relational 
effect. The practices of power are not pre-determined, but subject to the specific relationality 
and the contexts of actors (Henderson et al., 2002; Hess, 2008; Hess and Yeung, 2006; Yeung, 
2005). Although lead firms are powerful in their owned value chains, local firms may find a 
way to leverage their power by utilizing resources resting in their institutional and spatial 
contexts. 
Since the 1970s, we have witnessed an intensified articulation of latecomer economies in 
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the Asia–Pacific region into GPNs in various industries, such as the dramatic rise of Japan, 
the rapid industrialization of the four East Asian “tigers” economies and the recent 
ascendance of an emerging giant, China (Cho et al., 1998; Clark and Kim, 1995; Dicken, 
2007; Gereffi, 1994; Hoskisson and Johnson, 1992; Ozawa, 2005; Sit and Yang, 1997). This 
integration is mainly associated with a process conceptualized as strategic coupling, as 
showed by Figure 3.1. In the context of regional development, strategic coupling refers to 
“the dynamic processes through which actors in regions coordinate, mediate, and arbitrage 
strategic interests between local actors and their counterparts in the global economy” (Yeung, 
2009a: 232). TNCs reap value from various means by utilizing regional assets provided by 
regional institutions and local firms. The power of complementarity derives from both 
inherent regional advantages and the industrial structure of global industries (Coe and Hess, 
2011). Regional institutional actors, such as policy makers, play as a critical mediator in 
optimizing regional assets to seek for a better connection with GPNs so that local firms may 
take up a more promising position. 
Figure 3.1 Strategic coupling in globalizing regional development 
 
Source: Figure 1 in Coe et al. (2004:470). 
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The process of strategic coupling has three distinctive features. First, it involves active 
intervention and intentional action of the part of participants which is strategizing through 
carry out new combinations of resources to disturb the existing static equilibrium of an 
economy for arbitraging different opportunities (Mathews, 2002; Schumpeter, 1934). 
Secondly, it is a time-space contingent process, while not static. Strategic decoupling and 
recoupling may also happen due to changing capabilities of interests of participants or 
changing institutional-spatial contexts. Thirdly, the convergence process of coupling is 
multi-scalar that transcends different territorial boundaries and geographical scales (Yeung, 
2009). 
3.3.2 Actors, knowledge gaps and tension 
As shown in Figure 3.1, the process of strategic coupling constitutes relations and power 
among key actors which subsequently determines the ways of value creation, enhancement 
and capture. Based on Figure 3.1, this study develops a specific framework for understanding 
better globalizing regional development and the dynamics of industrial upgrading (see Figure 
3.2). In Figure 3.2, industrial upgrading takes place in a latecomer region based on strategic 
coupling between TNCs in GPNs and local firms in the region through which the advantages 
of regions interact with the strategic needs of the TNCs. Meanwhile, both TNCs and local 
firms indirectly couple with regional institutions through the process of institutional matching. 
Three key actors are identified in this relational framework: transnational corporations, local 





Figure 3.2 An analytical framework of industrial upgrading in globalizing regions 
 
Source: compiled by author. 
Transnational corporations (TNCs) refer to firms that have the power to coordinate and 
control operations in more than one country, even if they do not own them (Dicken, 2007). 
During the process of globalization, TNCs are primary players orchestrating their GPNs at a 
global scale. Some of them are global lead firms (branded-name firms presenting in end 
markets) which rest in the core positions of GPNs with superior technological and market 
power. Some of them grow into key suppliers or contract manufacturers for lead firms, 
following lead firms’ steps during global industrial relocation (Humphrey, 2003). Some of 
them pursue industrial specialization and become platform developers or specialized-product 
providers (Sturgeon, 2002). TNCs will be attracted to locate at different regions due to their 
interests to take advantages of geographical differences in production or distribution factors. 
The advantages can be ownership, locational or internationalization advantages in Dunning’s 
account (Dunning, 1979, 1988, 1995, 2000); the capabilities in the supply-base (Gereffi et al., 
2005); special natural resources, lower labor wages, or specific state policies in terms of fiscal 
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incentives, industrial policies, trade barriers and subsidies and so on. 
Local firms (the same as latecomer firms in this thesis) are the firms originating within a 
region. Conceptually, they are similar to local suppliers in the terminology of the GVC 
literature. Except for earning a profit, the initiative of local firms is to catch up with TNCs to 
prevent being discarded or marginalized by them. To reap time-cost efficiency during the 
process of catching up, most of the local firms would like to develop external linkages for 
sourcing knowledge and seeking additional assistance in territories, networks and society 
where they are embedded (Hess, 2004). This is the fundamental incentive for local firms to 
develop strategic coupling with TNCs and regional institutions. 
Regional institutions in Figure 3.2 are represented by regional formal organizations, 
regionally specific institutions, local arms of national/supranational bodies and extra-local 
institutions that affect activities within regions without co-present necessity (Coe et al., 2004). 
Governmental agencies are the most important representatives that exert power based on a 
political-administrative system of governance dominated by national/regional/local states. 
Associational economies exist as networked forms of industrial organizations which mean for 
fostering inter-organizational cooperation and communication, the alleged ‘collective social 
order’(Cooke and Morgan, 1998). Regional institutions serve as a critical mediator in 
optimizing regional assets and providing business-friendly and supportive institutional 
environment. In doing so, regional benefits from attracting good-performance TNCs to locate 
in and generate a knowledge-spillover effect among in situ firms through various means 
(Trippl et al., 2009). 
When strategic coupling happens in a latecomer region, three key actors engage each 
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other and form different power relations. The opportunities of industrial upgrading result from 
knowledge diffusion and reproduction among the coupled actors. There are basically two 
main obstacles for local firms to catch up with TNCs: dislocation from the main international 
sources of technology and from the main international markets they seek to enter (Hobday, 
1995). Schmitz (2007) reinterpreted these obstacles as technology and market gaps. 
Extending their ideas, I term these gaps as knowledge gaps shaped by the specific knowledge 
structures and prior knowledge of respective actors. Table 3.1 lists the main features of 
technology and market gaps that vary among different industries and market conditions. 
 
Table 3.1 Knowledge gaps between latecomers firms and TNCs 
Sources: adapted from Figure 2 in Hobday (1995) and Schmitz (2007:422). 
 
To latecomer firms in GPNs, technology gap is a result of isolation from original sources 
of technologies, such as R&D centers, or the feedback loop between users and producers that 
spurs innovation; the difficulty of accessing proprietary technology; and weak indigenous 
innovation capability. Market gap originates from the difficulty for them to understand and 
respond to rapidly changing consumer demands when it is disconnected from the final market. 
Core market knowledge can be seasonal and heterogeneous market demands as well as tastes 
or fashion trends, skills of marketing, branding and distribution, and the expertise of supply 
Industrial and market configuration Technology gap Market gap 
Matured industries: standard technologies 
with slow change 
Low High 
New industries: specific technologies with 
rapid change; 
High Moderate 
Foreign market: high demanding of 
design and quality, highly competitive; 
High High 
Domestic market: matured products with 





chain management and so on (Barney, 1991; Schmitz, 2004; Van den Bulte and Moenaert, 
1998). 
When strategic coupling is developed, the central concern of key actors is how to 
develop a better relationship that can meet partners’ demands and fulfill their own business 
goals simultaneously as well. However, the partnership of coupling is not always full of 
harmonious corporation and synergy. Tensions may be generated in relation to knowledge 
sharing and competition which may raise serious challenges to local upgrading. Tension 
refers a situation that there are mismatched needs or interests of actor in a relation in which 
difficulties are caused. Within strategic coupling, there are fundamental tensions existing at 
three different levels which may impede, constrain or discourage local upgrading.  
At the inter-firm level, tension is inherent between latecomer firms and TNCs. 
Latecomer firms would try various means to bridge knowledge gaps with TNCs, improve 
their in-house capabilities, and even create their own lead. But TNCs prefer to maintain these 
gaps at a moderate distance. They define the content of knowledge diffusion from their sides 
to local suppliers so that local suppliers can produce qualified products and will not grow up 
to become a new competitor towards TNCs themselves. In doing so, TNCs can reinforce their 
leading positions in GPNs as an industrial ‘gate keeper’ (Humphrey and Schmitz, 2002b; 
Schmitz, 2004; Schmitz, 2007). 
At the extra-firm level, between regional institutions and firms, tension is derived from 
institutional mismatching. In many occasions, regional industrial policies would like to 
maximize knowledge spillover and sharing within the regions so as to foster better collective 
learning and innovation. But firms naturally prefer knowledge isolation to maintain their 
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competitiveness, particular to the knowledge related to their core competence. Meanwhile, 
regional policies are meant to satisfy the demands of local and foreign firms. But these 
policies do not necessarily produce benefits for all participants in a regional economy. In 
some occasions, regional polices may even pose challenges to firms’ own interests (Coe and 
Hess, 2011; Schmitz, 2007). 
At the intra-firm level, tension emerges when firms try to upgrade, such as renewing 
production lines, adopting a new production system or just making some organizational 
changes. Suck cost is a key factor that discourages firms to upgrade their production and 
organizational systems due to high transaction costs and asset specificity (Clark, 1994; Clark 
and Wrigley, 1997). Labor may resist upgrading actions because they may suffer from 
learning new processing skills, adopting more demanding technologies or even being laid off 
after the installation of new production systems, such as the replacement from Fordism 
production to ‘flexible’ production (Gertler, 1995; see more details in section 2.2.2). 
Due to the existence of tension, actors in strategic coupling encounter dilemmas in the 
pursuit of industrial upgrading. TNCs would like to assist local upgrading, but they have to 
pay attention to the content of knowledge diffusion so that local suppliers would not catch up 
too easily. Latecomer firms also encounter a dilemma. The quicker latecomer firms would 
like to catch up, the more they need to be dependent on TNC so as to maximize learning 
opportunities. But this dependency may produce heavy sunk costs and cause technological 
and organizational lock-in. Latecomer firms therefore lose more bargaining power due to a 
high degree of asset specificity. Within firm-state relationships, regional actors are facing 
more complicated dilemmas because regional institutions are not profit-seeking actors and 
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may have many other value orientations, such as social welfare or political objectives. The 
dilemmas in promoting upgrading are summarized in four paradoxes (Cammett, 2007; 
Meyer-Stamer et al., 2004):  
(1) Upgrading-life-cycle paradox: pursuing active local policy is crucial in the early stage 
of upgrading but effective local policy networks is likely to be available at a late stage;  
(2) Integrationist paradox: local policy networks which seek to achieve close relationships 
between local producers and global producers will be marginalized if they have 
successfully upgraded;  
(3) Location paradox: firms are increasingly demanding when it comes to locational quality 
but show a decreasing propensity to invest in local policy network;  
(4) Cost-efficiency paradox: assisting upgrading of local firms is an ultimate way of 
improving regional competiveness, but it is more time-consuming and costly in 
comparing with attracting the location of TNCs. 
3.3.3. Power dynamics and the strategies of local firms 
The existence of tension and dilemmas imply that power relations within strategic 
coupling can never be static and pre-determined. In contrast, the interactions are contingent 
on the changing mutual interests of each party which tries to increase their power strength by 
strategizing possessed resources or arbitraging opportunities (Mathews, 2002). Power in this 
thesis refers to the relational effects of a capacity to influence and the exercise of this capacity 
through actor-specific practices (Allen, 2003; Hess, 2008; Yeung, 2005). It is anchored in 
institutional space, positional and also practical through social actions. It becomes emergent 
when it is practiced, while power is not inherently possessed, and is not everywhere. 
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According to Henderson et al. (2002), there are three types of power in GPNs including 
corporate power from the capacities of firms, institutional power from the capacities of 
organizations and collective power from the actions of collective agents. The ways of power 
exercise are significantly influence value enhancement and capture in GPNs. 
To TNCs, their power is derived from two specificities: 1) their capabilities to 
orchestrate GPNs so that they can take advantages of geographical differences in the 
distribution of factors of production; 2) their capability in setting parameters and standards in 
industries (Gereffi, 2001a; Gereffi et al., 2005; Gibbon, 2001; Hess and Coe, 2006; Sturgeon 
et al., 2009). This power of domination is organizationally embedded in GPNs and 
geographically embedded in their home countries/regions which serve as the sources of R&D 
activities, innovation and primary strategic decisions (Coe et al., 2008a, b). TNCs control the 
developmental pace of their branch plants, subcontractors and other low-tier suppliers. 
Meanwhile, they also bargain with regional institutions for lower production costs, better 
fiscal incentives, and more supportive institutional environment. 
To local firms, their power comes from their technological capabilities and other 
competitive advantages, such as producing products and other home-based advantages. 
Normally, local firms are less powerful because they are substitutable, unless they possess a 
unique resource or develop certain technological edges, or find out a specific niche market. 
To regional institutions, their power is the state-legitimated administrative power that 
refers to the capacity of a state to regulate behaviors and enforce order within its territory. In 
globalization, this power is highly localized and represented by the control of market entry 
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firms to reshape power relations with TNCs. Local firms may increase bargaining power if 
they possess certain scarce resources or receive additional supports from state institutions. 
Local firms also can bypass the governance power if they identify alternative sources of 
knowledge, such as multi-tasking by inserting various value chains within the same GPN. 
Furthermore, local firms can directly lower tension and develop new synergy, when they 
identify more mutual interests with TNCs. Recognizing these alternatives, there are three 
important institutional-spatial conditions that underpin local firms to leverage power relations 
with TNCs. 
The first condition is the diversity of knowledge channels that emphasizes the available 
networks of knowledge diffusion rather than one-way diffusion from TNCs to local firms. 
Trippl et al (2009) has provided a sound summary of these linkages (see Table 2.2). By 
plugging into a GPN, firms would have many potential ways of knowledge accumulation, 
such as formal transactions, informal communication, technology transfer, organizational 
succession, learning by doing, learning by interaction, benchmarking and collective learning. 
These channels help local firms to reduce dependence on TNCs. 
The second condition is the availability of regional assets which are more at regional 
(national) scale. The concept refers to the ‘holy trinity’ of technology - organization - 
territories defined by Storper (1997b). Regional assets can be supportive industrial policies set 
by pro-active states; associational economies including industrial associations, chamber of 
commerce and other business organizations; home-based advantages like cluster economies, 
localized supply networks and social-ethic communities; or large domestic markets (see 
section 2.2 in Chapter 2). Embedded in these regional assets, local firms may give TNCs more 
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incentives to share or co-develop knowledge with them. Because regional assets are 
territorially bounded, transaction costs increase for non-local actors to get access. Local firms 
have certain advantages based on social-cultural familiarity, though these assets are not 
entirely exclusive to non-local actors. 
The third condition refers to the complexity of competitive dynamics in GPNs that is 
more relevant at a global scale. It points to competition between TNCs at the top hierarchy of 
their value chains. This condition has a strong impact on TNCs’ decisions to cooperate with 
other partners due to competitive pressures within GPNs. To local firms, the more 
complicated that competitive dynamics is, the more upgrading opportunities they may identify. 
There are three basic types of competitive dynamics, cost, flexibility, and speed (time to 
market), which are pushing global lead firms to deepen cooperation with their local partners 
so that they can further sharpen their competitive cutting edges (Lüthje, 2002; Yeung, 2009a). 
Meanwhile, competitions between global lead firms and platform developers also provides 
new opportunities for contract manufacturers and suppliers to implement functional 
upgrading (Feenstra and Hamilton, 2006; Galvin and Morkel, 2001; Lüthje, 2002; Lüthje, 
2004; Sturgeon and Kawakami, 2011). For instance, they can purchase and internalize 
turn-key technologies from platform developers within the same GPN, thus directly 
upgrading into owned-brand manufacturers to compete with lead firms. In this case, lead 
firms have not power to block this upgrading because lead firms can only exert control upon 
their value chains but not the whole GPN. 
In sum, by recognizing these institutional-spatial conditions, latecomer firms are able to 
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3.4.1 Variety of strategic coupling 
Based on collective endeavor from a journal special issue in Regional Studies in 2009, 
Yeung (2009) summarized three basic types of strategic coupling based on the development 
trajectories of six globalizing regions in East Asia. They are: 
(1) International partnership where lead firms from outside the region forge direct 
linkages with local firms as key nodes within global networks 
(2) Indigenous innovation where local firms develop greater technological capacities so 
as to occupy a better position when engaging with lead firms in GPNs 
(3) Production platforms where local firms strengthen capacities of systematic 
integration and specialize in manufacturing works for serving global lead firms. 
Although this category of coupling has shed light on the pattern of integration between 
latecomer regions and GPNs, the current conceptualization is insufficient for explaining 
industrial upgrading. It is summarized through different strategies that latecomer regions have 
deployed. Hence it is not a theoretically consistent topology for further analyses. The first 
type refers to a type of relationship; and the second type refers to a strategy of local firm; 
while the third refers to a type of position in GPNs. In contrast to this ontological ambiguity, 
Schmitz (2007) has offered an relevant account about latecomer strategies for global 
integration (see Table 3.2). 
Schmitz’s (2007) category is logically coherent because it is built on a four-fold 
configuration, according to the extent of technology and market gaps. But this policy-oriented 
category is too pragmatic to capture the ongoing dynamics of global integration. Basically, the 
strategies are overlapping with each other. For instance, strategies of attracting FDI and 
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technological licensing actually are virtually the same as the strategies of inserting into global 
value chains. When firms pursue original design manufacturing, they may also develop joint 
venture with other firms for absorbing some cutting-edge technologies from the partners. 
Another pitfall is that this category overlooks the influences of institutional-spatial contexts 
(see section 3.3.3 in this chapter). Technology and market assets are not necessarily bounded 
within firms, but can be provided by other non-firm actors. Overall, Schmitz’s (2007) account 
provides some solutions for latecomer regions, but fails to showcase the pattern of their 
integration into the global economy. Apart from these critiques, this category of latecomer 
strategies is insightful, because it implies the relationship between power asymmetry and 
knowledge gaps.  
 







1. Access to technology and market 
is a severe problem for local firms. 
Foreign direct investment is a 
preferred strategy. 
2. Key challenge is not technology, but 
marketing. Integrating into value 




3. Challenge is not in marketing, 
but technology. Acquiring 
technology through licensing or 
joint ventures seems the best 
option. 
4. Technology and marketing gaps are 
narrow. Local firms can export 
own-designed complete products 
directly. 
Source: Adapted from Figure 2 in Schmitz (2007: 422). 
 
This study synthesizes both Yeung (2009) and Schmitz (2007) and reinterprets the 
typology of strategic coupling as shown in Figure 3.5. In a broader sense, the typology 
represents different relationships between latecomer regions and GPNs; in a narrow sense, the 
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production stability. Local firms need TNCs’ help to bridge the knowledge gaps so as to catch 
up quickly instead of relying on their own efforts. 
Cooperative coupling  
When technology gap is narrow, but market gap is wide, cooperative coupling tends to 
prevail. It refers to a situation that local firms in a latecomer region develop a complementary 
relationship with foreign firms within GPNs. The power of complementarity is built on 
mutual interests in terms of competitive advantages in labor division or co-development. 
Latecomer firms do not have to possess equivalent power as foreign firms. But at least they 
must have qualified technological capabilities or identify certain competitive advantages so 
that they can have autonomy in selecting strategic partners and their upgrading strategies. 
TNCs have incentives to treat local firms as strategic suppliers so as to reduce transaction 
costs. 
This pattern is similar to the relational governance in Gereffi’s (et al., 2005) account 
which is based on non-cost transactions that are governed by social mechanisms, such as 
mutual trusts, reputation, or family/ethnic ties. The difference is that cooperative coupling has 
a broader definition which also includes cost-based transactions. Cooperative coupling also 
looks like coupling through being production platforms in Yeung’s (2009) account. But it has 
a nuance meaning in that TNCs have also developed certain dependence on these production 
platforms. Otherwise they are hard to keep cost competitive, comparing with the others which 
have developed cooperative coupling with latecomer firms. In this pattern, power relations are 
still asymmetrical, but in a moderate mode. Local firms and TNCs would mutually influence 
on the basis of various cooperative agreements, either formal or informal, in terms of 
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production, transaction, marketing and R&D activities. Overall TNCs cannot exert 
overwhelming control to local firms. This mutual dependency can be regulated through 
trust-based cooperation, contract-based commitment, or other social mechanisms. Within 
these relations, local firms and TNCs both impose costs on maintaining the stability of 
cooperation. 
Reciprocal coupling 
When technology gap is large, but market gap is small, reciprocal coupling tends to 
occur. It reflects a situation in which actors develop coupling relationships for exchanging 
technology and market resources possessed exclusively by each actor. To latecomer upgrading, 
it specifically refers to a situation that TNCs comply with specific criteria from states and 
local firms, so as to get access to localized assets, such as local market. The state criteria often 
require them to provide additional assistance to local firms, or provide other benefits for the 
local economy. Power relations in this pattern are highly regulated by the intervention of state 
actors. The reciprocity of resource exchange is the key mechanism for developing such 
coupling. Forms of coupling can be technological licensing/cooperative agreements, joint 
ventures (either based on capital or technology), strategic alliances, or other forms of 
cooperation.  
This pattern is similar to the situation of ‘obligated embeddedness’ theorized by Liu and 
Dicken (2006). The difference is that Liu and Dicken (2006) only referred to the situation in 
which market access was utilized by states as critical assets to increase their bargaining power. 
In this study, reciprocal coupling can be built on other potential assets, such as 
national/regional business systems, monopoly industries, domestic logistic systems, natural 
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resources, institutional arrangements, or social/ethnic ties (Cooke and Morgan, 1998; Qiu, 
2005; Storper, 1997a, b; Whitley, 2000; Zhou and Tong, 2003). In the GVC literature, this 
type of coupling is absent as state actor is not explicitly incorporated into their conceptual 
framework. 
Absorptive coupling 
When technology and market gaps are both small, absorptive coupling tends to take 
place. It refers to a circumstance that local firms are capable of serving directly both domestic 
and global markets with their indigenous capabilities. Meanwhile they still would like to 
couple with TNCs for absorbing state-of-art knowledge. Overall, TNCs are still occupying a 
leading position in their own value chains. But local firms are actively plugged into GPNs and 
manage to channel knowledge and identify various industrial opportunities. 
This is a more matured and ideal level of global integration and it is also the most 
difficult stage for latecomer firms and regions to achieve. Power in absorptive coupling is 
more or less balanced in which local firms have sufficient independence in selecting partners, 
partnerships and market niches. Local firms have greater bargaining power for require more 
knowledge diffusion from TNCs, but local firms do not override TNCs’ power. Again, this 
pattern of coupling is absent in the GVC literature, because the GVC literature believes that 
local firms cannot possibly build up such balanced power relation with global lead firms, 
unless local firms quit the value chain and construct their own chains. 
3.4.2 Producing industrial upgrading: How does strategic coupling matter? 
The formation of strategic coupling is driven by the power of complementarity where the 
constituents of relationships benefit from each other’s co-presence and engagement. Generally, 
95 
 
when the power of complementarity in strategic coupling is greater, it will be more possible 
for upgrading to be produced based on higher synergy and lower tension. Four propositions 
are developed to elaborate on this mechanism in relation to the variety of coupling. 
 
Proposition 1: In captive coupling whereby TNCs dominate knowledge diffusion, the deeper 
local firms become captive to TNCs, the faster will upgrading be facilitated. But the 
upgrading is limited and tends to be restricted in process and product upgrading. 
 
In captive coupling, TNCs exert strict governance on local firms by defining the content 
of local upgrading such as setting production parameters and allocating manufacturing tasks. 
The content of knowledge is more related to production and processing technologies, while 
not technologies in product development/design. Knowledge spillover from TNCs is limited 
in the sense that only standard and simple technologies will be diffused through formal traded 
relations. Market knowledge is rarely diffused from TNCs since there is no incentive to share 
it. In order to improve the supply capability of local firms, TNCs would like to assist local 
firms to upgrade more quickly. For instance, TNCs may import advanced machines for local 
firms or provide basic labor training. To achieve these helps, local firms are required to give 
up certain rights of control of their own corporate functions, such as management of 
production systems. 
In order to receive more technological assistances from foreign partners, local firms 
should focus on developing technological capabilities that meet TNCs’ demands, particularly 
in some technologies with asset specificity. TNCs may encourage these local efforts because 
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their bargaining power may increase once local firms are technologically locked into them. 
Hence, the deeper local firms are dependent on TNCs, the more technological assistance local 
firms may be received. Functional upgrading is almost impossible because local firms are 
kept out of design technologies and marketing skills. There is no incentive or return for TNCs 
to share the knowledge. Indigenous efforts of functional upgrading will also create tension to 
the coupling relation. 
Regional institutions in captive coupling often encounter a dilemma (see section 3.3.2). 
They need to decide whether to put the strategic needs of local firms or foreign firms as their 
top priority. To help local firms, regional policy makers can provide much preferential 
assistance and invest intensively in constructing a regional learning system, but this process is 
time-consuming and costly. Local firms may also leave the region after successful upgrading. 
To give preference to foreign firms, regional policy makers can simply provide substantial 
fiscal incentives and give more priority to the needs of foreign firms. This strategy may serve 
as a critical shortcut for ‘upgrading’ regional economies. But this kind of regional upgrading 
would be shallow if local firms are further marginalized or discriminated, such as the 
formation of technological enclaves in developing regions (Wang and Lin, 2008; Wang and 
Lee, 2007). The region may also become vulnerable due to over-dependence on TNCs 
(Chapman, 2005). My detailed empirical investigation in Chapter 6 points to this process and 




Proposition 2: In cooperative coupling, the more developed are complementarity and mutual 
interests between foreign and local firms, the higher is the potential for local upgrading. 
 
Ways of knowledge diffusion are rich within cooperative coupling. Since local firms can 
provide qualified technological services, TNCs are interested in developing various 
cooperation partnerships with local firms. Once TNCs treat local firms as strategic suppliers 
or partners, they tend to provide substantial helps to local firms so that the latter can conform 
to the former’s demands, such as special training in developing OEM/ODM business. 
Meanwhile, TNCs may provide market feedbacks and may even share some knowledge in 
design to suppliers so as to meet rapid changing market demands. Therefore, the more TNCs 
are interested in cooperative with local firms, the more possible upgrading will be achieved. 
Product upgrading would be more prosper than other types of upgrading because it satisfies 
TNC’s need of rapid product change for competing in the global market (Lüthje, 2004; Staritz 
et al., 2011). But functional upgrading remains unwelcomed by TNCs, because local firms 
may grow up as a new competitor. However, once the mutual interest is built on exploiting 
new markets rather than challenging the original market shares of TNCs, functional upgrading 
would be possible. In other words, the more mutual interests are developed, the more 
upgrading possibilities can be realized in local firms. 
Based on upgrading initiatives, local firms may invest a lot in familiarizing with the rules 
of the global market and in seeking global business opportunities. However, this effort not 
only requires intensive investment in capital, but also brings them into direct competition with 
a number of TNCs that have established world-wide brands, global distribution networks and 
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tremendous retail terminals. Given time and cost constrains, local firms would prefer to stay 
as contract manufacturers for global lead firms and improve their competitiveness by 
developing cutting-edge production technologies. Chapter 7 illustrates this proposition based 
on local upgrading in the apparel industry in the PRD. 
 
Proposition 3: In reciprocal coupling, the more balanced are power relations, the more 
synergy is there for upgrading. 
 
In reciprocal coupling, the extent and content of exchanged resources determines the 
ways of knowledge diffusion and power relations between local firms and TNCs. The power 
for regional institutions comes from their legitimized administrative rights on their territories. 
Local firms do not have this administrative power, but they have bargaining power because 
they are familiar with territorialized assets which are rooted in national bureaucratic systems 
and social-cultural networks. The outcomes of upgrading are quite diverse because all types 
of knowledge may diffuse according to specific criteria proposed by the local party.  
TNCs are not passive to the local demands of knowledge transfer, but will try various 
efforts to defend their leading positions in GPNs. For instance, they may enforce a modular 
pattern of production organization so as to internalize their competent technologies within 
modularized components. TNCs may only transfer know-how, but may continue to block the 
transfer of know-why. They also may increase the complexity of knowledge sharing by 
enforcing exclusive industrial standards or setting specialized production parameters. Hence 
local firms may also be technologically locked into them due to high asset specificity. 
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The niche of maintaining reciprocal coupling is a balanced power relation in which each 
party does not override the other. If local party request substantial knowledge sharing while 
does not provide corresponding benefits, TNCs may take a short-term strategy in the coupling 
without any intent of upgrading. If TNCs’ power overrides s the local party, they may be 
replaced unless they have technological monopoly in the global industry. In Chapter 8, this 
thesis exemplifies this proposition in the PRD’s automotive industry. 
 
Proposition 4: In absorptive coupling, the more capable are local firms in multi-tasking 
within GPNs, the more upgrading will occur. 
 
Absorptive coupling is an ultimate stage of latecomer upgrading. It is also the most 
difficult stage of development for local firms to achieve. Although TNCs still have greater 
power in terms of technological advance and market control, local firms already have certain 
independence in selecting partners to couple with. In this case, TNCs have to prepare for the 
potential challenges derived from further local upgrading. TNCs may resist sharing their 
original newly advanced technologies or even enforce specific agreements in the coupling to 
hinder local upgrading. They may also raise industrial entry barriers (e.g. new industrial 
standards) to impede local firms’ entry into the global market (Nadvi, 2008; Nadvi and 
Wältring, 2004; Tewari, 2008). 
A fundamental way for local firms to achieve this stage is to improve their absorptive 
capacities which refer to the ability of acquire, assimilate, transforms and exploit knowledge 
and apply it to commercial ends (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). There are generally two ways 
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of improving absorptive capacities that are (1) constantly investing in R&D (either internal or 
external); and (2) diversifying knowledge structures by training and recruiting more skilled 
labor and talents (Kim, 1998; Vind, 2008; Yang and Lin, 2012; Zahra and George, 2002). The 
improvement of absorptive capacities enable firms to speed up the learning process of 
absorbing knowledge from their TNCs counterparts, become more able to absorb knowledge 
from other channels, and eventually reduce dependency on TNCs. 
Apart from improving absorptive capacities, the GVC literature has suggested local 
firms to insert into multiple value chains rather than highly depend on one single chain 
(Schmitz, 2004). I rephrase this strategy as multi-tasking in GPNs through which local firms 
develop various partnerships with different types of TNCs which can be global buyers, 
branded lead firms, platform developers or intermediate traders. By serving multiple functions, 
such as conducting OEM/ODM/OBM business or developing different market niches 
simultaneously, local firms can diversify knowledge channels and identify more competitive 
dynamics within GPNs (see section 3.3.3). These efforts help local firms maximize upgrading 
opportunities by synthesizing resources at different localities or positions within GPNs. 
Empirical investigations of this study find that none of the industries, cities or clusters in the 
PRD has yet developed such absorptive coupling. However, the potential of absorptive 
coupling is emerging at some cases which is discussed in Chapter 9. 
3.4.3 Dark sides of strategic coupling and the potential of decoupling 
The above sections have shown the variety of strategic coupling and its dynamic process 
of evolution. However, this thesis tries to avoid an essential view towards the causality 
between strategic coupling and upgrading. Section 3.3.3 has implied that the process of 
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strategic coupling does not always benefit all regional actors, but contains certain dark sides. 
Power relations among coupled actors are not naturally harmonious, whereas are interwoven 
with various tensions. 
During the formation of coupling, regional actors have to be aware of the possibility of 
institutional capture, whereby the engagement between local institutions and external firms 
leads to the direct and indirect subsidization of the activities of inward investors through 
prioritizing the needs of such firms at the expense of indigenous firms (Phelps, 2000). Due to 
asymmetrical power relations between regional institutions and TNCs in GPNs, TNCs are 
more able to influence regional growth agenda in favor of their interests, such as industrial 
policies concerning commercialization, innovation and other research funds; regulations of 
labor markets in terms of skills, wage and working conditions; and more basically, fiscal 
incentives in taxations and infrastructures (Christopherson and Clark, 2007).  
Within strategic coupling, numerous studies have shown that the embeddedness of GPNs 
into regional economies does not guarantee to bring positive outcomes (Lowe, 2009; Phelps 
and Raines, 2003). Some of the local actors (e.g. firms and labor) may be marginalized in the 
process of value capture, though they may contribute substantially in value creation and 
enhancement. Meanwhile, the opportunities and livelihoods of people and households raise 
serious questions towards the issue of social upgrading when industrial upgrading is fulfilled. 
Coe and Hess (2010) have provided a detail account of negative consequences resulted from 
strategic coupling in which ruptures and frictions are created due to the conflict of interests 
between the coupled actors (see Figure 3.6). Tensions are trans-scalar in the sense that the 
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convention and recombination (MacKinnon, 2012; MacKinnon et al., 2009; Martin and 
Sunley, 2006). On the other hand, intra-regional firms have to improve their absorptive 
capacities so as to reduce dependency on TNCs and move to a more beneficial position within 
GPNs (see section 3.4.2). 
3.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has conceptualized the dynamics of local upgrading according to different 
types of strategic coupling. This effort bridges the theoretical gaps between geographical and 
non-geographical studies by embracing key influential factors (industrial governance, 
embeddedness and state intervention) and linking multi-scalar forces within a coherent 
analytical framework (see Figure 3.2). It thus contributes to the literature on industrial 
upgrading by offering a more realistic account of the mechanism of local upgrading. In 
contrast to the regionalism literature, my framework recognizes both endogenous and 
exogenous forces in a more balanced way. Comparing with the GVC literature, my 
framework provides a useful lens for appreciating the influences of various non-firm 
(non-profit) actors on the process of upgrading. More importantly, it reveals the influence of 
institutional-spatial contexts on value chain governance in which power relations may be 
reconfigured. Without privileging any specific scale or actors, this framework examines how 
the interactions of key actors within strategic coupling lead to various outcomes of upgrading. 
My analyses show that the driving forces of local upgrading are not as rigid as the GVC 
literature and development studies have predicted (see Chapter 2). This is basic contribution 
of this thesis. 
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The most critical contribution comes from my conceptualization of the typology of 
strategic coupling. Critically revisiting the concept of strategic coupling, this chapter further 
conceptualizes the concept in relation to different configurations of knowledge gaps and 
power relations. The fourfold typology serves as a key variable for explaining the dynamics 
of upgrading. This effort links together the regionalism literature and the GPN studies and 
helps readers understand the geography of upgrading in the context of globalization. Without 
any rigid and pre-determined trajectory, the process of local upgrading is dynamic and 
contingent to the interactions among key actors. Power relations and responsive strategies are 
critical factors that shape ways of knowledge diffusions. The interpretation of this typology 
illustrates the importance of political economy within GPNs in which the power relations of 
key actors and their bargaining processes are embedded in specific institutional-spatial 
contexts. While the content of knowledge diffusion is highly influenced by inter-firm 
governance pattern, synergy can be fostered to nurture more local upgrading. Within strategic 
coupling, besides the power of complementarity, there are also mutual interests and the 
reciprocity of resource exchange that produces synergy. 
Another effort made by this chapter is related to the discussion of power dynamics 
within strategic coupling. It is pointed out that local actors can utilize resources embedded at 
different scales to leverage the governance power of foreign firms. This effort opens out many 
other possibilities for local firms to increase bargaining power or bypass the control of TNCs. 
Particularly, upgrading opportunities would emerge when local actors manage to synthesize 
different resources. This interpretation complements to development studies by offering more 
alternative of local upgrading strategies. The problem is whether local firms are capable of 
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identifying these opportunities. The overall efforts of this chapter verify my central argument 
that local upgrading is subject to interactions among key actors, rather than the dominant 
power of global lead firms or state strategies alone. Four propositions are developed based on 
each type of strategic coupling. The rest of this thesis devotes four empirical chapters to 
exemplify the propositions, including one general chapter about strategic coupling in the PRD 







Chapter 4 Methodology 
 
Achieving a methodological approach which is consonant with one’s own values and 
concerns typically involves the longest struggle in research work and the deepest 
kinds of engagement (Salmon, 1992:77). 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The primary aim of my methodological approach is to investigate and measure how 
different types of strategic coupling are formed and affect the process of local upgrading in 
the PRD. The entire data collection process is guided by four key issues: (1) the extent to 
which the PRD has achieved industrial upgrading; (2) the key drivers of upgrading in 
respective historical moments and industries; (3) the types and evolution of strategic coupling 
developed during the processes of upgrading and (4) strategies that local firms have deployed 
in upgrading and the response of their foreign partners. 
This chapter is organized into six sections. The second section reflexively discusses a 
methodological commitment in the choice of a relational perspective. The third section 
provides a contextual overview about doing fieldwork in China and the strategies adopted for 
ensuring the accessibility and credibility of sought data. This section embodies how I have 
negotiated with and invested in the field based on my social-cultural advantages. The fourth 
section reviews earlier methods applied in the studies of industrial upgrading and details the 
selected methods. This effort shows how the applied methods link my research objectives to 
my theoretical pursue. This chapter also provides a critical assessment on my awareness and 
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enforcement of research ethics in the fifth section and ends with a summary. 
4.2 Methodological commitment 
While the relational perspective in economic geography receives scholars’ attentions 
increasingly, many of the discussions are concentrated in ontological and epistemological 
levels that argue for an alternative for understanding the intentions and strategies of economic 
actors, the patterns of relations, and how they behave upon the relations (Bathelt and Glückler, 
2003, 2011; Yeung, 2005). At a methodological level, this perspective does not privilege 
either a quantitative or a qualitative approach. The merit of this methodological openness 
provides a wide space for students of economic geography to apply various analytical tools 
from previous studies. But there is a methodological challenge for this perspective.  
As I have discussed in Chapter 3, there is a risk in adopting a relational perspective. It 
may become immune to empirical evaluation once the analytical framework becomes too 
loose and broad to include everything (Sunley, 2008). It also may over privilege a 
network-centric view and over emphasize the influence of non-territorialized relations such 
that geographical ingredients are losing relevance. This methodological risk becomes the most 
critical challenge throughout this study. In order to overcome this challenge, adopting 
multiple and complementary methodology practices becomes necessary for exploring the 
micro-foundation of economic actions and also generate theoretical insights based on a 
multi-scalar dimension. This effort overcomes the weakness of individual stand-alone 
methods and the fallibility of single method for representing complicated social-economic 
phenomena. In doing so, this study can go beyond making ‘stylized facts’ like the mainstream 
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economists prefer, or delivering ‘close dialogues’ that just reinterprets the same geography 
without new theoretical contributions (Clark, 1998; Yeung, 2003). This is a critical realist’s 
approach to the studies of upgrading. In critical realism, the behaviour and experiences of an 
individual is not just determined by their indigenous characteristics but by their positions in 
social structures, together with their associated resources, constraints and rules. The 
underlining mechanisms of a phenomenon do not just arise from the causality of a series of 
events, but also derive from the social structures of objects, and the locality they take place 
within geo-historical contexts (Sayer, 1997, 2000). Guiding by this view, my methodological 
objective is not only to explain the mechanisms of industrial upgrading, but to find the 
geo-historical contexts that may facilitate or hinder the working of mechanisms. 
In order to accomplish my research objectives, multiple methods are deployed that 
incorporate an interpretive approach (intensive) and a deductive orientation (extensive) 
approach, including using secondary data, in situ research, in-depth interviews, questionnaire 
surveys and participation observation. The infusion of both intensive and extensive 
approaches helps me reveal the complex motivations, opinions and experiences of an 
individual; and also identify regularities, patterns and distinguishing features of a population 
(Bryman, 2001; Hay, 2010; Kong, 1998). These methods are reflexively applied in all 
selected industries, localities and cases throughout this study. They are not novel in economic 
geography, while the synthesis of these methods would be a nuance. When absorbing useful 
methodological insights from earlier works, I also ground them in the context of doing 
fieldwork in China. The next section addresses fieldwork context in terms of constraints, 
limitations, personal home-based advantages and responsive strategies. 
109 
 
4.3 Contextualizing methods in the field 
Fieldwork context is very important to formulating a valid methodology for a 
social-science study. Proper understanding of the fieldwork contexts will guide researchers to 
select the most appropriate and effective methods for pursuing the right data (Patton, 2002). 
To all fieldwork researchers, there is always a fear that the validity of entire research may be 
jeopardized when they are forced to adjust or even revise the chosen methods in the field, thus 
becoming deviated from ideal methodological designs (Salmon, 1992). The central concern of 
understanding fieldwork contexts is to minimize the risk of getting ‘surprises’ or even failure 
in data collection during the planned main period of fieldwork (Crang and Cook, 2007). This 
section discusses specific problems of doing fieldwork in China as well as in the PRD; and 
my advantages and strategies of overcoming these problems. 
4.3.1 Doing fieldwork in China 
From the early 1990s, with the further opening reform of China, fieldwork opportunities 
in China became more and more available for oversea scholars. But the huge size, political 
specificity, and the diversity of geographical, social and cultural differences are posing many 
challenges towards scholars. As Heimer and Thøgersen (2006:1) noted, “doing fieldwork 
inside the PRC [People Republic of China] is an eye-opening but sometimes also deeply 
frustrating experience”. Normally, conducing fieldwork in such a developing country often 
encounters many common problems as in other developing countries, such as a low level of 
data accessibility but a high level of red tape, bureaucratic inefficiency, bribery/corruption, 
high sensitivity to outsiders or the approval of a research visa and so on (Heimer and 
110 
 
Thøgersen, 2006; Lowe, 2009; Udry, 2003; Wei, 2000; Yeung, 2001). Specifically in China’s 
contexts, there are three major issues challenging both domestic and foreign researchers. 
First of all, probably the biggest challenge is the dominant presence of the Communist 
party-state in the form of direct political-ideological control and the intangible influence of 
party discourse. The strict political censorship creates a barrier of ambiguous climate towards 
both domestic and overseas fieldworkers: what sort of information is open to the public is not 
clearly defined, but subject to the decision of local authorities and party cadres. When 
ambiguity emerges, the result is often information blockage, particularly to overseas 
researchers. Moreover, without an authorized and official source, foreign requests of access 
would be easily denied by governmental agencies or individual due to distrust and the intent 
of keep away from troubles. 
The difficulty of data access was the second methodological challenge. During the Mao 
period and even through to the 1980s, field researchers were under close surveillance with 
very limited access to the field and data collection. Today, this constraint has been greatly 
reduced. Many domestic universities, research institutes and even governmental agencies 
increasingly welcome overseas academics for short-term visits or joint research. While the 
restriction of access is loosening, the difficulty of field access is transferred to the level of a 
local contact. Currently, getting a research visa or finding a collaborator is no longer sufficient. 
A capable local contact becomes a necessary prerequisite for completing fieldworks. Many 
economic geographers have also pointed out this importance of capable local contacts for data 
collection in their China studies (Qiu, 2005; Wei et al., 2007; Yang, 2009). The quality of 
Guanxi (relation) among fieldworkers, local contacts and informants become a crucial key for 
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success. This feature is deeply rooted in Chinese traditional culture of trust building upon 
personal relations, gift economy, courtesy in networking and the preference of face-saving 
(Dunning and Kim, 2007; Hsu and Saxenian, 2000; Tsui, 1997). Without understanding these 
subtle rules or social norms, fieldworkers may not be able to reach the sought data in China. 
The third challenge, more specific to the PRD, is the anti-survey attitude among 
enterprises and organizations. More and more domestic and overseas researchers treat China 
as a precious empirical ‘lab’. Abundant research projects, planning programs and surveys 
have been implemented either officially or informally in the past decades. This trend has 
turned the PRD (as well as the Yangzi River Delta) into an over-studied place in which firms 
become tired of arranging for interviews and filling in questionnaires. They are sometimes 
frustrated by some badly designed studies disguised in the name of local authorities. One of 
my informants was involved in a compulsory national survey in which he was given a very 
thick questionnaire through the mail with a tight submission deadline. As he complained, “I 
did open the mail and took a look at the file. It was a book, not a questionnaire! I then threw it 
away. I am a businessman, not a student for exam”. 
4.3.2 Negotiation within the field 
As a native Chinese, I have been educated to comply with Chinese social norms, cultures 
and political ideology and did not meet great difficulties in infusing myself into the field. 
Having stayed there for eight years, I also know the study field well, such as its development 
history, geographical characteristics, economic and institutional conditions, local dialects and 




Benefiting from the fortune of timing, my research topic of industrial upgrading was 
resonating well with many ongoing policy research projects and governmental planning 
schemes during the fieldwork (see Chapter 1). This institutional context indirectly increased 
the credit of this study which was considered as a coherent and well-timed research project 
according to the prevailing political climate in the PRD. However, this advantage was still 
insufficient to sustain my access into the field. Without a formal and trustable local reference, 
I would still be regarded as an outsider. 
Specific efforts were devoted for finding sound local contacts. I invited a collaborator 
from my former graduate school at Sun Yat-sen University. Established in 1924, this 
university currently is one of the top ten universities of China located mainly in Guangzhou, 
the geographical center of the PRD. Serving as a significant education and research center, it 
has developed strong economic-social networks within the PRD based on thousands of 
promising alumni every year, various government-university research projects and 
laboratories, and a large number of public educational courses offering for the society. My 
collaborator is an experienced economic geographer. He has good reputation and intensive 
social networks in the PRD through his years of works as a prominent professor and research 
consultant. During my fieldwork period, he was conducting a national research project about 
industrial transformation and relocation in the PRD. Since I was invited to join in his project, 
my fieldwork was thus reframed as an international joint project. A specific agreement was 
made that I can autonomously conduct fieldwork under this project without necessity to share 
collected data with my research collaborator. 
But joint-research project merely served as one of my stepping stones to the field. I 
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intensively deployed my social networks to approach the potential informants. I sought helps 
from my classmates, alumni, collaborators in my earlier research projects and other personal 
friends. They rest in different domains in the PRD, particularly in Guangzhou city and the 
urban planning industry. For instance, Ms Z was my classmate who worked in the Urban 
Planning Office of Xintang township government. Since January 2010, she has been in charge 
of a local urban renewal project involving the renewal of the land-use property rights among 
many local firms in the apparel industry. With her great help, I managed to approach many 
prominent local entrepreneurs in Xintang, as well as the vice party deputy of the town. The 
fieldwork in Xintang eventually constitutes an important part of Chapter 7. In another 
example, I was introduced to a director in Flextronics1 (Zhuhai) through my friend who 
worked in Flextronics (Singapore). A ‘snowball’ effect happened after a successful interview. 
The director decided to recommend me to meet a vice president of Guangzhou Automotive 
Corporations. The vice president subsequently became a vital gatekeeper for me to access the 
automotive industry where I collected substantial data to complete my Chapter 8. 
Apart from the problem of access, I also met some difficulties in collecting quantitative 
data. Due to the problem of the anti-survey attitude in the PRD, I changed the original design 
of my questionnaire survey, based on suggestions from my collaborator and my pilot test (see 
section 4.4.2). In short, my fieldwork was a process of constant negotiation between the ideal 
methodological design and the availability of data and local contacts. Five key methods were 
eventually deployed in fieldwork, which is addressed in the next section. 
                                                              
1 The second largest global lead firm in electronics service manufacturing industry. 
114 
 
4.4 Methods and Data collection 
To a fieldworker, sources of data are infinite and one should always find a balance 
between the focus of addressing research objectives and the creativity of identifying empirical 
evidences. As Yeung (2003) and Clark (1998) pointed out, one of the merits of practicing 
economic geographies is the openness of using various methods beyond stylised facts and 
modelling to approximate the real world. This thesis has no intent of inventing or proposing a 
new method, but tries to engage in best practices in previous studies. This section interprets 
the reasons and implementation of method selection in relation to the types of sought data. 
4.4.1 Methods in early studies 
In prior studies of upgrading, economic geographers have shown the effectiveness of 
qualitative methods, mainly through case studies and on site research. These works have 
illuminated the strategies, performance, behavioural characteristics of firms in 
learning/upgrading, as well as the spatial restructuring of production networks (Coe et al., 
2004; Tokatli, 2003, 2007; Tokatli and Kizilgun, 2004; Vind, 2008; Yang, 2009; Yeung, 2007). 
Participation observation was applied for tracing the learning process and trajectory of 
regional upgrading (Lowe, 2009; Yang, 2009). Based on a questionnaire survey, Scott (2008) 
examined the interrelation between customer’s demands and upgrading in the furniture 
industry in Thailand. In Pavlinek and Zenka’s (2010) study of the automotive industry, the 
number of employee turnover was used for measuring process/product upgrading; wage 
improvement was applied to measure aggregate upgrading; R&D intensity (share of R&D 
expenditures in industrial value-added) was measured for reflecting the extent of functional 
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upgrading. These methods are all useful and have been integrated into this study. 
In other disciplines, such as industrial economics, economic sociology and development 
studies, scholars frequently apply quantitative indicators to measure upgrading, such as firm 
size, export/import, industrial gross output, industrial value added, the number of labour, 
profit, and capital investment and so on (Gereffi, 1999; Kaplinsky and Farooki, 2011; Ozawa, 
2005; Rabellotti, 2004; Schmitz, 2004). Other indicators like expenditure in R&D activities, 
value of new products, number of technicians and patents are applied, particularly in the 
innovation studies (see a detail review in Polenske, 2007). One of the most influential works 
comes from Giuliani et al (2005) who investigated casual relations between collective 
efficiencies and industrial upgrading based on a statistical model of Likert scale. But the 
mechanism of it was rather ambiguous because the causality was determined based on a 
simple correlation analysis without any detail elaboration and explanation. 
4.4.2 Methods employed in this study 
The difficulty of measuring empirically industrial upgrading comes from its multiple 
features. It has quantitative nature, like improvement in productivity and efficiency in relation 
to product and process upgrading. It also involves qualitative change, such as functional and 
inter-sectoral upgrading (see definition in Chapter 3). This study applies quantitative and 
qualitative methods that are associated with each other and infused in analyses. The types of 






Table 4.1 Research objectives, information requirements and methods 





 Historical development of the 
PRD 
 Incentives and strategies of 
actors from global, regional, 
and local scales, institutional 
and geographical contexts in 
the 1980s 
 Relationality and the pattern 
of integration 
 Literature in Chinese, archives, 
government publication and reports 
 Interviews with officials and researchers
 In-depth interviews with local 
entrepreneurs 







 Power relations and synergy 
within the coupling; 
 Investment, technology 
transfer, labour training, 
various learning and 
innovation activities 
 Key drivers of these activities 
 Extent and content of 
upgrading 
 In-depth interviews with local and 
foreign entrepreneurs 
 government publication and reports 
 Statistical yearbooks at both national, 
provincial and urban levels; 
 Informal discussions 
 Mapping: demographic distribution of 
industrial clusters 
 Participation observation: training, 
learning and innovation activities 
 Questionnaire survey: informants’ 





 Changing institutional 
environment 
 Emerging regional assets 
 New industrial opportunities 
 what new resources are 
deployed by firms; 
 Changing power relations; 
 Strategies of upgrading 
 Archives, publication, media news, 
official reports about new industrial 
policies and governmental imperatives 
 In-depth Interviews with officials and 
researchers 
 In-depth interviews with officials, local 
and foreign entrepreneurs 
 Questionnaire survey: informants’ 
evaluation to various assets / resources 
Source: author’s fieldwork. 
 
Secondary data 
Apart from reviewing Chinese literature, statistical yearbooks and reports in the PRD are 
important sources of secondary data. The collected statistical reports included three sets:  
(1) General statistical yearbooks in multiple years at national, provincial and urban 
levels from 1990 to 2010 and some statistical reports about data before 1990s. 
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(2) Specific statistical yearbooks: industrial statistic yearbooks and scientific statistic 
yearbooks in 2009, 2005 and 2000. 
(3) Guangdong Economic Census in 2004 and 2008. There are currently most precisely 
firm-level survey data in China. The 2004 census was provided by my collaborator, 
while a brief version of 2008 census was purchased from a local database company. 
Building on insights in the previous studies, I used various indicators to measure 
industrial upgrading at a regional level on the basis of industrial value added. Industrial value 
added equals the difference between an industry’s gross output (consisting of sales or receipts 
and other operating income, commodity taxes, and inventory change) and the cost of its 
intermediate inputs (including energy, raw materials, semi-finished goods, and services that 
are purchased from all sources). This indicator reflects the extent of value creation and 
capture more precisely than total industrial outputs. It has been increasingly applied in the 
GVC studies (Cattaneo et al., 2010; Gereffi, 2008; Sturgeon and Gereffi, 2009). 
Besides statistical reports, various urban planning reports were also collected (see Table 
4.2). According to China’s industrial regulations in the urban planning industry, information 
in urban planning and design reports are only allowed to be publicly disclosed one year after 
the approval of the plans. Hence I only used information from the approved planning reports 
before 2011. These reports provide many firm-level economic data in different cities, towns 
and industrial clusters, which support my elaborations on the pattern of strategic coupling 
throughout four empirical chapters. They also show the regional strategies and policies 
relevant to upgrading. Many representative firms presented in these reports were my top 
priority for research interviews and visits. 
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Table 4.2 Referenced urban planning reports 
In English In Chinese 
 DRCGP, 2009, "Research Report of the High-Tech Renewal 
of Traditional Industries in Guangdong Province",  





 DRCGP, 2009, "Research on the Development of High-Tech 
Industries in Guangdong Province in a New Era",  
(Development and Reform Commission of Guangdong 




 NDRC, 2003, "Planning of the Coordination and 
Development of Megalopolis in Pearl River Delta",  




 NDRC, 2008, "The Outline of the Plan for the Reform and 
Development of the Pearl River Delta 2008-2020",  (The 




 DRBBDGS, 2005, "Research of Lessons from Industrial 
Upgrading from Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore (in 
Chinese)",  (Development and Reform Bureau of Baoan 




 CDPRC, 2007, "Industrial Planning Section in Urban Master 
Plan of Shenzhen 2006-2020 (in Chinese)",  (Shenzhen 
Division of China Development and Planning Research 





 GDDRC, 2004, "Development Planning of Nine Key 
Industries in Guangdong Province 2005-2010 (in Chinese)",  





 GDEIC, 2010, "Development of the Strategic New Industries 
of the Guangdong Twelve Five-Year Plan",  (Guangdong 




Source: author’s fieldwork. 
 
In-depth interviews 
      Since the post-quantitative cultural turns, economic geographers have recognized the 
merit and beauty of ‘talking to people’ as a considerable method for practicing human 
geography (Cloke et al., 2004). In-depth interview has become one of the fundamental 
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methods for geographers to get closer to the reality, thus transcending the explanatory limit of 
neoclassical economics (Dunn, 2010). This method can fill a gap in knowledge that other 
methods (e.g. census data) are unable to bridge efficaciously. It can investigate the complex 
behaviors, motivations and opinions of informants. By giving informants some causes to reflect on 
their experiences, in-depth interview can help researchers to find out more about the research 
objects than if they are simply observed or complete a questionnaire (Minichiello et al., 1995; 
Valentine, 1997). 
While census data present the general characteristics of industrial upgrading, this study 
deploys in-depth interviews for identifying the mechanism of local upgrading and more 
critically, for linking different empirical findings together in order to explain the evolution of 
strategic coupling and the outcomes of upgrading. These interviews not only provide direct 
evidence, but also point to many clues for understanding the phenomena of upgrading. 
More specifically, I conducted a pilot fieldwork with several interviews in June 2009. 
Two revisions were made based on feedbacks from the pilot test. First, I decided not to 
proceed to interviewees directly by myself, but to rely on local contacts to play an 
intermediate role. This worked well in trust building. Second, I only conducted face-to-face 
interviews, because Chinese informants regarded interviews via telephone or email as a 
distrustful and impolite manner. Three key industries (the automotive, electronics and apparel 
industries) were selected to represent a variety of industrial specificity in term of industrial 
governance and production organization (see Table 4.3). These three industries have been 
playing a representative role in the transformation and upgrading of regional industrial 
structures (see section 4.1 in Chapter 1). But they went through different trajectories of 
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industrial upgrading respectively. 
 
Table 4.3 Industrial specificity in the PRD 
Sources: author’s fieldwork, Dicken (2007), Gereffi et al. (2005), Schmitz (2004). 
 
In-depth interviews constituted the main part of the fieldwork. They were conducted 
from February to September in 2010 during which site research and participation observation 
were accompanied. Informants were selected based on a non-probability sampling with two 
principles: (1) the sample enterprises were involved in upgrading activities or events no 
matter they failed or succeeded; (2) the sample enterprises were representative and not 
reflecting an ad hoc case. Ultimately, 110 interviews were accomplished in the field. Most of 
the informants are concentrated on five major cities in the PRD, including Shenzhen, 
Dongguan, Guangzhou, Foshan and Zhuhai (see Figure 4.1). Corporate informants made up 
the majority and senior-level informants accounted for a major share. About one third of all 
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Table 4.5 shows the profile of informants from another angle. 77 of the corporate 
informants are manufactures and 6 of them are from professional service providers and 
traders. The majority of manufactures are composed by three targeted industries. The 
informants are representative according to their positions. Table 4.6 shows the economic 
profile of corporate informants. Among 83 interviewed companies, ten of them are top 50 
companies in Guangdong Province in 2009 in terms of total industrial output. About 20% 
companies had a value of industrial output over 500 million yuan in 2009. The total industrial 
output of four largest interviewed companies was 363 billion yuan which accounted for 6% of 
the PRD’s output value in 2009. 
 
Table 4.5 Industrial structure of informants 
Types of informants  Number Percentage in total 
Manufacturing 77 70% 
Apparel  21 19% 
Electronics  34 31% 
Automotive  16 15% 
Chemical  2 2% 
Ceramics  2 2% 
Steel  2 2% 
Other 33 30% 
industrial association  11 10% 
gov. agency  10 9% 
Research Institute  6 5% 
Service company  4 4% 
Trader  2 2% 
Total 110 100% 









Table 4.6 Economic profile of corporate informants 
Items   Number of enterprises Percentage in total 
Decade established 
1980s 39 47% 
1990s 27 33% 
2000s 17 20% 
Start-up Investment (million yuan) 
< 1 10 12% 
1 - 5 27 33% 
5 - 10 23 28% 
> 10 23 28% 
Revenue Scale (in 2009, million yuan) 
< 5  5 6% 
5 - 50  22 27% 
50 - 500  40 48% 
  500 - 50,000  12 14% 
> 50,000  4 5% 
Employment in 2010 (person) 
< 100  10 12% 
100 - 1000  28 34% 
1,000 - 5,000  24 29% 
5,000 - 10,000  12 14% 
> 10,000  9 11% 
Ownership types 
SOE 5 6% 
FIE 24 29% 
PE   54 65% 
Total  83 100% 
Source: author’s fieldwork. 
 
Questionnaire survey 
Questionnaires are useful for collecting information about informants’ behaviour, 
experiences, social interactions, attitudes, opinions and awareness of events. There are some 
limitations to the depth and extent of qualitative data that a questionnaire is capable of 
gathering. But this method have several strengths that can effectively complement qualitative 
research (MacLafferty, 2003; Parfitt, 2005). It can provide a framework for in-depth 
interviews, allowing key concepts, values and meanings to be teased out and measured. It also 
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gives informant the privacy and time to consider the developer their responses to sensitive 
questions (McGuirk and O'Neill, 2010). 
During my preliminary fieldwork in 2009, some of my local contacts suggested to me 
that I should not conduct a questionnaire survey because local entrepreneurs might hold an 
anti-survey attitude (see section 4.3). Yang (2009) also reported this problem in the PRD in 
which she eventually changed the planned survey. But when re-entering the filed in 2010, I 
figured out that the problem rested in the way of survey delivery, not in the survey itself. In 
many of the previous surveys, questionnaires were delivered by mails, express delivery, or 
undergraduate students who were temporarily hired as research assistants. These 
questionnaires tended to be negatively resisted. However, this problem could be eliminated by 
better trust building and courtesy, such as face-to-face communication between principle 
investigators and informants.  
Recognizing the nature of the anti-survey attitude, I insisted on conducting a survey by 
delivering the questionnaire at the end of the interview. Informants were free to complete it on 
spot or mail it back to me later. In order to lower informants’ resistance, I also deployed some 
networking skills which were rooted in the culture of gift economy in China. I only asked my 
local contacts to introduce informants whoever my local contacts had a strong tie. Therefore, 
most of my informants were willing help and, in doing so, giving/returning a favour to my 
local contacts. Meanwhile, I prepared a set of research materials about industrial upgrading 
for sharing with informants. This initiative made the interview a mutual learning process. 
Additionally, a coaster printed with NUS’s logo was given as a token of appreciation. 
Only manufacturers were involved in the survey. The informants were asked to evaluate 
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the progress of various types of upgrading of their companies and some influential factors 
during the process of upgrading. The questionnaire was not asking the same question as in the 
interview. For instance, during the interview, I asked the informant to talk about how a new 
production line was installed and why they wanted to purchase that machine. In the 
questionnaire, the informant only evaluated the extent of process upgrading based on a given 
value. A pilot test was conducted with eight corporate informants and three professional 
researchers in March 2010. My thesis committee also gave me substantial feedbacks on the 
questionnaire design. Two revisions were made accordingly: (1) the number of questions was 
reduced from 50 to 30; (2) the scale of value was reduced from 0 ~ 5 to 0 ~ 3 (see the 
translated version of questionnaire in Appendix A). 
The overall outcome of questionnaire survey was satisfactory. 77 sets of questionnaires 
were accepted by informants. About one third of them were completed on the spot and the rest 
returned questionnaires through express delivery, fax or email.2 All returned questionnaires 
were checked to see whether informants had completed them and whether the answers were 
consistent with the interviews. Incomplete or unclear questionnaires were followed up 
accordingly. When the informants became unavailable, the questionnaires were deemed as 
unqualified samples. This effort ensured an effective returned rate (89%) of which 69 






2 Many of them asked me to email the questionnaire to them later on instead of completing it on the spot. 
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Table 4.7 Sample profile of questionnaire survey 








Source: author’s fieldwork. 
 
In-site and participation observation 
In-site and participation observation yielded data on knowledge diffusion during the 
process of local upgrading in the PRD. The observation allowed me to move beyond taking 
information from interviews as a matter of fact, and more significantly, developed a 
ground-level feeling of the on-going mechanisms and outcomes. I mainly engaged in three 
types of observation. 
First of all, throughout the whole fieldwork, I travelled extensively through different 
cities, towns and industrial districts in order to conduct interviews. Observation along the way 
was thus conducted. I observed in an impressionistic manner the outcomes of regional 
upgrading. During the interviews, many corporate informants also offered me a site visit to 
their factories, R&D centres, and production lines (see Figure 4.2). I cognitively perceived the 
flow of knowledge diffusion from receiving orders to delivering goods. Particularly, I was 
able to observe some in-house training sections and workshops for understanding better 
product and process upgrading. In some special occasions, the informant personally showed 
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observation. This perceived knowledge is fully deployed in my explanations and 
interpretations throughout this thesis. 
4.5 Research ethics 
Research ethics is the values that regulate and govern the ethical behaviours of scholars 
during research, as well as the ways of scholars in reinterpreting collected information and 
attempting to elaborate the perspective and norms of the profession (Dowling, 2010; Hay, 
1998; Valentine, 2005). Key issues include positionality, honesty, ethical standards, 
confidential protocol and authorship. This section elaborates my positionality in fieldwork 
and how I averted inappropriate ethics behaviours. 
4.5.1 Positionality 
I consider research positionality as the most critical issue which requires a researcher to 
be continuously reflexive towards scientific beliefs, values and approaches. This effort is to 
ensure internal consistency of my study from theorization to empirical verification. The 
problem of positionality can be dated back to the crisis of representation in social science that 
‘the problem of description becomes the problem of representation’ (Hay, 2010; Marcus and 
Fischer, 1986). This situation happens when a researcher fails to appropriate and synthesize 
shifting paradigms adopted in his/her research. Hence the researcher encountered with a 
problem of explaining the reality with a storyline mixed up by different value judgements and 
standards, irrespective of his/her awareness of this problem. Internal contradictions in 
interpretations are thus generated. 
Being aware of this problem, I adopted critical realism as my philosophical paradigm for 
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perceiving and theorizing reality. Whilst empiricism and positivism tends to locate causal 
relationships at the level of events generally, critical realism locates the causality at the level 
of a generative mechanism. It argues that causal relationships are irreducible to ‘empirical 
constant conjunctions’ in terms of David Hume's doctrine, or ‘empirical contexts' in Andrew 
Sayer's account (Archer et al., 1998; Bhaskar, 1975; Collier, 1994; Sayer, 1994, 1997). In 
other words, a constant conjunctive relationship between events is neither sufficient nor even 
necessary to establish a causal relationship.  
The relational perspective in economic geography is partly rooted in critical realism 
(Bathelt and Glückler, 2003, 2005; Boggs and Rantisi, 2003; Yeung, 1997b, 2005). It explains 
the spatiality of economic actor’s activities by (1) highlighting the relationality and power that 
produces conjunctive relations between events; and (2) identifying the contexts when the 
events happen in a single or multiple localities (see section 3.2 in Chapter 3). As such, 
upgrading is neither a necessary outcome of learning or innovation, nor pre-determined by 
stylized governance patterns (as in the GVC literature). Instead, it should be grounded in both 
causal relations and spatial contexts where industrial upgrading takes place. This is the 
fundamental way of interpretation in this thesis. 
4.5.2 Ethics and its implementation 
When entering the field, I did not encounter difficulties in understanding industrial 
landscapes and everyday life in the field. Being a native Chinese, it is also possible for me to 
avoid a predisposed Western-centric cultural perspective to China’s issues. I critically remind 
myself to avoid being a China centralist who exaggerates the achievements of China’s 
economic growth and becomes blind to the dark sides of these achievements. I keep reflexive 
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of the power dynamics among local contacts, informant and me. To informants, they were 
doing a favour for friends (friend-like organizations). In the view of local contacts, they were 
both doing a favour for me and for academic research. 
From design to implementation, my fieldwork followed strictly established procedures, 
protocols and other ethical norms I had committed with the approval of the Institutional 
Reviewing Board (IRB) of NUS. This IRB work was completed in March 2009. 
Informed consent was received on the spot of interview as a confirmation of informant’s 
acknowledge upon the procedure of interview (e.g. duration or approval for recording), 
privacy protection, confidentiality, and other rights of participants (e.g. levels of data 
disclosure and anonymity). Several informants refused to sign the forms for personal issues, 
though they agreed to let me use information collected during the interviews. About one third 
of the corporate informants requested to be anonymous. Most of the governmental informants 
disallowed me to quote any exact figures they had mentioned during the interviews in my 
thesis or further publications, except if those statistical data were publicly available. 
An interview guideline was given to informants in advance and interview language was 
chosen by informants to ensure the comfort and accuracy of expression (see a sample of 
guideline in Appendix B). Most of the localities of interviews were in informants’ own offices 
or workplaces where they had a sense of authority. Questions asked were not supposed to 
cause any trouble to informants. If informants disagreed with audio recording, hand-writing 
was used as a replacement. Informants were allowed to interrupt the interview without 
necessity to explain, but I did not encounter this situation. At the end of each interview, 
informants were requested to check the scripted interview data in order to convince them that 
132 
 
all data were accurately recorded. Whenever data are extracted and represented in thesis, I 
strictly assure that the informant’ identity is confidential. Their anonymity is guaranteed by 
using titles or pseudonyms if a direct quotation is extracted from the interview data. Before 
publication, all extracted data (cases and quotations) will be sent back to the informants for 
double checking accuracy and the consent of publication. In sum, every attempt is made to 
ensure the rights and privacy of my informant, as well as the honesty and objectivity of my 
research. 
4.6 Conclusion 
The methodology of this study is premised on the multi-methods approach to empirical 
research. My methodological framework was designed to explore the content and extent of 
upgrading at the firm and the regional level, the formation of strategic coupling, and most 
importantly, to explain the interrelations between coupling and upgrading. This methodology 
was not idealistic, but was grounded upon rounds of negotiation within the field contexts. The 
selected methods were strictly guided by a scientific belief of critical realism. Data collected 
include statistical reports in multiple years, a pool of in-depth interviews, a set of 
questionnaire survey, and observations in the field. The outcomes are satisfactory: 110 
interviews were conducted and 69 questionnaires were collected with a high return rate. These 
efforts have demonstrated the effectiveness, representativeness and validity of my fieldwork. 
Having detailed the methodology of this study, I now turn to the next four chapters that 
systematically present my empirical findings and their theoretical implications on local 
upgrading in the PRD. 
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Chapter 5 Industrial upgrading and evolutionary strategic coupling 
in the Pearl River Delta 
 
5.1 Introduction 
Since the 'open-door' reform in 1979, China has been transformed from an isolated 
country into one of the world's leading producers, traders and destinations for FDI. In the first 
half year of 2010, China overtook Japan and became the second largest economy in the world 
with the GDP of $2.6 trillion.1 However, this remarkable economic growth has been 
questioned. There is an ongoing debate about whether the performance of China’s economic 
is driven mainly by productivity growth or by factor accumulation (Wang and Meng, 2001; 
Wang and Yao, 2003). It is unclear whether FDI or human capital is more influential. The 
role of FDI in domestic knowledge spillover and national exports is also controversial 
(Cheung and Lin, 2004; Xu and Lu, 2009). 
Specific to industrial upgrading, when the performance of the Chinese economy has 
been improved, whether Chinese local (domestic) firms have achieved corresponding 
upgrading is still in question (Huang, 2008; Sun, 2007; Young and Lan, 1997). There are two 
different strands of thoughts. In a pessimist view, Steinfeld (2004:1971) argues that “Chinese 
enterprises have become extensively linked with the global economy, yet in a shallow manner. 
They remain stuck in commodity manufacturing, undifferentiated activities for which 
                                                              
1 Source: National Bureau of Statistics, http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/jdsj/t20100716_402657756.htm 
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innovation is absent”. Huang (2008) believes that SOEs have made a major contribution to 
the growth of domestic economies. But the contribution is at the expense of a huge amount of 
state investments utilized in a very inefficient way. Steinfeld (2010) also critiques that 
Chinese firms will not be the threat to the West, due to their lagging-behind speed in 
technological innovation in comparison with Western TNCs. 
In contrast to these critiques, other studies embody an optimistic view to the 
achievement of upgrading in China, such as the formations of industrial districts and the 
changing patterns of regional development (Marco and Marco, 2005; Sun, 2007; Wei et al., 
2007; Wei et al., 2009b); the improving capabilities of innovation in domestic firms (Ernst, 
2007; Fan, 2007; Lazonick, 2004; Zhou, 2008a; Zhou and Tong, 2003); the enhancement of 
institutional environment (Lin, 2009a; Zheng et al., 2009) and so on. These studies consider 
export-oriented industrialization and indigenous absorptive capabilities as the key to achieve 
innovation and industrial upgrading (Zhou and Wei, 2011). Scholars in the literature of 
developmental state hold a similar view. They argue for export-driven forces as the primary 
and superior impetus for industrial growth and technological upgrading to latecomer 
economies (Amsden, 1989; Beeson, 2004; Hobday, 1995; Lall and Urata, 2003; White, 1988). 
Situating in such a debate, this thesis does not attempt to offer an exhaustive account of 
the progress of industrial upgrading or to argue whether foreign firms or China’s states are the 
key driver of domestic industrial growth. Drawing upon the case of the PRD, it focuses on an 
issue that these China studies have not yet clearly articulated: how does the interplay among 
foreign firms, domestic firms and state institutions affect local upgrading? 
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Chapter 3 has theorized the causal mechanism between strategic coupling and the 
dynamics of latecomer upgrading. From this chapter through to Chapter 8, I will 
operationalize the relational framework and exemplify the upgrading mechanism based on the 
case of the PRD over three decades of development. As the first empirical chapter, this 
chapter focuses on three topics: what types of strategic coupling have been developed in the 
past decades; the extent to which the PRD has achieved upgrading and the key drivers of this 
upgrading; the features of changing pattern of coupling. It is organized into five sections.  
The next section provides an overview of the regional trajectory of industrial 
development and the characteristics of upgrading in the PRD. Key analyses are laid out in the 
third and fourth sections. Drawing upon the relational framework, the third section elaborates 
on the formation of strategic coupling and the limited outcomes of upgrading produced in 
strategic coupling. The fourth section articulates the evolutionary tendency of strategic 
coupling in the PRD in three dimensions: the changing profiles of foreign trade, the diverse 
performance of firms and changing institutional-spatial conditions. The final section discusses 
how the trajectory of the PRD exemplifies the casual relation between strategic coupling and 
local upgrading. A preface of subsequent chapters is provided. 
5.2 Growth dynamics in the Pearl River Delta: beyond a world factory 
Chapter 1 has introduced the changing role of the PRD in China’s national economy 
through its shifting from a less-favored region into an experimental field of marketization. 
This section summarizes three key development stages of the PRD over three decades in 
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relation to changing regional institutional environment. The progress of industrial upgrading 
is measured in various ways. 
5.2.1 Development stages of the Pearl River Delta 
The post-reform development of the PRD can be reinterpreted as three stages in relation 
to institutional reforms historically. From 1978 to 1992, the PRD was in a period of restricted 
policy experiment. Strategic coupling was developed in which the central government 
mediated this region to meet the demands of industrial relocation of Hong Kong and other 
East Asian NIEs such as Japan. This period was meant for exploring institutional reforms and 
learning the manipulation of capitalism (Lu, 2001; Xu, 1988). Before 1986, all reform 
policies were only available within two special economic zones in the PRD (Shenzhen and 
Zhuhai). Township and village enterprises (TVEs) were encouraged by local states within 
rural areas in the rest of the PRD. Foreign investors, mainly from Hong Kong, were allowed 
to establish export-processing enterprises (EPEs) in the PRD. The preliminary success of 
industrialization encouraged China’s central government to remove the restriction after 1986. 
Industrialization was speeded up. From 1986 to 1992, the total industrial output of the PRD 
increased by 32% annually; and land used for urban and industrial development expanded by 
60,000 hectares. 
During the 1990s, strategic coupling was reinforced in which the PRD experienced very 
rapid industrialization with further market liberalization. The initial success and the Southern 
inspection tour of Deng Xiaoping (in 1992) served as catalysts that brought more institutional 
supports to the PRD (Fang and Luo, 1999; Gan and Gan, 1994; Li, 1997; Tang and Tian, 
2002). In 1994, the PRD was officially established as an independent economic zone with 
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more autonomy for attracting foreign investments and leveraging institutional reforms (Wu, 
2005). Meanwhile, the implementation of new fiscal law stimulated prefecture governments 
as the key actors of industrial development, because they became heavily dependent on land 
transfer fees as revenues (Li, 2002; Lin, 2009b; Wu, 2007). From 1990 to 1993, the amount of 
utilized FDI in the PRD reached $14 billion, which was twice of the total amount in the 1980s. 
From 1993 to 1997, the PRD underwent rounds of economic booms in stock market and real 
estate market (commercial and industrial). Billions of domestic capitals and millions of 
migrant workers flowed in this region. However, this rapid development was slowed down by 
the 1997 Asian financial crisis during which Hong Kong experienced a very serious recession 
and significant negative impacts on the PRD occurred (Jao, 2001; Lin and Chen, 2003). 
After 2000, China’s accession into WTO made the PRD more open to international 
competition in which local firms enjoyed less export rebates, import subsidies and tax 
reduction as before (Chen and Wang, 2010; Sit, 2001; Yeung, 2002a). During this period, 
strategic coupling was enhanced in two ways. 
First, Hong Kong was further integrated with the PRD under the Mainland and Hong 
Kong Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPA). This arrangement was an 
economic cooperative framework launched in 2004, including tax-free policies, market 
opening in service industries and investment facilitation2. The mission of CEPA was partly 
meant for upgrading the PRD’s economy by attracting more producer-service industries from 
Hong Kong (Yang, 2005).  
                                                              
2 Since 2004, about 300 products have been treated as tax-free products for manufacturing, covering industries 
like electronics, apparel, medical and chemical. Four main industrial markets in the PRD were open for Hong 
Kong firms to participate in and hundreds of manufacturing components were treated as free-tax goods. Macao 
was included in the agreement later on. 
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Second, the PRD’s regional authorities have implemented various new industrial policies 
to stimulate industrial upgrading and improve absorptive capacities. As introduced in Chapter 
1, the PRD has adopted the dual-transformation policy since 2008 which was meant for 
replacing lower value-added industries with the higher ones. When this policy was 
implemented, tension emerged between local and regional authorities in defining the usage of 
industrial land (Yang, 2012; also see Chapter 7). Meanwhile, apart from increasing research 
funds for endogenous firms, regional authorities implemented a new policy - Guangdong 
Technology Correspondent Project which was straightly meant for improving regional 
absorptive capacities. The project tried to build up regional innovation networks by 
establishing connections between universities/institutes and local firms. Selected technicians 
were allocated to local firms for at least one year and were required to participate in at least 
one project pertinent to upgrading or innovation, such as process improvement, new product 
development or equipment redevelopment. By 2010, about 1,000 technicians were allocated 
to 932 firms. About 80% of the firms located in the PRD and more than 50% were electronics 
enterprises 3 . During this period, the PRD has also been challenged by its economic 
sustainability, such as the exhausting land resources, raising labor wages, environmental 
degradation and increasing raw material costs and so on (Huang and Chen, 2009). All these 
problems pointed to industrial upgrading as an ultimate solution (Yu and Zhang, 2009). 
5.2.2 Characteristics of industrial upgrading 
Throughout three decades of export-oriented industrialization, the PRD has achieved 





backwater into one of the world’s leading manufacturing hubs. From 1978 to 2010, GDP in 
the PRD grew by 15-17% annually (GDSY, 2010). By 2009, the PRD took up 3% of the 
world exports with a value of $234 billion. Within China, the PRD has become a national 
economic vanguard. Since 1990, the PRD has accounted for more than 28% of export value in 
the country’s total. Since 2000s, the annual GDP of the PRD has consistently exceeded 8.5% 
of the national total. This rapid industrial growth was accompanied by the improvement of 
performance at the firm level. A measurement based on industrial value added (IVA) 
illustrates this tendency. 
As shown in Table 5.1, the total IVA of the region increased from 6.1 billion yuan in 
1980 to 1,529 billion yuan in 2009. This significant growth resulted from improved efficiency 
of firms. From 1980 to 2009, IVA per enterprise continuously grew from 0.4 million yuan to 
37 million yuan. The IVA per capita also achieved a remarkable growth of 23.5 times. During 
the same period, the number of firms only increased by 2.5 times and the number of workers 
grew with 10 times. These growth rates were much slower than the ones in IVA per enterprise 
and per capita. 
By comparing the ratios of labor intensity and technology intensity, a watershed of the 
regional trajectory can be seen. Around 2000, the figure of labor intensity reached a peak 
level and then dropped slowly. In contrast, the ratio of technology intensity kept increasing 
continuously. This trend implies that firms in the PRD were less dependent on utilizing 
massive labor as before. Instead, significant investments were devoted to improving the 
technological capabilities of firms. It should be noticed that the figure of technology intensity 
here only refers to expenditures on new facilities and equipment renewal. Overall, the profit 
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ratio of the PRD’s firms was enhanced from 3.5% in 1990 to 6.1% in 2009. 
 
Table 5.1 Industrial development and upgrading in the Pearl River Delta 
Category Unit 1980 1990 1995 2000 2005 2009
GDP billions 12 101 408 842 1828 3218
# PRD / Nation % 2.6 5.4 6.7 8.5 9.9 9.4
IVA billion 6.1 29 120 263 815 1529
No. Enterprises thousand 16.3 25.1 19.5 15.7 28.2  41.6 
No. Employees million 3.3 6.1 15.1 25.8 28.2 32.6
IVA per enterprise millions 0.4 1.2 6.2 18.1 28.9  36.7 
IVA per capita thousand 1.9 5.4 8.0 15.3 28.9  46.9 
ELI unit 193 232 776 1352 999  783 
ETI million 0.1 0.6 2.5 5.4 6.4  7.2 
Profit ratio % N.A. 3.5 3.1 3.5 4.8  6.1 
Notes: expect for figure in GDP, all data refer to enterprises above designated size that an annual 
turnover more than 5 million yuan. These enterprises accounted for the majority of total industrial 
output in the PRD which was more than 85% before 2000 and about 95% by 2009. IVA= industrial 
value-added; ELI, enterprise labor intensity = employment per enterprise; ETI, enterprise 
technology intensity = annual net value of equipment and instrument per enterprise; Profit ratio = 
gross profit / total turnover. 
Sources: Guangdong Statistic Yearbook, 1990-2010; Pearl River Delta and Yangzi River Delta Statistic 
Yearbook, 2000, 2006, 2010; Guangdong Industrial Census 2004. 
 
The revealed competitive advantages (RCA) index is applied to reflect the changing 
competiveness of the PRD in the 2000s. The RCA index is widely used in international 
economics for calculating the relative advantage or disadvantage of a certain country/region 
in a certain class of goods or services as evidenced by trade flows (see Balassa, 1979; Li et al., 
2012). Results in Table 5.2 show that the region has been upgrading its competitiveness in the 
past decade with an increasing RCA index from 0.11 to 0.17, in spite of negative impacts 
from the global financial crisis in 2008.4 The most competitive industries were textile, 
apparel (including footwear, headgear and so on), stone products, miscellaneous manufacture, 
and workers of art collectors. The competitiveness of machinery and electronics products also 
                                                              
4 The massive drop of the RCA index in 2004 mainly resulted from the huge increase of imports in plant products, 
medical instruments and equipment, clocks and watches, musical instruments and so on. These export amount of 
these products originally exceeded import before 2000. 
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achieved moderate extent of growth from 0.15 to 0.23. But the international competitiveness 
of the automotive sector was reducing (see products of Vehicles and Aircraft vessels). 
 
Table 5.2 RCA index of foreign merchandise trade in Guangdong Province 
Years 1998 2004 2009 
Total 0.11 0.07 0.17 
live animal 0.33 0.25  0.02  
Vegetable products 0.09 -0.49  -0.63 
Animal or vegetable fats -0.36 -0.90  -0.86 
Prepared foodstuff 0.44 0.37  0.31 
Mineral products -0.24 -0.77  -0.56 
Chemical products -0.37 -0.52  -0.33 
Plastics &amp  -0.36 -0.42  -0.35 
Wood &amp products -0.27 -0.08  0.14 
Wood pulp &amp -0.44 -0.30  0.07 
Textile &amp 0.35 0.36  0.63 
Footwear, Headgear, Umbrellas, Feather & amp 0.96 0.97  0.97 
Stone products 0.42 0.47  0.67 
Jewelry, Coins 0.07 0.27  0.15 
Base metal &amp -0.31 -0.24  -0.2 
Machinery, Electric product &amp 0.15 0.12  0.23 
Vehicles Aircraft vessel 0.32 0.15  0.08 
Instruments, Medical/optical Instruments &amp 0.34 -0.20  -0.16 
Miscellaneous Manufacture 0.94 0.93  0.93 
Works of Art Collectors 0.98 0.95  0.93 
Special Trading Goods 0.18 -0.89  -0.8 
Notes: the RCA of net exports as a percentage of gross exports plus imports, given by  




ܺ௫௔௧is the region x’s export value of commodity at time t; 
M୶ୟ୲ is the region x’s import value of commodity at time t; 
Ceteris paribus the closer the index is to +1.0; the more competitive an industry is in the global 
economy, and vice versa: that is, RCA ൒ 0 implies comparative advantage while RCA ൑ 0 implies 
a competitive disadvantage. 
Sources: export and import data of main merchandise in Guangdong Statistic Yearbook in multiple 
years. Data specific for the PRD are unavailable. Provincial data are deployed and regarded as 
representative because The PRD’s foreign trading accounted for more than 90% of the entire 




Besides the upgrading of firm performance, functional upgrading was also achieved at 
the regional level in the sense that the PRD has upgraded from a processing base into one of a 
local economic power house with horizontally agglomerated industries, vertically integrated 
production networks and a growing body of R&D and innovation activities (Enright et al., 
2005; Enright et al., 2003; Yang and Liao, 2009; Yu and Zhang, 2009). Dozens of industrial 
clusters, national/provincial industrial parks and development zones were developed in 
various sectors, such as electronics, home appliances, telecommunication equipment, toys, 
automobile vehicles, watches and clocks, garments, footwear, plastics products, and ceramics 
and so on. 
As I have shown in Chapter 1, the industrial structure of the PRD is moving towards and 
concentrating in higher value added sectors (see Figure 1.3). The dominant role of the 
electronics industry, including electronics product, ICT and electronic machinery, has been 
reinforced. In contrast, the influence of the textile and apparel industries is declining over 
time. As a newly emerging industry with higher value added, the transport equipment industry 
stands as the industry with most significant growth. 
Along with the transformation of industrial structure, the positions of these industries in 
GPNs are also improved. Currently, the PRD’s electronics industry is not made up by low 
value-added processors in a marginal position. Instead, the PRD has taken up a much more 
central role in the electronics’ GPNs. This industry comprises manufacturing plants of many 
global lead firms in consumer electronics such as Sony, Kyocera, Toshiba, Samsung, LG, 
Nokia and Motorola; key electronics manufacturing service (EMS) providers like Foxconn, 
Flextronics, Quanta, Compal, Wistron, Inventec and Delta; and promising local or domestic 
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Chinese firms like Huawei and ZTE (telecommunication), Media and TCL (home appliance), 
and Lenovo (computer) and so on. Integrated with thousands of suppliers, these leading 
electronics firms agglomerate within dozens of industrial clusters/parks in the PRD, 
particularly in Shenzhen, Dongguan and Zhuhai (see details in Chapter 6).  
In the apparel industry, thousands of competent local firms agglomerate in clusters and 
product-specific specialized towns. They are manufacturing countless products for most of the 
global branded retailers ranging from Louis Vuitton, Prada and Armani in Europe; to Levis, 
LEE and A&F in the United States. Although the importance of the apparel industry in the 
PRD has been shrinking, this industry still accounted for 5% in total world export in 2009. 
This portion led ahead many developing countries such as Turkey, India, Vietnam and 
Indonesia (see details in Chapter 7). In the automotive industry, the PRD have been upgraded 
into a key automotive industrial base supplying to the large domestic market of China. The 
key change in this industry occurred in the three joint ventures between SOEs and leading 
Japanese auto assemblers (Toyota, Honda and Nissan). A vertically integrated production 
network was constructed by these joint ventures, their origin suppliers and new local Chinese 
suppliers (see details in Chapter 8). 
According to my empirical survey of 69 interviewed firms in 2010, product upgrading 
was the most significant type of upgrading with a value of 2.16 (see Figure 5.1). Process 
upgrading stood second and was followed by functional upgrading. Sectoral upgrading was 
less significant with only a score of 0.57 within a scale of zero to 3. The overall tendency 
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wage in manufacturing SOEs in the PRD was about $5 per month (Yu, 2008). Before the 
Asian financial crisis in 1997, monthly wages in manufacturing were merely increased to 
$100 in the PRD (Gu and Yang, 1999). This cost-based complementarity was attractive to 
TNCs. 
 
Figure 5.2 Captive coupling in the PRD 
 
Source: compiled by author. 
 
At the regional scale, with a liberal policy framework, regional governments in the PRD 
managed to facilitate the formation of captive coupling. This institutional leeway satisfied 
both the interests of local entrepreneurs and global capitalists. They both preferred a more 
flexible administrative environment so that they could practice capitalism without violating 
relevant laws and directives (e.g. public ownership) in China (Chen and Pu, 1999; Enright et 
al., 2003; Ning, 1998; Xu, 1988). Hong Kong firms played a critical intermediate role during 
this process. This point can be illustrated by the view of an owner of a Hong Kong-based 




My big boss [investor] was actually from the US. When he decided to outsource jeans 
to China in 1982, he chose the PRD for its cheap labor costs and liberalizing 
environment. He set up a company in Hong Kong first for coordinating his business. 
This was because this big boss was skeptical of opening directly a factory in China 
since he had heard a lot of negative comments about the unstable politics and arbitrary 
local cadres of China. He also did not fully understand how to do business in China. 
That was why I was chosen to be a partner (Interview 100325, on 25 March 2010 in 
Guangzhou). 
 
At the local scale, captive coupling was reinforced by a bottom-up approach of FDI 
promotion. In the beginning of the 1980s, Guangdong Province had little financial capital in 
its regional banking systems. Without additional capital investments from the central 
government, Guangdong provincial government had little capability to launch large scale 
construction projects or to nurture competent SOEs. Hence the provincial government further 
decentralized power and promoted foreign investments at the local scale such as counties, 
towns and villages, which led to a scattered form of FDI distribution in the PRD (Cui, 1999; 
Xu, 1988; Yang and Sit, 1995). Local governments were highly incentivized because they 
could retain the bulk of the revenue generated under a specific arrangement of ‘fiscal contract’ 
(财政包干 Cai Zheng Bao Gan). As Table 5.3 shows, the category of ‘others’, including 
small cities, counties, towns and villages, accounted for most of the FDI with the highest 
growth rate between 1980 and 1993. These local governments served as flexible and 
pro-active actors to satisfy the needs of foreign investors. The former chief planner in 
Guangzhou Urban Planning and Design Institute has conceptualized this phenomenon as the 




Dongguang is a typical city that is highly dependent on FDI. At that time, all 33 towns 
were mobilized to attract foreign investments at the same time, like a local tournament. 
The municipal governments almost had no restriction on them or industrial plan for 
them, expect setting an unwritten but fixed annual criteria of FDI attraction to be 
achieved. I called it as ‘small dog economy’ in which all the dogs [towns] were running 
round and competed with each other for food [FDI]. It was quite flexible and efficient 
for development in the beginning, but it was a rough way of resource utilization in 
terms of lands and environment (Interview, 100417, on 17 Apr 2010 in Guangzhou) 
 
Table 5.3 Distribution of actual utilized foreign capital in the PRD (1980 – 1983) 
Urban scale (population) 1980 1993 1980-1993 Annual growth rate 
 % % % % 
Mega city (> 1 million ) 28.1 13.2 14.2 43 
big city (0.5~1 million) 26.3 22.3 29.5 52 
middle city (100~500 thousand) 22.0 18.1 21.2 51 
Others (< 100 thousand) 23.6 46.5 34.7 55 
Total amount (million, $) 101.2 6428 20094  
Note: Others include small cities, counties, towns and villages. 
Sources: Guangdong Statistics on Regional Economic Development, 1980-1993. 
 
Social and ethnic business networks in the PRD also played a positive role in facilitating 
captive coupling. These connections enabled the region to enjoy good accessibility to 
information about the global market, state-of-art technologies and modern managerial skills. 
They either introduced the PRD to wider audiences or directly shaped the relocation decisions 
of TNCs based on personal networking or preferences, particularly when the decision makers 
or brokers were ethnic Chinese (Hsing, 1996; Olds and Yeung, 1999; Qiu, 2005; Yeung, 
1997a). For example, many of the apparel industrial clusters in the PRD benefited from the 
overseas relatives of local entrepreneurs (see details in Chapter 7). Zhuhai City attracted 
many Japanese firms by constructing a specific social network. In the mid-1980s, Zhuhai 
governments hired several Chinese returnees from Japan as senior officers in the Zhuhai 
Bureau of Foreign Economy and Trade. These returnees actively organized several official 
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business trips to Japan for promoting FDI. Meanwhile, the returnees mobilized their social 
connections in Japan to get in touch with Japanese lead firms in the electronics industry. As a 
result, Zhuhai successfully brokered a large amount of Japanese electronics companies to 
offshore their manufacturing segments to Zhuhai, such as Canon (1990, camera and printer), 
Mitsum (1991, transformers and magnetic head) and Panasonic (1993, motor and battery). By 
2000, Zhuhai had hosted about 240 Japanese electronics companies and continuously 
attracted more Japanese firms based on this agglomeration effect. Within a single year in 
2006, 100 Japanese electronics firms established branch plants in Zhuhai with a total 
investment over US$ 10 million.5 Apart from providing fiscal incentives for these Japanese 
firms, Zhuhai governments also actively built up several industrial parks to accommodate 
them and even provided help in recruiting workers, technicians and engineers. 
5.3.2 Limited upgrading in captive coupling 
Due to large knowledge gaps, liberalizing regional environment and local initiatives, the 
integration pattern of the PRD formed as captive coupling. Local economies were captive to 
foreign firms which provided capitals and technologies by establishing a large number of 
FIEs. This captive coupling led to rapid industrialization in the PRD in which product and 
process upgrading was significantly realized based on the synergy between local 
entrepreneurs and foreign investors. However, the upgrading was limited. The limited 
upgrading was embodied by the prevalence of export-processing enterprises (EPEs) and Hong 
Kong firms in the PRD. 
                                                              
5 Source: author’s interviews in Zhuhai in June, 2010, with four interviewees: two directors and a senior officer of 
three industrial parks, and a vice-director of the Foreign Economy and Trading Bureau of Zhuhai. 
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EPEs were called the San Lai Yi Bu (三来一补) enterprises in China, which is also 
termed as process and assemble firms (Yeung.G, 2001). These enterprises refer to three forms 
of processing works6 and compensation trade. These enterprises have no domestic sale quota 
and all finished goods must be exported. It should be noticed that investments in EPEs are 
excluded from the conventional definition of FDI and are regarded as ‘other forms of foreign 
investments’ in Chinese statistical terms. EPEs are similar to the maquiladora in Mexico 
which emerged in the 1960s and became prevalent after the establishment of NAFTA in 1994 
(Kamel and Hoffman, 1999). The difference is that EPEs have greater flexibility in material 
procurement. They do not necessarily process materials designated or provided by foreign 
partners, while enjoy certain autonomy in sourcing in global markets (Gan and Gan, 1994; 
Song et al., 1989; Xu, 1988). 
EPEs have been prevalent in the PRD for three decades which means that the region has 
highly depended on this type of enterprises in which local firms are captive to foreign 
investors. In 1980, investments in EPEs accounted for 61% of total utilized foreign capital in 
the PRD. Though the portion was decreasing, it still took up a share of 48% in 1990 (GDSY, 
2001). Data from the custom regime shows the significant role of EPEs in the foreign trading 
of the PRD. In 1990, EPEs accounted for 82% of total export value and 80% of total import 
value in the PRD. A decade later, the portion was reduced a little bit with 78 % in export and 
70% in import. By 2009, EPE still played a major role in foreign trading, accounting for 57 % 
of export value and 54% of import value in the PRD.7 
                                                              
6 (1) manufacturing with designated designs and templates from foreign partners; (2) manufacturing with provided 
raw materials from foreign partners; (3) manufacturing with imported materials from foreign partners. 
7 Guangdong Statistic Yearbook in multiple years, 1995 – 2010. 
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Due to geographical proximity, social-cultural networks and deliberated national 
strategies, Hong Kong firms became the primary players in establishing EPEs in the PRD. 
Taiwanese firms followed after the mid-1980s (Leung, 1993; Tuan and Ng, 2004; Yu, 2008). 
By 1985, Hong Kong-origin investments ($670 million) accounted for 90% of total utilized 
foreign capital in the PRD.8 Most of them were concentrated on the apparel and electronics 
industries (Chui et al., 1997). The prevalence of Hong Kong firms formed a regional 
production pattern between the PRD and Hong Kong, termed as the ‘front shops-back 
factories’ (FSBF, 前店后厂) pattern. 
 
Figure 5.3 Front shops-back factories pattern of production in the PRD 
 
Source: Figure 3 in Sit and Yang (1997:657). 
 
Shown as by Figure 5.3, Hong Kong played a dominate role as the front store which 
received orders from global markets and completed manufacturing works by thousands of 
EPEs in the PRD (Sit and Yang, 1997; Sit, 1998). The FSBF pattern largely boosted the 
competitiveness of Hong Kong firms by offshoring and outsourcing labor-intensive segments 
                                                              
8 Guangdong Statistics Yearbook in multiple years, 1991 - 2010. 
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to the PRD hinterland. Many Hong Kong-based FIEs participated in this pattern later on by 
subcontracting orders to local manufacturers rather than establishing EPEs. 
There was synergy for nurturing upgrading within EPEs. In terms of labor division, 
foreign investors were in charge of investing in facilities (including machines, plants and 
basic equipment), importing parts of raw materials, providing designs and managerial 
assistance, and exporting final products to global markets. With very low entry barriers, local 
firms provided all other resources such as land, workshops and low-waged workers, except 
capital and technologies. In terms of profit sharing, local firms earned a fixed amount of 
processing fees and tax reimbursements, while foreign firms appropriated all other profits. 
Therefore, foreign investors had incentives to improve production efficiency by upgrading 
product ranges and processing technologies in EPEs. Local partners were willing to follow 
the governance of foreign investors as this was the best learning opportunity for them, when 
their indigenous capabilities were rather weak. Knowledge diffusion took place through the 
efforts of foreign investors in three general steps: providing product definitions and designs, 
constructing production lines (equipment, facilities and even factories) and labor training. For 
instance, during the 1980s, there were about $3 billion machines imported into the PRD by 
foreign investors. A comment from the owner of Changjiang Textile and Apparel Company 
interprets knowledge diffusion within EPEs: 
We knew nothing at all at that time [the 1980s]. We would be better off by just 
following the instructions set by foreign businessmen. We did what they told us to do. 
They taught us how to set up a factory, organize a production and management system, 
although sometimes we did not know why we should do it that ways. Our business 
boomed quickly. Many workers from states owned enterprise hopped to my factories, 
because in my factory, they could earn more and learn more (Interview 100427, on 27 




Though there was synergy, functional upgrading was limited within EPEs. By defining 
production and organization, foreign investors had overwhelming power towards local 
partners from production to delivery. Local firms served as affiliated processors at a truncated 
and marginal position within EPEs. This position was disconnected from information about 
market demand, marketing, procurement, logistics, the management skills of production 
system and supply chain. Foreign investors had no incentive to transfer any of these types of 
knowledge to local firms which hindered local upgrading to a certain degree. 
Without strong endogenous technological capabilities, the corporate power of local 
firms was too weak to help them escape from such a disadvantage position or bargain for 
more learning opportunities. Institutional power was also weak in the sense that regional 
assets, such as liberalizing institutional environment, pro-active developmental states and 
overseas social-cultural networks could only facilitate the process of industrialization, 
whereas could not support local firms to reshape power relations with foreign investors (Cui, 
1999; Li, 2002). Without associational economies, collective power was also hard to be 
developed among local firms in the PRD. The weak power of local governments and firms 
was described by the director of Guangdong Development Research Institute as below:  
 
At that time [the 1980s], policy was our only treasure for development. We kept 
persuading foreign firms to invest in the PRD, while at that time, we could not ask for 
too much. It was good enough once those business-men were willing to invest in. 
Therefore, local governments rushed to attract FDI by lowering production costs. As I 
remembered, many towns and counties even waived land rents. At the same time, all 
industries came in, unselectively, such as low end and processing industries, or highly 





Institutional inertia was also developed within EPEs that further hindered local 
functional upgrading. Comparing with FIEs, foreign investors in EPEs only have to pay 
processing fees. Operating in the forms of EPEs had lower managerial costs and earned more 
marginal profits. Moreover, workers in EPEs were employed under short-term labor contracts 
without any coverage of pension or social insurance (Gu and Yang, 1999). Therefore, foreign 
investors hardly had interests in upgrading EPEs into FIEs, unless they wanted to develop the 
domestic market. To local authorities in townships and villages, they also preferred to stay 
with EPEs for earning administrative and processing fees. Once EPEs were upgraded into 
normal enterprises, local authorities could only reap profits from land leasing. This was why 
local authorities resisted the new regional-upgrading policy in 2008 which aimed for 
relocating EPEs in the PRD.9 
To sum up this section, the economic take-off of the PRD resulted from the formation of 
captive coupling based on multi-scalar forces: the global imperative of industrial relocation, 
regional liberalizing tendency and local initiatives. Synergy within captive coupling nurtured 
rapid industrial growth as well as limited product and process upgrading in the region. 
Functional upgrading was impeded organizationally and institutionally. Nevertheless, the 
PRD was not dominated by this captive coupling throughout three decades of development. 
Strategic coupling has been evolving since the 1990s. Next section addresses this dynamics. 
                                                              




5.4 Impetus of change: evolutionary strategic coupling 
The formation of captive coupling occurred between the 1980s and the early 1990s. 
Beginning in the mid-1980s, FIEs started to increase their influence in the region through 
establishing joint exploration of resources and three types of FIEs (ventures): equity joint 
venture, contractual joint venture and wholly foreign-owned venture. Different from EPEs, 
these FIEs not only benefited the regional economy through the effects of knowledge 
spillover, and also nurtured local firms as their suppliers. Since the 1990s, FIEs became much 
more influential and replaced EPEs as the key driving force. Meanwhile, local firms were also 
catching up with FIEs and managed to develop more comprehensive partnerships with foreign 
investors by utilizing various new regional assets. This section illustrates the evolutionary 
tendency of strategic coupling in three dimensions: (1) the changing regional profiles of 
foreign trade which reflect the evolving pattern of integration; (2) the divergent performance 
of firms which present the reconfiguration of driving forces to local upgrading; (3) local 
upgrading strategies which are embedded in various spatial-institutional conditions. I argue 
that these changes provide new opportunities for local firms to leverage the governance power 
of foreign firms in their pursuit of local upgrading. 
5.4.1 Changing patterns of foreign trades: moving away from captive coupling 
By examining the changing profiles of foreign trade data in the PRD, this study identifies 
two distinctive features related to the evolution. First, as shown in Table 5.4, the PRD has 
been directly articulated into the global economy, rather than depended heavily on the 
intermediate role of Hong Kong. From 1990 to 2009, the dominant role of Hong Kong was 
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overtaken by firms from the United States, Japan, Taiwan and other EU members. Although 
Hong Kong was still the most important partner in the export market, its share declined from 
81% to 32%. In the import market, there was evidence of Hong Kong’s shrinking share from 
80% in 1995 to 7% in 2000 and to 2.4% in 2005. Moreover, Hong Kong was excluded from 
the top five importers in 2009. In the export market from 1990 to 2009, the United States 
overtook Hong Kong’s role with an increase from 4% to 19%. During the same period in the 
import market, Hong Kong was replaced by Japan, Taiwan and South Korea. Particularly, 
Japan became the third important trade partner of the PRD. This tendency implies that the 
PRD is moving from a marginal node into a more central position within GPNs. The region 
has articulated into global markets by building up trade relationships with many of the most 
important developed and developing countries.  
 
Table 5.4 Main trading partners of Guangdong Province (1990 – 2009) 
Rank 
Export 
1990 1995 2000 2005 2009 
1 Hong Kong(81) HK(87) HK(34.3) HK (39) HK (32) 
2 US (3.8) US (3.1) US (28) US (25) US (19) 
3 Japan(2.7) Japan (2) Japan (8.4) Japan (6.2) Japan (4.9) 
4 Macao(1.6) Taiwan(2) German(3.5) Netherland (3) German(3) 
5 Singapore(1.3) Macao (0.8) UK(2.87) German(2.5) Singapore (2.7) 
Rank Import 
1990 1995 2000 2005 2009 
1 HK (66) HK  (80) Taiwan(19) Taiwan(18) Japan(14) 
2 France(8) Taiwan(11) Japan(18) Japan(17) Taiwan(13) 
3 Macao (6.4) Japan(3) South Korea(9) South Korea(9) South Korea(9) 
4 Japan (4.4) US (1.2) US (6.8) US (4.2) US (4.8) 
5 UK(4.0) Sweden(1) HK  (6.7) HK  (2.4) Malaysia (4.7) 
Sources: Guangdong Statistics Yearbook, 1991-2010, Unit: %. 
 
Second, as shown in Table 5.5, the PRD was reducing dependence on EPEs in its 
international trade markets. In export trade, the share of EPEs declined from 82% in 1990 to 
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57% in 2009. In import trade, it was reduced from 80% in 1990 to 54% in 2009. 
Correspondently, ordinary trade kept growing and exceeded the share of EPEs. The 
articulation into global markets and the fading influence of EPEs implies that the PRD has 
been moving away from captive coupling. Both foreign and local firms in the PRD 
increasingly export more sophisticated products than EPEs. 
 
Table 5.5 Changing patterns of foreign trades in the PRD (1990 – 2009) 
Year Total Ordinary trade EPE Trade  Others 
Export         
1990 22.2  18% 82% 0.6% 
1995 56.6  19% 80% 0.4% 
2000 91.9  22% 78% 0.3% 
2005 238.2  35% 65% 0.0% 
2009 359.0  42% 57% 0.9% 
Import  
1990 19.7  18% 80% 2.0% 
1995 47.4  16% 83% 0.7% 
2000 78.2  30% 70% 0.8% 
2005 189.8  38% 61% 0.6% 
2009 252.2  46% 54% 0.3% 
Notes: EPE trade refers to trades based on export-process firms. Others include trades based 
on bonded warehouse, donations and so on. 
Sources: Guangdong Statistic Yearbook 1992-2010, Currency: US$, billion. 
 
5.4.2 Divergent performance of key actors: who are the drivers? 
While the pattern of captive coupling is evolving, who are the key drivers of this change? 
By investigating into the performance of different firms, this study finds that the driving 
forces of the PRD have been reconfigured constantly in the last two decades. By and large, 
SOEs have the best performance but least influence in the PRD. The region is still led by FIEs. 





 Table 5.6 Enterprise Performance in the PRD (1991 – 2009) 
Year SOE COE PE #FIE FIE(HTM) Others 
Industrial value added (billion)         
*1991 25 15 1.2 5 12 N.A. 
1999 33 21 30 41 97 29 
2005 38 11 197 255 290 55 
2009 83 12 530 429 407 68 
Number of enterprises (unit)         
*1991 7172 20499 N.A. N.A.  N.A. N.A. 
1999 1304 2801 1914 1261 5776 N.A. 
2005 1047 974 8909 3931 9810 N.A. 
2009 294 612 14727 5364 11720 N.A. 
IVA per enterprise (million)         
*1991 3.5  0.7 N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 
1999 25.2  7.5 14.2 32.5 16.8  N.A. 
2005 87.3  11.3 22.1 64.9 29.5  N.A. 
2009 281.4  19.6 36.0 79.9 34.7  N.A. 
IVA per capita (thousand)          
*1991 14  7 N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 
1999 84  29 73 82 45  N.A. 
2005 290  39 101 123 75  N.A. 
2009 469  43 154 148 87  N.A. 
Notes: SOE refers to state owned enterprise; COE refers to collective owned enterprises; PE refers to 
private invested enterprise; FIE (HTM) refer to FIEs originated from Hong Kong, Taiwan and Macao; 
Others refer to all firms with annual revenue lower than 5 million yuan plus EPEs.  
*: Data in 1991 refer to the whole Guangdong province. Currency: yuan. 
#: FIEs refers to foreign invested enterprise excluding the ones from Hong Kong, Taiwan and Macao. 
Sources: Guangdong Statistic Yearbook 1996-2010; the PRD and the YRD Statistic Yearbook, 
2005-2010; Guangdong Economic Census 2004 and 2008. 
 
During the 1980s, SOEs were playing a dominant role in the regional economy. By 1992, 
more than 7,000 SOEs produced the majority of output with 25 billion yuan IVA. Collective 
owned enterprises (COEs) were the second largest forces accordingly. From then on, SOEs 
and COEs have lost their influence. The number of SOEs and COEs shrank incredibly. In 
2009, there were only 294 SOEs and 612 COEs. Meanwhile, their contribution to IVA in the 
PRD became very insignificant. In 2009, SOEs contributed only 83 billion yuan IVA which 
was 10% of the FIEs’ total, while the COEs’ outputs were much less. However, the SOEs 
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turned out to be highly efficient in terms of their growing figures of IVA per enterprise and 
IVA per capita which were ranked top among all firms in the last decade. 
This distinctive trajectory of the SOEs/COEs largely resulted from the radical national 
reform during the 1990s (Wu, 2005). Due to the unsatisfactory outcome of the SOEs reform 
in the 1980s, China implemented two radical policies in implementing managerial and 
structural reform among SOEs which were termed as ‘Zhua Da Fang Xiao’ (抓大放小, 
grasping the big and let go the small) and ‘You Jin You Tui’ (有进有退, selective industrial 
development). These policies significantly consolidated the number of SOEs through intra- 
and inter-regional mergence and acquisition, massive employment layoff and privatization 
(Huang, 2002; Steinfeld, 1998, 2004). In doing so, SOEs became giant corporate groups and 
possessed a huge amount of fixed assets and dominated in monopolistic industries, such as 
petroleum, power supply, railway and telecommunication (Wang, 2011). By 1998, the 
number of SOEs in China was reduced to about 60,000 and then further to 20,000 in 2009, 
while most of them were highly profitable due to monopoly.10 
Since 1990, EPEs have been losing their importance in the regional economy. In 
Guangdong Province, while EPEs accounted for 60% of foreign investments 1980s, the 
portion significantly declined to about 25% in around 1995 and shrank further to 12% in 2005 
and to 4% in 2009 (GDSY, 2001). When EPEs, SOEs and COEs became less influential, FIEs 
emerged as the key driver of the regional economy. As shown in Table 5.6, FIEs had 
accounted for the largest share of IVA and the numbers of firms since 1999. Among private 
firms, FIEs and FIEs-HTM (firms from Hong Kong, Taiwan and Macao), FIEs had the best 
                                                              
10 In 2009, with a profit of $20 billion, China Mobile Communications Corporation was evaluated as the most 
profitable corporation in the world; the total profit of all SOEs was $ 137 billion while top six monopolistic SOEs 
accounted for 63%. 
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performance and FIEs-HTM became the least efficient recently in terms of IVA per 
enterprises and per capita. 
The dominance of FIEs resulted from the further market liberalization in the PRD during 
the 1990s and the 2000s (see also section 5.2.1). As Steinfeld (2004:1979) described, “the 
reformers [in this period] pursued arguably the most liberal FDI policy of any Asian 
developing country”. Incentivized by the new taxation law since 1994, urban authorities 
became a very pro-active force in mobilizing large-scale development projects in the PRD. 
Because land conveyance became one of the most important sources of revenue, regional 
governments tended to increase their income by ‘selling’ land for industrial and urban 
development (Lin, 2009b). By 2006, 30 development zones and industrial parks were 
established in the PRD, covering an area of 28,266 hectares. These industrial districts were 
used for attracting the relocation of TNCs, particularly those in high- and new-technology 
industries (DRCGP, 2009; Wong and Tang, 2005). 
In order to improve local supply stability and international competitiveness, FIEs did not 
merely relocate non-core processing segments to the PRD, but progressively transplanted 
their suppliers to the region. Within respective production networks, incumbent and new 
technologies were diffused from their R&D centers and headquarters to the production sites in 
the PRD. This mechanism of FDI-driven development has been discussed in many previous 
studies (Enright et al., 2003; Lin, 1997; Sit and Yang, 1997; Yang, 2005; Yang, 2009; Yang 
and Liao, 2009). My interpretation of captive coupling in section 5.3 is generally consistent 
with their explanations. 
160 
 
While FIEs are leading the regional economy, private firms have achieved the most 
significant growth. As shown in Table 5.6 above, private firms were quite insignificant in 
1991, contributing to less than 3% of the regional IVA. But they have made remarkable 
progress within two decades. In 2009, they contributed 1/3 of the regional total. In 1999, the 
performance of private firms was lower than most of the other firms in terms of IVA per 
enterprise. But in the last decade, the number of private firms increased dramatically from 
about 2,000 to 15,000. Meanwhile, they managed to upgrade their production capabilities by 
substantially improving efficiency: the figures of IVA per enterprise and IVA per capital 
more than doubled. These figures showed higher efficiency than FIE-HTM. It also should be 
noted that data in Table 5.6 only refer to firms with a minimal annual turnover of 5 million 
yuan. As this study’s estimation is based on multiple sources of statistical yearbooks, there 
were about 140,000 enterprises in the PRD lower this minimal annual turnover in 2009, 
contributing to merely 5% of the regional total IVA. These smaller firms employed millions 
of workers and were struggling for their survival. 
5.4.3 Strategies of local upgrading 
The above elaboration has demonstrated that the PRD is moving away from captive 
coupling to a certain extent. The regional economy is no longer dependent on EPEs to 
stimulate rapid industrialization. Firms in the PRD are moving from a highly truncated mode 
to a more central position within GPNs. Meanwhile, the PRD is no longer fully dependent on 
FIEs in driving regional growth. Local firms have caught up with FIEs and become another 
key driving force in shaping regional upgrading. What are the trajectories of local upgrading? 
What are the key strategies adopted by local firms? Is there anything new beyond previous 
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studies that emphasize the importance of indigenous innovation? The rest of this chapter 
attempts to answer these questions on the basis of the empirical investigation of this study. 
To account for the remarkable industrial growth and upgrading in China, previous 
studies have pointed to a key answer in relation to the contributions of knowledge spillover 
from TNCs, strong state investments and intensive endogenous innovation, such as in the 
cases of Lenovo and Huawei (Ernst, 2007; Fan, 2007; Fan, 2011; Fan, 2006; Lazonick, 2004; 
Li, 2009; Lin and Wang, 2009; Yang, 2009). However, my empirical investigation shows that 
the majority of local firms in the PRD do not conform to this catching-up trajectory. 
By examining the performance of high-tech industries in the PRD, this study finds that 
the absorptive capacities of the PRD has been improved, but strong innovative capability has 
yet to be developed in the region. Innovation here refers to the use of new technologies, 
methods or ideas.11  
As shown by Table 5.7 below, from 1998 to 2008, high-tech enterprises achieved 
significant growth and accounted for 31% of the regional industrial output. Within the output 
value of high-tech products, the share of the value of new products progressively grew from 
13% to 17% during the same period. Meanwhile, the amount of R&D expenditures and 
employment for R&D all had an impressive growth (more than ten times). The number of 
issued patterns also grew from 10707 to 62031. These trends indicate that the PRD as a whole 
is more capable in making new/higher-value-added products and has improved its 
technological capabilities. However, if we take the increasing number of firms into account, 
the achievement of innovation at the firm level was not significant and was even a bit 
                                                              
11 Innovation differs from invention in that innovation refers to the use of a new idea or method, whereas 
invention refers more directly to the creation of the idea or method itself. 
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disappoint. From 1998 to 2008, the average R&D expenditure of high-tech firms increased 
from 6.8 million yuan to 9.2 million yuan, but the ratio between R&D expenditures and 
output value decreased by 0.4%. Although the total amount of issued patents increased six 
fold, the average amount per firm declined from 13.1 to 7.9. In a similar trend, while the 
PRD’s high-tech firms were employing more technicians for conducting R&D activities, the 
average number of R&D technicians did not experience a corresponding increase. It indeed 
grew from 26 in 1998 to 47 in 2000. After that, the average number was dropping and it 
eventually declined to 25 in 2008. 
 
Table 5.7 Performance of the high-tech industries in Guangdong Province 
 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 
General        
 High-tech products in total 
industrial output (%) 
 11.2 17.2 21.6 23.5 30.5 30.9 
 Value of new products in 
high-tech products (%) 
 12.7 13.9 12.9 13.5 13.9 16.7 
 Number of high-tech firms  815 1173 1730 3065 4673 7831 
R&D and Patent        
 R&D expenditures of 
high-tech firms (million) 
 5,600 11,300 16,200 24,100 38,500 71,800 
# per enterprise  6.8  9.9  9.4  7.9  8.2  9.2  
# in high-tech output (%)  3.6 3.9 3.5 2.8 2.5 3.2 
 Issued patents (item)  10707 15799 22760 31446 43516 62031 
# per enterprise  13.1  13.9  13.2  10.3  9.3  7.9  
 R&D Employment (people)  21,100 53,400 69,400 76,300 127,100 197,500
# per enterprise  26  47  40  25  27  25  
Notes: According to the official category from National Bureau of Statistics of China (2006), high-tech 
industries include eight key sectors: nuclear fuel processing, chemical-information products, 
medicine manufacturing, aerospace manufacturing, electronics and communication products, 
computer and internet equipment, medical equipment and instrument, and public software. See 
more detail at: http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjbz/t20061123_402369836.htm. Data specific for the PRD 
are not available. But the PRD accounted for more than 80% of output in high-tech industries in the 
2000s. Hence provincial level data are considered as representative. 
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According to my field survey (see Figure 5.4), cooperation with local partners had the 
most significant influence on the upgrading strategies of local firms. Global partners were the 
second most important type of collaborators. Regional institutions were less significant with a 
score of 1.29. 
At the regional level, local firms tended to utilize emerging new assets to increase their 
bargaining power and upgrading opportunities. Apart from the liberalizing environment, there 
were at least three new assets available for local firms in the PRD. First was the emergence of 
China’s huge domestic markets. This market did not exist in the 1980s to most of firms. It was 
originally small in size and regionally fragmented due to limited household incomes and the 
state-controlled pricing system. But currently China’s domestic markets have become quite 
large based on the incredible industrial growth and the increasing purchase power of firms 
and individuals (Gadiesh et al., 2007; Ma, 2009; Wu, 2005). Second was the growing body of 
regional supply networks. Different from the condition in the 1980s, the PRD has now 
developed such a production network based on thousands of TNCs, the transplanted suppliers 
and the growth of local firms. The third asset was the emergence of regional associational 
economies (e.g. industrial associations) which served as the channels of knowledge diffusion 
in the PRD. 
Figure 5.5 articulates the influence of these assets on local upgrading among the 
surveyed firms. Domestic markets served as the most important asset to local firms in 
upgrading. The availability of technologies in the PRD stood as the second important factor, 
followed by the factors of regional supply-base capabilities and production-cost advantages. 
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Figure 5.6 above shows that governmental support was only effective in constructing 
infrastructures (with a value of 1.57). All other governmental support such as technologies, 
capital, market and human resource, was not influential towards local upgrading. 
At the global level, local firms tended to look for more upgrading opportunities by taking 
advantages of competitive dynamics within GPNs. This strategy was implicitly generalized 
from different viewpoints by my informants. It enabled local firms to bypass the control of 
foreign firms and cooperate with a wider range of foreign partners. The disintegration of the 
FSBF pattern (see section 5.3.2) between Hong Kong and the PRD is a good example. 
Within the FSBF pattern, Hong Kong firms’ governance power was vulnerable. 
Overtime, the PRD’s local firms became familiar with international markets and trading 
regulations. They went to Hong Kong to establish their own shops and receive orders from 
global buyers directly. At the same time, when domestic institutional environment became 
more liberal, global buyers also preferred to bypass Hong Kong traders and to develop their 
own suppliers in the PRD. This tendency was facilitated by more frequent international trade 
fairs, business exhibitions or other events hosted in the PRD (Yeh and Xu, 2006). The reunion 
of Hong Kong and China and the Asian financial crisis also facilitated this process (Jao, 2001; 
Shen, 2003). Eventually, the governance power of Hong Kong firms was bypassed. Hong 
Kong no longer served as the ‘front shop’ of the PRD. It gradually shifted to providing 
professional sourcing/trading services for global buyers and logistic services for the PRD 
firms respectively (Tewari, 2006; Yeh and Xu, 2006). This change is reflected in the 
comment by a senior committee member of the Fashion Designer Association of Hong Kong 




After the reunion, global buyers [lead firms] preferred to cooperate directly with firms from 
mainland China. Everybody knows that middle man [Hong Kong’s firms] must take some 
money, so why not we just move further to deal with the producer. I must say, that the crisis 
[in 1997] gave the PRD an opportunity. Because China’ well performances within the crisis, 
those buyers had faith to deal with Chinese firms, and they soon found that that PRD’s local 
firms were not bad actually. So things got changed. A lot of [Hong Kong] bosses needed to 
find another way to make money, like turning to the logistics and financial industries. Hong 
Kong sill has certain expertise in these kinds of industries (Interview 100602, on 2 June 2010 
in Guangzhou). 
     
By synthesizing assets at different scales, a few firms in the PRD were able to recouple 
and even decouple with TNCs, thus pursuing industrial upgrading on their own efforts. For 
instance, after years of accumulation, Huawei had decoupled with its Hong Kong OEM 
customer in the early 1990s and built up R&D team to develop HAX switch by its own. This 
decoupling did not suffer Huawei a lot because it has yet to develop technological lock-in to 
the Hong Kong firm, or institutional lock-in to itself. Witnessing foreign switch makers 
gained huge profits from the China market, Huawei decided to pursue product upgrading, 
from developing the small-scale switch system to the large scale switch system, and then 
move to develop mobile telecommunication facilities (e.g. base stations) and cellphones. By 
heavily investing in indigenous absorptive capacities, Huawei imitating those most 
transferable incumbent network technologies and specialized in engineering designs (Fan, 
2011; Li, 2011b). Two additional factors sustaining the upgrading of Huawei. First is the 
mattress culture12, symbolizing a distinguishing characteristic of Huawei’s low-cost and 
hard-working spirit. The annual average wage of R&D technicians was lower than 40% of the 
global level, comparing with Cisco and Alcatel in the 2000s. Second is the huge and 
                                                              
12 During the process of developing the key technology, its engineers usually worked almost 24 hours a day in the 
laboratory for months; they took naps only when they were very tired, and got up to work again after some rest. 
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fragmented domestic market which allows Huawei to find its critical mass by selling their 
less-perfect products in rural and sub urban areas initially.13 
The above empirical observations have introduced three general strategies of local firms 
adopted in their pursuit of upgrading. These strategies are not exclusive to each other and can 
be synthesized. In Chapters 6 to 8, I provide further detailed case studies to demonstrate how 
local firms deploy these strategies to leverage the governance power of foreign firms. For 
instance, domestic markets serve as a crucial source of profits in the electronics industry 
(Chapter 6), while it is utilized by local firms to practice marketing skills in the apparel 
industry (Chapter 7). In the automobile industry, domestic markets are deployed as an 
exchange for knowledge diffusion from TNCs (Chapter 8). In reducing knowledge gaps, local 
firms in the electronics industry mainly learn from their TNCs clients (Chapter 6). But in the 
apparel industry, they accumulate knowledge through diverse channels (Chapter 7). In the 
automotive industry, local firms absorb knowledge from their foreign partners (Chapter 8). 
The overall finding resonates with Viotti’s (2003:653) view that innovation tends to be “a 
phenomenon alien to late industrializing economies”. Many local firms in the PRD actually 
adopt “a strategy of learning that focuses on the mastering and improving of the absorbed 
technologies of production.” 
5.5 Conclusion: the changing dynamics of local upgrading 
In most of the contemporary China studies, the PRD has been recognized as one of the 
world’s leading manufacturing bases and the vanguard of China’s national economy (Cartier, 
                                                              




2001; Chen and Li, 2006). Scholars interested in the PRD mainly attribute the success of 
PRD’s development into four factors: (1) export-oriented strategies; (2) knowledge spillover 
from FIEs (mostly from Hong Kong and Taiwan); (3) economic power decentralized by the 
central government that allows regional policy makers to construct a business-friendly 
institutional environment; and (4) local initiatives of coupling facilitated by ethnic-based 
social networks (Enright et al., 2005; Hsing, 1996; Ng and Tang, 2004; Sit, 1998; Smart and 
Lin, 2007; Yeh et al., 2006). These studies generally come to an agreement that while the 
PRD experiences upgrading through learning from and benchmarking against TNCs, it is now 
becoming less promising due to exhausted land resources, increasing labor costs, and 
deteriorative environment (Liao and Chan, 2009; Lin, 2009b; Yang, 2009). Some scholars 
have argued for greater endogenous technological innovation to overcome this diminishing 
return (Fan, 2011; Zhou and Wei, 2011). Otherwise, industrial development will reach a 
bottle-neck soon and upgrading is bound to be impeded as Steinfeld (2004, 2008) has 
predicted. 
Although the above assertions are plausible and have been supported with some 
empirical facts, they mainly hold a static view of the captive coupling pattern of integration. 
In contrast to them, this chapter offers an alternative interpretation by investigating into the 
relation between strategic coupling and local upgrading in the PRD. 
By reviewing three decades of development in the PRD, this chapter found that the 
development trajectory of the PRD cannot be accounted for the developmental state literature. 
A developmental state did not appear in the PRD. Instead, the region underwent a liberalizing 
process continuously which was mediated by the central government’s desire for promoting 
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export-oriented industrialization. More recently, a regional imperative of upgrading emerged 
that tended to relocate labor-intensive manufacturing industries within the region. Empirical 
examination has shown that the PRD managed to achieve upgrading in various dimensions, 
such as corporate performance, international competitiveness, and structural and functional 
changes. The region is moving into a world manufacturing hub, rather than a processing and 
assembling base. 
Through the relational framework, this chapter reinterpreted the economic take-off of 
the PRD in relation to the formation of captive coupling among foreign firms, regional 
institutions and local firms. The prevalence of EPEs reflected how synergy within captive 
coupling led to rapid industrial growth as well as the improvement of the processing 
capabilities of local partners. A historical analysis of the operation of EPEs demonstrated that 
synergy within captive coupling was not predetermined by value chain governance. In 
contrast, it was subject to specific institutional arrangements and spatial conditions where 
EPEs were embedded. The asymmetrical power relation within EPEs hindered the prospect of 
local upgrading, such as functional upgrading. Local firms had little power to escape from the 
disadvantaged position. However, my further analyses illustrated that captive coupling was 
not static but evolutionary and subject to changing knowledge gaps and institutional-spatial 
conditions.  
Section 5.4 has largely articulated the impetus of changes. Since the 1990s, there were 
many ongoing trends implying that the PRD was moving away from captive coupling, such as 
the new regional profile of foreign trading and the divergent performance of firms. The new 
regional trading profile indicated that the PRD was no longer captive to Hong Kong for 
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participating into the global trading. It became more capable of engaging with trading 
partners from most of the developed countries in a more comprehensive manner. During this 
process, the driving forces of the regional economy were reconfigured substantially. EPE, 
SOEs and COEs, the key players before 1990s, lost their influences significantly. In contrast, 
FIEs became the most significant economic force, while local private firms caught up quickly. 
Interestingly, local firms had already performed better than FIEs from Hong Kong, Taiwan 
and Macao by 2009. 
While previous studies have emphasized the importance of indigenous innovation in 
nurturing local upgrading, the PRD case does not conform to this phenomenon. Drawing on 
the performance of the high-tech industries, this chapter identified that the influence of 
innovation was less significant. In contrast, the empirical survey of my study showed that 
local firms would like to adopt three alternative strategies related to different resources and 
opportunities rested at different scales. 
This chapter so far has revealed the evolutionary tendency of strategic coupling. The 
unresolved issues are that: what type of coupling is the PRD evolving towards, and what are 
the subsequent impacts to industrial upgrading? My interpretation of three local strategies 
remains preliminary at this stage and insufficient to provide conclusive answers. Next three 
chapters will detail the evolutionary strategic coupling and subsequent upgrading in three 
different industries: electronics, apparel and automotive. My analyses will articulate the 





Chapter 6 Captive coupling in the electronics industry: relocation, 
localization and local upgrading 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The electronics industry is one the most important sectors in the world because it 
employs more workers, generates greater revenue, and stimulates innovation across entire 
economies than any other sector (Mann and Kirkegaard, 2006). In the PRD, the electronics 
industry is the most influential industry in terms of output and export value throughout three 
decades of development (see Chapter 1 and 5). This chapter provides an examination of local 
upgrading in the PRD’s electronics industry. 
Contemporary studies have articulated the difficulty of latecomer upgrading in the 
electronics industry due to the strong intensity of technology and capital. In order to 
overcome this difficulty, the GVC literature suggests latecomer firms to insert into value 
chains and become the quick followers of global lead firms, so that latecomer firms can catch 
up through learning by doing, technology sharing and organizational acquisition from global 
buyers to their suppliers (Gereffi et al., 2005; Schmitz, 2004; Sturgeon and Lester, 2004a). 
However, these scholars also admit that upgrading opportunities are limited and restricted by 
industrial gate keepers based on the regular pattern of modular governance in this industry. 
From a different perspective, scholars suggest that developmental state institutions can 
directly promote upgrading in the domestic electronics industry by heavily investing in 
indigenous innovation (Beeson, 2004; Douglass, 1994; Johnson, 1995; White, 1988). More 
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recent studies of the electronics firms in China similarly argue that strategies like FDI 
promotion or export-oriented industrialization are not sufficient in fostering industrial 
upgrading, but have to be accompanied by intensive investments in local innovation in order 
to improve indigenous capabilities (Fan, 2011; Zhou and Wei, 2011). If we follow the logic of 
the above studies, local upgrading in the electronics industry in the PRD is bounded to be 
doomed, since the PRD almost lacks any of the assets listed above. Would local upgrading in 
the PRD be a less satisfactory story? This chapter conducts a critical investigation to answer 
this question. 
As elaborated in Chapter 5, the PRD’s economic take-off was initially led by the pattern 
of captive coupling. Local firms were positioned in a marginalized node within global GPNs 
and concentrated in the processing and assembly segments of value chains. However, recent 
dynamics has called for a re-examination of the pattern of coupling and the corresponding 
outcomes of upgrading in the electronics industry. At the local scale, the further localization 
of global lead firms has substantially strengthened the manufacturing capabilities of the PRD 
that leads to the amazing growth of such companies as Foxconn (see the opening story in 
Chapter 1). This localization would reduce knowledge gaps between local firms and TNCs 
because it provides more learning opportunities for local firms. At the national/regional scale, 
there are emerging new assets such as regional supply networks and domestic markets that 
may increase the bargaining power of local firms (see section 5.4 in Chapter 5). At the global 
scale, increasing competition among global lead firms, platform developers and contract 
manufactures have provided more opportunities for local firms to catch up (Sturgeon and 
Kawakami, 2011). But these changing institutional-spatial conditions do not guarantee the 
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success of local upgrading. There are still many tough obstacles for local firms to overcome, 
such as the prevalence of modular governance and rapid change in technologies and so on. In 
this sense, learning by doing or reverse engineering would be difficult, because the limited 
absorptive capabilities of local firms will make their efforts seriously lagging behind the rapid 
speed of innovation in global lead firms (Steinfeld, 2010). But what if local firms are not 
merely reliant on reverse engineering or learning by doing? What if global lead firms would 
like to cooperate with local firms for various interests beyond seeking low-cost suppliers?  
Situated in such an industrial context, this chapter focuses on three issues: (1) the 
formation of captive coupling in the electronics industry and whether it has evolved since the 
1990s; (2) the current achievement and limitations of industrial upgrading in the region; (3) 
upgrading strategies adopted by local firms. The overall attempt of this chapter is to explain 
the ongoing dynamics of local upgrading in the PRD’s electronics industry, rather than to take 
it for granted as another repeated story of latecomer development which gets stuck in 
labor-intensive activities. 
This chapter starts by interpreting the key features of the global electronics industry and 
the potential power dynamics in its modular governance. By grounding the electronics 
industry in the PRD’s context, the third section elaborates on why and how the pattern of 
captive coupling is developed and persistent over the decades and the current outcomes of 
upgrading. While the limitations of local upgrading are revealed, the fourth section provides a 
critical account of alternative upgrading strategies. Drawing on case studies, this penultimate 
section articulates three potential pathways of local upgrading. This chapter finally discusses 
how the PRD’s electronics industry offers a different story beyond previous studies and sheds 
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light on a geographical interpretation of value chain governance. 
6.2 Governance and power dynamics in the global electronics industry 
In this thesis, the electronics industry refers to a broad range of industries including 
semiconductor, information and communication technology (ICT), electronic machinery and 
equipment, and electronic products (e.g. home appliance, cellphone, liquid crystal display, 
and computer) and so on. This section probes into global industrial trends and power relations 
in the modular pattern of its value chain governance. The discussion serves as a critical 
industrial context for understanding the development of the electronics industry of the PRD. 
6.2.1 Global industrial shifts and modular governance 
The global shift of the electronics industry generally departs from the global North to 
the global South in the past decades (Dicken, 2007). From the 1960s to the 1980s, North 
American firms in the computer industry heavily outsourced low-value added manufacturing 
segments to Mexico and East Asia that in turn enabled the US firms to upgrade into more 
design-intensive activities in both electronic devices and platforms, such as the ‘horizontal 
computer industry’ in the Silicon Valley (Grove, 1996) and the ‘Wintelism’ (Borrus and 
Zysman, 1997). By taking this opportunity, contract manufacturers in East Asian newly 
industrialized economies (NIEs) built up regional production networks in more complex 
‘triangle manufacturing’ arrangements that brought factories in Japan, South Korea, 
Singapore, Taiwan, and Hong Kong into an integrated production system (Gereffi, 1999; 
Lüthje, 2002). During this process, global lead firms served as industrial gate keepers based 
on their strong technological capacities and governance power. Their higher-tier suppliers, 
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such as strategic partners in East Asia, also developed certain strong bargaining power due to 
their capabilities in systematic integration and supply chain management. The lower-tier 
suppliers and subcontractors had less power due to their substitutable nature. 
Due to different firm strategies, national contexts and the competitive dynamics of cost, 
flexibility, and speed within GPNs, East Asian firms have gradually specialized in certain 
segments or products and formed an inter-regional division of labor to a certain degree 
(Lüthje, 2004; Yeung, 2009a; Yusuf et al., 2004). Without radical product shift, Japanese 
producers mainly stay in consumer electronics and tend to specialize in developing new 
generations of dynamic random access memory (DRAM), electronic machinery and 
equipment (e.g. Toshiba). Meanwhile, many of them have upgraded into global lead firms in 
consumer electronics (e.g. camera, multi-media players, and home appliances). South Korea 
firms follow the pathway of Japan, but invest heavily in semiconductor, liquid crystal display 
and mobile device technologies. Some of them also grow up and become global lead firms 
(e.g. Samsung and LG). In contrast, Taiwanese CMs specialize in the entire production chain 
of the semiconductor and personal computer by providing electronics manufacturing services 
(EMS), such as TSMC, Foxconn and Quanta. Singapore firms tend to develop strong 
expertise in process engineering and wafer fabrication, such as Chartered Semiconductor. 
Together with Hong Kong, the PRD join in East Asian production networks but is situated in 
a marginal position for processing and assembling less sophisticated products (e.g. non-core 
electronics components, casings or plastic parts). Components with sophisticated technologies 
or higher value added are produced and distributed by global lead firms and CMs outside the 
PRD (Lüthje, 2002; Yang, 2007; Yeh and Lee, 2002). Apparently, the PRD has limited space 
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of industrial upgrading in such a position. The region is isolated from core knowledge in 
terms of production technologies, systematic integration skills, as well as marketing and 
distribution skills. 
6.2.2 The fragility of governance power 
The electronics industry has become highly globalized production networks based on the 
prevalence of modularization and standardization which integrates a customer’s need for 
direct monitoring and control (Principe and Honday, 2003; Sturgeon, 2002). This industrial 
specificity enhances interoperability in the sense that components and systematic elements 
can be substituted without redesigning the entire products (Balconi, 2002; Langlois, 2003; 
Ulrich, 1995). Hence electronics lead firms are able to engage in the twin strategies of 
outsourcing and offshoring over a long distance without losing their governance power in 
dealing with their suppliers. Meanwhile, by isolating sophisticated technologies within 
modularized components, they can reinforce their core competences and enforce parameter 
setting along with their value chains (Frigant and Layan, 2009; Humphrey and Schmitz, 2004). 
That is the alleged power of modular governance in favor of lead firms. Upgrading 
opportunities are offered by global lead firms to their local suppliers through parameter 
setting and product definition in value chains (Gereffi et al., 2005; Sturgeon, 2002). The 
imperative of doing so is to reduce asset specificity and to take advantage of specialization. 
Under modular governance, local firms in the PRD’s electronic industry indeed receive 
some learning opportunities by serving as suppliers. But the barrier of upgrading is evident, 
because knowledge diffusion is defined and modularized by global lead firms. These types of 
knowledge are more related to the skills of know-how (e.g. processing technologies), while 
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still have a way to reach the knowledge of know-why. When technology sharing goes beyond 
lead firms’ interests, local suppliers would not receive any assistance from lead firms (Gereffi 
et al., 2005; Humphrey and Schmitz, 2002b; Schmitz, 2004; Sturgeon and Kawakami, 2011). 
Therefore, local firms tend to be kept at the most labor-intensive and lower value-added 
segments of value chains, unless they receive substantial state supports, invest heavily in 
innovation or manage to launch joint actions with other local firms (Fan, 2011; Giuliani et al., 
2005; Humphrey and Schmitz, 2002b; Lowe, 2009; Zhou and Wei, 2011). However, the 
dynamics of local upgrading does not always follow this rigid logic. As articulated in Chapter 
3, there are three institutional-spatial conditions that may help latecomer firms to leverage the 
governance power of electronics lead firms: diversity of knowledge channels, regional assets 
and competitive dynamics within GPNs. Particularly in the electronic industry, the complex 
and dynamic power relations within GPNs provide more opportunities for local firms to 
leapfrog. 
Different from the apparel industry, an electronics GPN is not just made up by a simple 
dichotomy of global buyers and local suppliers in a linear structure, but is made up by at least 
four groups of key actors: (1) global lead firms (branded-name firms presenting in end 
markets); (2) platform developers/specialized-product providers; (3) contract manufacturers 
(e.g. EMS providers); and (4) local suppliers (Dicken, 2007; Gereffi et al., 2005; Lüthje, 2002; 
Sturgeon and Lester, 2004a; Yeung, 2009a). 
Global lead firms premise their bargaining power on financial risks-taken during their 
ordering and selling products. They invest heavily in product development, marketing and 
distribution which are the core of their competiveness. Compared with lead firms, contract 
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manufacturers are less powerful because they are substitutable. Thus they struggle in product 
and process upgrading to capture a lion share of market in which they have strong 
manufacturing expertise. Meanwhile, they also increase power by collecting bundles of 
capabilities so as to provide one-stop shopping for lead firms seeking regional and global 
supply solutions (Sturgeon and Lester, 2004a). Suppliers, particularly lower-tier suppliers are 
the least powerful actors due to their highly substitutable nature and vulnerable capacities. 
However, the rise of platform developers complicates power relations within GPNs by 
providing turnkey/platform solutions of product manufacturing in the form of software, 
hardware, or combination, such as the Intel’s Atom chipset, Microsoft and Google’s Android 
operating system (Fixson and Park, 2008; Lüthje, 2004; Sturgeon, 2002). Upgrading 
opportunities are thus diversified. 
For contract manufacturers and suppliers, they can purchase and internalize turnkey 
technologies from platform developers within the same GPN, thus directly upgrading into 
own-brand manufacturers to compete with lead firms. Latecomer firms do not necessarily 
upgrade to challenge global lead firms. Instead, they can upgrade into a turnkey product 
supplier, or even a new platform developer, such as the formation of Global Mobility Bazaar 
(GMB) alliance of VIA from Taiwan (Feenstra and Hamilton, 2006; Galvin and Morkel, 2001; 
Lüthje, 2002; Lüthje, 2004). In this case, lead firms have no power to block this upgrading. 
They can only control their upstream suppliers and downstream customers along the same 
chain, but cannot control platform developers or specialized service providers in the same 
GPNs. 
In sum, there are many alternative upgrading pathways for latecomer firms. These 
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strategies do not necessarily challenge the governance power of global lead firms. The critical 
issue is whether local firms are able to identify the necessary assets and develop more synergy 
with their foreign partners during the process of local upgrading. This is the analytical focus 
of the next two sections. 
6.3 FIE-led upgrading in captive coupling: synergy and limitations 
The PRD has embraced the global economy through market liberalization and 
export-oriented industrialization after 1978. Based on outsourcing and offshoring strategies, 
electronics TNCs and their subcontractors took advantage of this opportunity and operated in 
the PRD in various forms of FIEs. This was the fundamental synergy that led to coupling 
between the PRD and the electronics GPNs. This section investigates the institutional 
contexts and synergy within captive coupling and how captive coupling leads to the progress 
and limitation of industrial upgrading. 
6.3.1 Institutional contexts of the electronics industry 
Experience from the East Asian electronics industries has shown the important role of 
developmental states in nurturing domestic upgrading through investing in indigenous 
innovation and facilitating technological transfer (Cho et al., 1998; Hobday, 1995, 2001; Liu 
and Dicken, 2006; Wade, 1990). But the PRD did not have this type of developmental state. 
All state support was allocated to other regions in East and North China (Cao, 2007; CCW, 
2004). 
Before the opening reform in 1978, China’s electronics industries developed through 
import substitution (Liang, 1999). However, this strategy eventually widened technological 
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gaps between domestic firms and TNCs (Cao, 2007). From 1982 to 2000, the national 
strategy for the electronics industry was shifted into export-oriented modernization (CW, 
2001). Many cooperative partnerships between SOEs and global lead firms were established 
in the forms of joint ventures, technological licensing, strategic alliances or cooperative 
investment (Liang, 1999; Wang, 1996). This strategy significantly accelerated the 
development of China’s semiconductor industry. However, none of the key SOEs was located 
in the PRD; they were instead concentrated in the Yangzi River Delta and Bohai Rim region 
(see Table 6.1). 
From 2000 onwards, China reinforced export-orientation strategy by liberalizing further 
the domestic market. In 2000, China’s State Council established a remarkable directive 
known as Policies for Encouraging the Development of Software and Integrated Circuit 
Industries (NDRCSC, 2001; see detail in Table 6.2). By providing fiscal incentives, this 
directive was meant for stimulating more TNCs to relocate higher value-added segments and 
R&D activities to China. This directive might appear to work effectively. It facilitated 
knowledge spillover from TNCs (CCW, 2004). By 2010, the total sale value in China’s 
electronics industry soared to near $1 trillion, while the value of exports accounted for 60% of 
the country’s total (PDO, 2011). There has been increasing localization of foreign firms in 
China in the forms of new production lines and factories, local management centers and R&D 
bases, as well as IC design segment (Ding et al., 2010; Fan, 2011; Li, 2008: also see Table 
6.1). However, during this process, Chinese SOEs and private firms lost domestic-market 
share seriously, from 69% in 1999 to 29% in 2009 (MIIT, 2003, 2009, 2010). While the 
production volume of integrated circuits (ICs) was huge, about 60% of the output came from 
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packing and testing segments (APCO, 2009). These problems put the policy effect on 
domestic upgrading in question. 
 
Table 6.1 Key semiconductor enterprises in China 
Type of 
cooperation 






6 inch silicon wafer with a minimal 
feature size of 0.9 m; 





4 inch wafer with a minimal feature size 
between 2-3µm 
 
  ISSI  1995 6 inch silicon wafer with a minimal 





5 inch wafer with a minimal feature size 
of 2.3 m 
 
  North Tel 1994 6 inch silicon wafer with a minimal 





Bi-CMOS, 5 inch silicon wafer with a 
minimal feature size of 2 µm 
Joint 
Ventures 
Shanghai Steel NEC 1994 
DRAM and Micro-programmed Control 
Unit (MCU), 0.5µm 















silicon wafer with a minimal feature size 





silicon wafer with a minimal feature size 




 In Bohai Rim Region: Motorola in Tianjin (1993);  
 In the Yangzi River Delta: Samsung in Suzhou (1996), AMD in Shanghai (1997), 
Philip in Suzhou (2002), Gracesemi in Shanghai (2003), TSMC in Shanghai 
(2003), Hynix in Wuxi (2006) and so on 
 In West China: Intel in Chengdu (2003) 
 In North China: Intel in Dalian (2007) 





Table 6.2 Policies of encouraging the development of the software and IC industries 
Aims Key items of the state directive in 2001
Key renewed items of the state 
directive in 2011 
Taxation 
discount 
All enterprises with 
endogenous-developed software 
products are only imposed by 17% 
value-added tax, while the amount of 
actual burden tax over 3% will be 
refunded to the firm for R&D 
expenditure (abolished since 2005 due 
the arbitration from WTO) 
Enterprise income tax will be 
waived in enterprises which are 
conducing software 
development, integration and 




Certificated new high-tech enterprises in 
software or IC industries enjoy a specific 
tax favor called “two plus three”: full 
waiver of tax for the first two year, and 
50% discount in the next three year. 
From “two plus three” to “five 
plus five”: free income tax for 
the first five years and 50% 
discount in the next five years. 
Enterprises conducing IC testing 
and assembly activities are also 




Key enterprises involved in national 
industrial planning are only imposed by 
10% of enterprise income tax. 
Besides the national planning, 
inter-provincial emerge of SOEs 
was also encouraged for 
cultivating stronger SOEs 
Market 
liberalization 
All in situ enterprises in software and IC 
industries enjoy these polices regardless 
the ownership types 
Electronic service industry is 
encouraged 
Sources: NDRCSC 2001, 2011. 
 
6.3.2 Captive coupling and synergy 
Before the reform in 1978, the PRD was still largely an agricultural-based economy and 
the electronics industry did not exist except several local SOEs producing lamps and wires 
(Lin, 1997; Sung et al., 1995). Due to the absence of state support, captive coupling was 
developed as knowledge gaps (technology and market) were too wide to be bridged (see 
Figure 6.1). As elaborated in Chapter 5, there were generally four factors that fostered 
synergy within captive coupling in the electronics industry: the locational advantage of the 
PRD; the liberalizing institutional environment; pre-existing ethnic-based business networks 
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and available low-waged labor pool. The synergy gave rise to the boom of EPEs and FIEs. 
 
Figure 6.1 Captive coupling in the electronics industry in the PRD 
 
Source: compiled by author. 
 
The opening reform of China made the PRD the prime hinterland, better than Southeast 
Asian countries, for accommodating the relocation of Hong Kong’s electronics industry 
(Clark and Kim, 1995; Huchet, 1997; Sung, 1991). Thousands of establishments in this 
industry constituted a major share of foreign investment in the PRD during the 1980s and 
1990s (Chui et al., 1997). Following Hong Kong firms, Taiwanese firms in the computer 
industry joined this process by the end of the 1980s (Xue, 2009). Currently all key Taiwanese 
EMS providers, including Foxconn, Quanta, Compal, Wistron, Inventec, ASUS and VIA, 
have built their production plants in the PRD. Shenzhen and Dongguan have the largest 
agglomeration of Hong Kong and Taiwanese firms, while Zhuhai attracts many Japanese 
firms. 
Regional and local authorities were pro-active actors in the formation of captive 
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coupling. They were keen in attracting electronics TNCs, because these firms brought 
significant growth in GDP, foreign trade and employment. These achievements could prosper 
regional economy and benefit the political aspiration and promotion of local carders. Since 
the 1990s, all prefectural governments in nine PRD cities have targeted the electronics 
industry as their strategic industries with the top priority in investment promotion, preferential 
fiscal subsidies, and infrastructure construction (NDRC, 2003; Sit and Yang, 1997; Xu, 1988). 
6.3.3 Regional upgrading within captive coupling 
Captive coupling led to substantial growth of the PRD’s electronics industry. After three 
decades of development, it continues to play a dominant role in the regional economy (see 
Figure 1.3). In 2009, it contributed to about US$ 25 billion in export value. This amount was 
about 25% of China’s total, about 4% of the world total (GDSYST, 2010). During this process, 
various types of upgrading were achieved. 
In terms of product and process upgrading, the electronics firms and labor are more 
capable of producing higher value-added products in a more efficient manner. Table 6.3 
shows this noticeable progress. In the past two decades, the number of firms and IVA received 
constant and substantial growth. Meanwhile, the production capabilities of firms and labor 
were both improved significantly. In 2009, the IVA per enterprise grew by nine times against 
1991; and IVA per capita increased by four times during the same period. Compared with 
them, the number of employee per enterprise presented a different trend that grew relatively 
slow from 1991 to 2005 and then fell down a little bit after 2005. It means that electronics 





Table 6.3 Upgrading in the electronics industry in the PRD (1991-2009) 
Year No. firms IVA IVA-E IVA-C NEE
unit billion million thousand person
1991 969 6.8 7.0 24.5  287
2001 1315 63.3 48.1 86.0  560
2005 2790 191.4 68.6 101.9  673
2009 4368 318.2 72.8 116.9  623
Notes: currency is Chinese yuan at constant 2000 price. The electronics industry in the PRD’s statistic 
data includes electrical equipment and products, ICT and computer related products and electronic 
equipment and products. All data refer to enterprises above designated size that an annual turnover 
more than 5 million yuan. IVA= industrial value-added; IVA-E= industrial value-added per 
enterprise; IVA-C= industrial value-added per capita; NEE = number of employee per enterprises. 
Sources: Guangdong Statistic Yearbook 1992, 1996, 2000, 2006, 2010.  
 
During the upgrading of processing efficiency, the product ranges of the electronics 
industry have been upgraded. The PRD is no longer processing low value-added and less 
sophisticated products (e.g. home telephones, cable, wires and non-core components), but are 
supplying the world with many high value-added and sophisticated electronics products, such 
as liquid crystal display products, multimedia players, computers, mobile phones, 
telecommunication equipment, medical/mechanical electronic devices and all kinds of 
electronics components (Chen and Pu, 1999; GDSY, 2000; GDSYST, 2010). In short, there 
has been a great deal of product and process upgrading in the forms described in the literature 
on latecomer upgrading (Humphrey and Schmitz, 2002b, 2004). Consistent with that 
literature, this study finds that foreign firms have played a very positive role in providing 
learning opportunities and assistance to their suppliers on the basis of arm-length market 
relations or subcontracting partnerships. Local firms have benefited from being captive to 
them. The trajectory of local upgrading is seen in a general manager of Lingyang Electronics 




In the 1980s, Lingyang was just an EPE processing plastic casings and assembled 
thermoses for Hong Kong clients. After a decade, the clients became our partners. They 
suggested and trained us to make coffee machines and toasters for global customers. By 
then we upgraded into a full-package manufacturer. With the help of our Hong Kong 
partners, we focused on supplying a few global branded buyers. In order to be 
certificated as their OEM supplier, we worked closely with the Hong Kong partners and 
technical consultants from our buyers to improve substantially the designs and functions 
of our products, as well as our workspace and supply-chain management. Now we are 
not only a qualified OEM supplier, but also conducting OBM business in Middle East 
and Southeast Asian markets under an appropriate brand. This is functional upgrading in 
your words (Interview 100415, on 15th April 2010 in Shunde). 
 
During the 1980s, the electronics industry in the PRD was just a processing and 
assembly base largely composed by thousands of EPEs (Gan and Gan, 1994; Song et al., 1989; 
Sung et al., 1995). Currently, the PRD has been gradually upgraded into a global 
manufacturing center comprising about 30 specialized-industrial towns and clusters (see 
Figure 6.2). Each town or cluster has more or less specialized in certain products or segments. 
23 of them are certificated as national industrial specialized towns (DRCGP, 2009; GDSYST, 
2010; NDRC, 2008).1 Leliu town is one of the largest town specialized in home appliances. 
Its industrial output exceeded 100 billion yuan in 2009. With about 40 billion yuan of 
industrial output in 2009, Shijie Town has been famous for manufacturing computer 
components in global markets. The total industrial output of these towns is unknown. Upon 
various news and statistical reports, this study has estimated that most of these towns had an 





1 Two criteria for the certification: (1) with an annual industrial output over 300 million yuan; (2) more than 70% 
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Foshan, Zhongshan, Jiangmen and Zhaoqing, has matured as the largest manufacturing center 
of the home appliance industry in China, occupying about 60-70% of the domestic market 
value by 2008 (Lin.D, 2009; Zhang and Xu, 2010). Some of them have become international 
branded firms (e.g. Midea, Kelon and Galanz). A comment from the vice chairman of the 
Electronics Industrial Association of Dongguan (EIAD) illustrates well this regional 
upgrading of the PRD: 
 
Dongguan has been well known for making easy-and-quick money for decades. But 
nowadays, we [the electronics industry] are no longer dependent on those low-end crabs 
[EPEs]. We are competing in the global market with qualified products based on 
multi-national FIEs and promising local firms located in specialized towns. In our survey 
during the economic crisis last year, we found out that labor wages in other developing 
countries such as Vietnam and Philippine were lower than here. But FIEs did not move 
away in a hurry because they cannot find a better supply base than here. Thirty years ago, 
you might make money by importing components and then assembling here. But now, it 
is unaffordable to do so. It costs too much than local sourcing (Interview 100807, on 17th 
Aug 2010 in Dongguan). 
 
6.3.4 Persistence of captive coupling 
Although regional upgrading is progressing in the PRD, the pattern of captive coupling 
is persistent. On the one hand, the region is still captive to the global industry for importing 
key electronics components. On the other hand, local firms are still captive to FIEs as their 
lower-tier suppliers. Fundamentally, the functional upgrading of the region is contributed by 
FIEs, rather local firms. 
According to the RCA index, the PRD’s electronics industry has been improving its 
competitiveness in the global industry (see Table 6.4). Between 2000 and 2009, the index of 
general electrical and electronics products increased from 0.05 to 0.16. The index of high and 
new tech products also increased from -0.04 to 0.1. Computer and communication products 
190 
 
(e.g. computer parts, cellphones, or network facilities) became the most competitive products 
in the PRD as their RCA index has grown from 0.37 to 0.59. However, trends from another 
two indexes show that the PRD is still heavily dependent on importing sophisticated 
components. Though having a noticeable drop, the index of products about 
computer-integrated technology was still at -0.48 in 2009. The index of electronic technology 
remained steady at about -0.7. The combination of these indexes implies that the PRD has 
become more able to manufacture and assemble electronic products within the region, but it 
still relies heavily on importing some sophisticated components and machinery. 
 
Table 6.4 RCA index of the electronics industry in the PRD 
Product Types 2000 2003 2006 2009
General electrical and electronic products 0.05 -0.03 0.06 0.16
High and New-tech electronic products -0.04 0.03 0.08  0.10 
Computer and communication 0.37 0.47 0.54  0.59 
Electronic technology -0.68 -0.77 -0.70  -0.67 
Computer-Integrated manufacturing -0.83 -0.79 -0.73  -0.48 
Notes: Data are at the provincial level. But in the electronics industry, the proportion of the PRD 
accounted for more than 95% of total foreign trade value in the whole province. It is thus 
considered as representative. 
Sources: Guangdong Statistic Yearbook in multiple years, data before 2000 are unavailable. 
 
Figure 6.3 generally shows that FIEs still considerably dominate the industry in the latest 
decade. The gap between FIEs and local firms was even enlarged. In terms of industrial value 
added, the share of FIEs increased from 60% in 1999 to 65% in 2008. During the same period, 
private firms had made great progress by increasing the share from 10% to 26%, but the share 
of SOEs dropped from 25% to 9%. In terms of export value, FIEs accounted for 75-80% of 
total exports. Private firms’ share of exports achieved the most significant increase from 4% 
to 19% and replaced the role of SOEs accordingly. It should be noted that the number of 
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SOEs has declined sharply during this period. Therefore, at individual level, the value added 
per enterprise of SOEs would be much higher than FIEs and local firms. But at the regional 
level, the contribution of SOEs to regional upgrading was rather insignificant. 
 
Figure 6.3 Changing driving forces of the PRD’s electronics industry 
 
Notes: SOEs = state owned enterprises; FIEs = foreign invested enterprise; PEs = private enterprises; 
others = collective owned enterprises and enterprises with annual turnover lower than 5 million 
yuan. Unit: billion yuan. 
Sources: The national economic census conducted in 2004 and 2008; Guangdong Industrial Census 
Yearbook 2000. 
 
6.3.5 Limitations of local upgrading: operating under the shadow of FIEs 
The above analyses have demonstrated that the PRD’s electronics industry has achieved 
noticeable regional upgrading in various ways. However, as the pattern of captive coupling is 
persistent, most of the upgrading outcomes are produced by FIEs. This finding echoes 
previous studies which have revealed the dependence of local firms on TNCs (Lin, 1997; 
Naughton, 1997; Sit, 1998). Through knowledge spillover effects, FIEs provided 
learning/benchmarking opportunities for local firms to use new machines, adopt new product 
systems, and absorb matured managerial skills. However, local firms met great difficulties in 
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further upgrading, because the regional production networks were substantially controlled by 
FIEs. These FIEs, particularly Taiwanese computer firms in Dongguan, tended to confine the 
knowledge within their backward linkages or the ‘global pipelines’ which are part of their 
GPNs, (Xiao and He, 2010; Xue, 2009; Yang and Liao, 2009). Although sophisticated 
components were exposed to local firms, the modular form of integration made reverse 
engineering less possible (Chesbrough and Kusunoki, 2001). The circumstances in Shijie 
town and Shilong town illustrate this upgrading predicament. 
Shijie is labeled as “Delta Town” because it is entirely dominated by Delta Electronics 
from Taiwan, the world’s largest producer of power supply units for personal computers. 
Within the town, Delta is surrounded by dozens of transplanted suppliers and about 200 local 
firms. This mini regional production network accounts for more than 80% of total output 
value in the town (IARE, 2010a). By 2010, just a few of local firms were serving as first-tier 
suppliers. All other local firms were satiated in manufacturing peripheral components and 
packing works. In a different sector, Shilong specializes in the optoelectronics industry led by 
a group of Japanese FIEs such as Kyocera, TKR, Konica Minolta and Nidec Sankyo. In 2005, 
it was certificated as China’s national base of the electronics industry with millions of annual 
production volume in various products including camera, copy machine, printer and desktop 
computer and so on (Zhu, 2010). These Japanese firms originally were EPEs. Since the 
mid-1990s, they were encouraged to convert into FIEs. Japanese firms agreed with that but 
decided to acquire most of the best local firms rather than investing in new plants and 
factories. Local states devoted abundant efforts to satisfy the needs of these Japanese firms 
and even persuaded local firms to be acquired. This transformation turned most of the 
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promising local firms into FIE’s subsidiaries and diminished the possibility of local functional 
upgrading, as told by the vice chairman of EIAD: 
 
In order to convert the Japanese EPEs into FIEs, local states almost mobilized all 
available resources, such as providing additional institutional services, offering more 
fiscal incentives, training professionals and persuading local firms to be acquired. The 
joint ventures were proved to be effective and successful. But we did lose something. 
Now we hardly find promising local firms that are wholly private-owned in Shilong. 
None of them can be the first-tier suppliers of those Japanese FIEs. As I know, some of 
the local talent entrepreneurs have left to establish new business somewhere else 
(Interview 100807, on 17 Aug 2010 in Dongguan). 
 
Within these networks, some FIEs further integrated production vertically. This effort led 
to less and less space for skilled local firms to pursue further upgrading due to the increasing 
complexity of transactions and asset specificity. Foxconn and Flextronics are two relevant 
examples. As the world’s largest EMS provider, Foxconn has integrated all production 
segments within several industrial parks in Longhua town in Shenzhen since 1988. This effort 
had shaped Longhua into a ‘Foxconn Town’ with more than 400,000 employees by 2009. This 
giant stood as the top export company in Shenzhen with a new record of $48 billion in 2010 
(Wu, 2011). This kind of huge industrial complex is what American plants cannot compete 
against (see the opening story in Chapter 1). The limited upgrading opportunity of Foxconn’s 
suppliers can be seen in the comment of a former manager of Foxconn: 
 
The strong capability of vertical integration of Foxconn is not only a nightmare to its 
competitors, but also a serious headache to it suppliers in Shenzhen. Most of the 
suppliers can only earn a marginal profit, since Foxconn knows the procedures and costs 
very well. Whichever sophisticated components or products, Foxconn makes by itself. 
So I don’t think there is a lot of knowledge spillover happening. Unless like me. When 
leaving it, I did carry away some knowledge (Interview 100706, on 6th June 2010 in 
Guangzhou by telephone). 
 
Similar to Foxconn, the world’s second largest EMS provider, Flextronics, built its own 
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industrial town in Zhuhai in 1996 and subsequently relocated all 13 key business units into 
the town. In 2009, Flextronics (Zhuhai) produced a total output value of $ 60 billion and also 
accounted for 41% of total export value in Zhuhai.2  During this process, Flextronics 
upgraded the function of its Zhuhai base from printed circuit board (PCB) assembly into a full 
range of EMSs, such as mobile devices, automotive components, computing devices, touch 
displays, camera modules and power suppliers and so on. An exclusive local supply network 
was constructed in three steps: (1) transplanted 26 Flextronics’ suppliers from elsewhere; (2) 
established 11 solely owned subsidiaries surrounding the industrial park; and (3) acquired 
four competent local suppliers directly. Its Vice President noted that:  
 
Compared with Foxconn, we were a bit late [in the PRD]. So we moved faster. We 
asked our suppliers to come, established our own one, and even acquired local [private] 
firms. Those local firms were out suppliers originally in PCB manufacturing. As they 
were growing fast, we saw their competences as well as potential challenge. So we 
bought them with an irresistibly good price instead of relocating our owned factories 
from elsewhere (Interview 100704, on14th May, 2010 in Zhuhai). 
 
In summary, this chapter finds that captive coupling has been developed and reinforced in 
the electronics industry in the PRD throughout three decades of development. Regional 
upgrading is possible in various ways. But it is mainly contributed by FIEs. Although local 
private firms have been catching up quickly, they still lag behind substantially with limited 
functional upgrading under the shadow of FIEs. This phenomenon can be found in the 
examples of Shijie and Shilong, Foxconn (Shenzhen) and Flextronics (Zhuhai). Nevertheless, 
the prospect of local upgrading should not be viewed too pessimistically. There are some new 
institutional-spatial conditions that may give local firms a chance to upgrade via a different 
                                                              
2 Interview with a vice president of Flextronics on 14 Mar 2010 in Zhuhai. 
195 
 
pathway. This issue is addressed in the next section. 
6.4 Potential pathways of local upgrading: leveraging the power of FIEs 
The above section has demonstrated a process of FIE-led upgrading within captive 
coupling. This process resonates with many previous studies which assert that TNCs (or 
global lead firms) play a determinant role in defining latecomer upgrading in the electronics 
industry (Cho et al., 1998; Gereffi and Fernandez, 2011; Hobday, 1995; Schmitz, 2004). 
However, as critiqued in section 6.2, these studies overlook certain potential in local 
upgrading. Although captive coupling has been reinforced, local firms may utilize some 
resources embedded in changing institutional-spatial contexts to leverage the power of lead 
firms. 
Based on my fieldwork in the PRD3, this study finds that local firms in the electronics 
industry are leveraging the power of FIEs by utilizing two resources most frequently: new 
regional assets and competitive dynamics within GPNs. This section articulates three cases in 
relation to these strategies of upgrading. Specifically, the case of Shunde shows how 
emerging regional assets can increase the bargaining power of local firms in the home 
appliance industry. The case of CZC illustrates how local firms may bypass the control of 
TNCs and CMs by taking advantage of recent competitive dynamics in the computer and 
cellphone markets. Finally, the case of Jingtuo exemplifies how local firms can synthesize 
various assets to achieve product upgrading under the shadow of FIEs. It should be noted that 
these cases merely shed light on some possible new pathways of local upgrading. They do not 
                                                              
3 In the electronics industry, 42 interviews were conducted including 37 firms and 5 regional institutions during 
the fieldwork in 2010. 
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mean that the entire electronics industry the PRD has fully moved away from captive 
coupling. 
6.4.1 New regional assets and the home appliance cluster in Shunde 
Compared with the historical moment in 1978, the institutional-spatial contexts of the 
PRD’s electronics industry have substantially changed. Various regional assets have been 
developed during rapid industrialization in this region. A regional innovation system has been 
emerging, though it is yet to be effective. Since the late 1990s, regional governments in the 
PRD have started to nurture many industrial associations (Xiao and He, 2010; Xue, 2009). 
Industrial associations were established in all the PRD cities and also in most of the 
specialized towns in the electronics industry, such as Beijiao and Leliu in Foshan city or 
Shilong, Shijie, Qingxi in Dongguan city. During the 2000s, 20 technological innovation 
centers, named as centers of productivity facilitation, were established in the electronics 
industrial clusters in the PRD. However, these tech-innovation centers had little innovation 
content and merely functioned as public platforms for prototype experiment and testing. Half 
of them were even privatized before 2005 due to operational difficulties (Qiu and Yang, 2008). 
Intensive indigenous innovation was absent in the PRD because local firms tended to focus on 
transferring and absorbing external technologies, while many electronics FIEs relied on their 
backward linkages to transfer technologies that are innovated and developed in their 
headquarters or home-country R&D centers (Fan et al., 2007; Yang and Liao, 2009). 
Industrial associations were also facing difficulties in facilitating collective learning in the 




In the past decade, we did try a lot to build up the so called ‘regional learning platform’ 
by providing various business meetings, learning workshops and training programs, as 
requested by the Dongguan municipal governments. However, this outcome was less 
significant because technologies in the electronics industry were too diverse and 
sophisticated. The attendants had few common languages and became less and less 
interested. They preferred to work closely with their clients where they learned more. 
Thus we still more focused on our normal duties like organizing business trips and local 
trade fairs which seemed to be more effective (Interview 100817, on 17 Aug 2010 in 
Dongguan). 
 
While the regional innovation system is yet to be effective, domestic markets become a 
rather important asset that gives rise of new upgrading opportunities. Originally, the 
electronics industry in the PRD relied highly on export markets since the 1980s. But the 
situation has changed now. China has become an emerging key market in many electronics 
sectors for global firms (APCO, 2009; Gadiesh et al., 2007; Jin, 2006; Naughton, 1997). In 
the past decade, the PRD’s electronics firms were selling more products in the domestic 
market than in the international markets. As shown in Table 6.5, in the electronic machinery 
and equipment products, the portion of sale value in the domestic market increased 
continuously from 41 % in 1999 to 61% in 2008. The domestic share of electronics and ICT 
products also experienced a similar growth from 25% in 1999 to 36% in 2008. Interestingly, 
when FIEs are concentrating more in the domestic market, local private firms are focusing 
more on international markets.  
Additionally, a regional supply network was emerging by the growth of local firms and 
the further localization of FIEs. This supply network comprised dozens of specialized 
industrial clusters and industrial parks with specialties in different segments in the electronic 
industry (see section 6.3.3). Among 31 surveyed firms,4 only 9 of them were largely based on 
                                                              
4 Among 37 interviewed firms, only 31 of them completed the questionnaire survey. 
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regional supply networks in their early stage of development. But currently 24 of them said 
that the majority of supply chains were grounded in the PRD. 
 
Table 6.5 Comparing the roles of market in PRD’s electronics industry 
Year 








Electronic Machinery & Equipment  
1999 92.0 59.7 40.8 100 
2004 304.0 49.7 50.3 100 
2008 696.4 38.7 61.3 100 
Electronics & ICT  
1999 175 75.1 24.9 100 
2004 802.1 74.3 25.7 100 
2008 1595.6 64.3 35.7 100 
FIEs     
1999 151.6 78.3 21.7 100 
2004 859.2 73.7 26.3 100 
2008 1666.2 69.4 30.6 100 
Private firms  
1999 50.8 11.8 89.2 100 
2004 320.7 27.9 73.1 100 
2008 870.1 34.0 66.0 100 
Sources: The first and second Guangdong Economic Census in 2004 and 2008. All data refer to 
enterprises have an annual turnover over 5 million yuan. 
 
My survey found that the influences of regional assets varied towards local upgrading. 
As shown in Figure 6.4, domestic markets, production costs and regional supply networks 
were the three most important regional assets with a value of 2.39, 1.97 and 1.94 respectively. 
Governmental supports and associational economies were less significant, and the 
social-cultural relations were the least important. According to my fieldwork, the combination 
of domestic markets, production costs and regional supply networks increased the bargaining 
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were quite needed in domestic markets such as fans, water heaters and electronic cookers later 
on. Without assistance from FIEs or TNCs, these local firms conducted reverse engineering to 
bridge the knowledge gap. The early electronic products from Shunde were poor in quality 
and functions, but those products were sold at an extremely low price in comparison with the 
ones made by Japanese and European lead firms. Hence these products were ‘acceptable good’ 
to a certain extent (Gadiesh et al., 2007). By taking the opportunity of booming domestic 
markets, many local firms achieved functional upgrading into domestic branded name 
companies, such as Midea, Rongsheng, Kolen, Galanz, Macro, Dongling and Wanhe.  
The preliminary success of these local branded firms stimulated the further development 
of local suppliers. Some of them were privatized from EPEs or township and village 
enterprises (TVEs); some of them span off from the branded firms; and some of them were 
joint ventures between local firms and global lead firms (Liu.W et al., 2010). This supply 
networks underpinned local branded firms to provide OEM services for global buyers, such as 
such as Electrolux, Hitachi and Mitsubishi during the mid-1990s. In 1995, Shunde contributed 
to about 80% of production volume in air conditioners and fridges in the China market (Lin.D, 
2009). By 2000, the sale records of many Shunde firms in the China market exceeded global 
lead firms, such as Panasonic, Electrolux and Siemens (Li and Wang, 2011). In 2006, Shunde 
was certificated as the “National Town of Home Appliances”5 with more than 2,000 
competent local firms, about 20 domestic branded lead firms and vertically integrated 
production networks interwoven among three clusters: Leilu, Beijiao and Daliang (see Figure 
6.2).  
                                                              
5 This honor was awarded by the National Industrial Association of Home Appliances in China. Apart from the 
branding effect, this honor makes Shunde more eligible in receiving funding and institutional supports from 
regional and national governments. 
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Midea is one of the most successful local branded firms which have fulfilled upgrading 
by relying on regional innovation systems and their own absorptive capacities. Starting by 
hiring part-time technicians6, Midea has developed various partnerships with many public 
research institutions and universities in the PRD since the early 1990s. These technicians 
enabled Midea to manufacture their owned-brand home appliances in domestic market 
through reverse engineering and technological imitation. Meanwhile, Midea also articulated 
itself into the global market to be an OEM supplier for earning stable profits and learning 
up-to-date product technologies. 
An important functional upgrading was fulfilled in 1996 in which Midea developed 
cooperative coupling with Toshiba through establishing a joint venture known as GMCC.7 
GMCC was meant for making compressors (for air conditioners and fridges) for the China 
market based on Toshiba’s X1C and X2C models. It initially sold compressors for many 
Chinese firms, and then consolidated clients in a few domestic lead firms. Synergy was 
developed because Toshiba was attracted by the emerging China market, while Midea was 
eager to access the key technologies of compressors. The nuance power relation during this 
functional upgrading is well noted by a manager of the GMCC: 
 
There were three reasons contributed to the establishment of the joint venture. First, 
Toshiba had problems in acquiring land for building factories at that time and it needed 
some local partners to solve this problem. Second, it was also too costly for them to 
establish their own plants. More importantly, Toshiba had foreseen the huge potential of 
China markets and did not want to miss the opportunity. Hence Toshiba agreed to 
develop joint venture with Midea. If Toshiba declined, Midea would surely turn to other 
partners for the joint venture (Interview 100902, on 2 Sep 2010 in Shunde). 
                                                              
6 These technicians were employed by SOEs and were officially not allowed to work for private enterprises. 
Therefore, they worked was technical consultants during weekend and were called ‘weekend engineers’ at that 
time. 
7  http://www.chinagmcc.com 
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Midea kept absorbing knowledge from Toshiba through technological licensing, engineer 
rotation and conducting co-development between Midea and GMCC. It then became the 
largest client of GMCC and successfully persuaded Toshiba to co-develop new compressor 
models with Midea. After years of accumulation, Midea eventually purchased necessary 
intellectual property rights (IPRs) from Toshiba and acquired the Toshiba’s shares (40%) of 
GMCC in 1998. In 2010, GMCC made the first turbo compressor based on Midea’s 
proprietary IPRs. This functional upgrading of Midea did not created much tension towards 
Toshiba because Toshiba did not consider the compressor technologies as their core 
competences and was more interested in developing more advanced technologies, such as 
clean and variable-frequency technologies.8  
In order to strengthen absorptive capacities and develop more promising patterns of 
coupling with global buyers, Midea established several R&D divisions in the past decade, 
such as the Midea-Toshiba Research Center of Variable-frequency Technology, Midea Motor 
Research Center (Shanghai), Midea Refrigeration Research Center and an in-house training 
center called Midea College. These R&D subsidiaries enabled Midea to provide qualified and 
rapid-renewing products for both global and domestic markets. 
What is the role of domestic and global markets in such local upgrading examples as 
Midea? An answer was provided by vice CEO of the Donglin Group (Interview, 100701). It 
should be cautioned that the domestic market here is not a necessary condition for local 
upgrading, but it does provide an opportunity for local firms to increase their bargaining 
power with global lead firms and to nurture their technological and marketing skills. 
                                                              
8 A similar story of local functional upgrading also happened in another joint venture in Guangzhou between 




China’s domestic market is extremely important to us. All local firms [in Shunde] started by 
selling imperfect products in China in the 1980s. We then learned how to make them better 
and how to manage a brand. But I should admit that we learn the most significant 
technologies from our OEM customers. They bring us to understand the state-of-art 
technologies, new designs and rapid changing consumer behaviors in the global market. 
Nowadays we keep both domestic (OBM) and international (OEM) businesses for balancing 
risks in volatile market changes, such as the economic crisis last year [2009] (Interview 
100701, on 1st July 2010 in Shunde). 
 
6.4.2 Competitive dynamics within GPNs: the functional upgrading of CZC 
Apart from the growing availability of regional assets, competitive dynamics within GPN 
is also a critical but implicit asset to local electronics firms. Since the mid-1990s, some new 
platform developers from East Asia have been challenging global lead firms in various 
product markets, such as the Creative Technology (Singapore, audio processing chipset), 
MTK (Taiwan, mobile phone baseband) and VIA (Taiwan, motherboard platform). Assisted 
by these turnkey solutions, many local firms in the PRD upgraded from component suppliers 
into branded manufacturers directly. Meanwhile thousands of shanzhai manufacturers9 joined 
the game by making copy-cat products. The growth of these products led to a market shake 
out later on and only a few local firms survived such as K-Touch (mobile phone), OPPO 
(multi-media products), Seavo (desktop computer) and CZC10 (netbook/tablet computer). 
These firms were mainly located in in Shenzhen and Dongguan (Liu.Y et al., 2010). This 
section specifically examines the case of CZC to illustrate how competitive dynamics have 
influenced local functional upgrading. 
                                                              
9 Shanzhai (山寨) product refers to Chinese imitation and pirated brands and goods, particularly in electronics 
industries. Shanzhai products are look alike, and low-quality or with improved functions done in parody. Recent 
dynamics in many Shanzhai products shows that they are no longer pirated brands, but are still based on 
imitation from global lead firm strongly. 
10 Chuang Zhi Cheng Technology, established in Shenzhen. 
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The upgrading strategy of CZC was to decouple with Taiwanese CMs so as to escape 
from their strict control; and meanwhile recouple with platform developers to launch its own 
products. CZC was established in the mid-2000s to exploit the domestic market of netbook 
computers. Being captive to Taiwanese CMs for procuring key components, CZC supplied 
netbook motherboards for local branded firms including shanzhai manufacturers. However, 
the problem of captive coupling kept CZC at bay, as told by the former vice-director of CZC:  
 
About 80% of our components were sourced from top Taiwanese CMs. They fully 
controlled us by price and volume. Whenever they claimed that they were out of stock, 
we had to take it and stop our work. When they raised price, we could not say no. We 
could not escape from them. If we use other CMs’ components, we will meet a 
problem of heat dissipation and systematic compatibility (Interview 100907, on 7th 
Sep 2010 in Shenzhen). 
 
Tension increased between Taiwanese CMs and CZC, when CZC’s market share 
gradually increased. CZC suffered from unstable supply of key components (e.g. chipset) 
from the Taiwanese CMs which tend to prioritize Taiwanese firms. CZC had risks in 
switching to other component suppliers because this segment was firmly controlled by 
Taiwanese CMs. Once CZC decoupled with Taiwanese CMs, it might have nowhere else to 
procure key components. 
An upgrading opportunity emerged through the availability of the Atom chipset solution 
from Intel. Atom was deliberately designed to solve the problems of heat dissipation. It 
helped latecomer firms in the PRD like CZC can utilize a wide range of component suppliers 
in the global market to make motherboards, so as to reduce dependency on Taiwanese CMs. 
CZC thus decoupled from its Taiwanese suppliers and recoupled with Intel to develop its own 
motherboard solutions. The incentive of Intel’s strategy resulted from the competition 
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between Intel and VIA for years.11 Based on the Atom chipset, CZC quickly developed 
turnkey solutions in the S30 platform which was cheaper but less sophisticated than VIA’s 
platforms (Pei and Hu, 2009). This effort made CZC become a platform developer in the low 
end of the notebook computer market. The S30 platform was quite welcomed in the domestic 
market. In 2009, CZC hit the top seller record among its peers in China.12 
To a certain degree, the CZC was functionally upgraded into a new platform developer 
but in a shallow form. The technological competence of CZC did not improve fundamentally. 
The S30 was still technologically lagged behind VIA’s products, though it did capture some 
market shares from VIA. The growing local supply network in Shenzhen also sustained the 
upgrading of CZC. A comment from Mr Mao, the CEO of Hedy Holding has described this 
change: 
 
The power of Taiwanese computer giants is weakening, with the rise of domestic OEM 
and ODM suppliers [such as CZC] and regional supply networks in the PRD. Now we 
can buy most of the components and the designs right here from the non-Taiwanese 
firms (Interviewed by Nandu Daily, published on 3rd Jun 2009). 
 
In 2011, after evaluating the cooperation of the Atom chipsets and the technological 
capabilities of CZC, Intel further authorized its Meego system (for tablet computer) to be used 
by CZC. The incentive of this strategy was derived from the competitive pressures between 
Intel and Microsoft, Apple, Google in operation systems occupying the top of the value-chain 
hierarchy. CZC was regarded as a strategic partner helping Intel to venture into the tablet 
computer market in China. Hence CZC enjoyed certain privilege of installing the Meego 
                                                              
11 VIA launched the Global Mobility Bazaar (GMB) alliance in 2008 that challenged Intel’s market shares by 
providing new turn-key solutions called the Nano platform. At: 
http://gmb.via.com.tw/resource/jsp/PartnersSolutions/PartnersSolutions.jsp 
12 Source: Nandu Daily on 3 Jun 2009, at: http://epaper.oeeee.com/D/html/2009-06/03/content_808524.htm. 
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system in its indigenously developed tablet computers. Domestic market opportunities 
increased the bargaining power of CZC in this deal. This Inter-CZC partnership is not unique 
in the PRD, but is a common phenomenon in the tablet computer market. As shown in Table 
6.6, there were at least 32 branded domestic firms in 2010 that had developed cooperative 
partnership with 9 global platform developers in the PRD. Some of these local firms had 
already achieved good sale records in global markets. For instance, Zenithink’s product was 
ranked just after Apple’s iPad and followed by Samsung, Archos and Motorola and so on in a 
global market survey in 2011.13 
 
Table 6.6 Global-local partnership in the tablet computer industry in the PRD 
Platforms Branded local firms 
Intel, 450//455/470/Z530 CZC, Bben, livefan, G’s Five Telsda, Viewpad, 
Idea, Jumper, Dianji, 
Qualcomm 7227/7627-T Lenovo, Huawei, Voosoo 
Freescale, iMX515/535 Grefu, Azpen, Eben 
VIA, 8505/8650 1pad, Flytouch, Chuangshizhe, Shuziyin, Jinghan, 
Rockchip 2818/2918 TCL, Aoson, Hyundai, Simai, Yuandao 
Infotmic, iMAPx210/220 Zenithink, Doken 
Amlogic 8726 Zenithink, Ramos 
Ranesas, Cortex A9 Linyun 
Telechips, TCC8803/9201/8902 Emdoor, Yufeng,  
Sources: media reports and author’ fieldwork. 
 
Taiwanese CMs had little power to block the functional upgrading of CZC. Although 
they were in the same GPN, the upgrading opportunity was given by Intel which Taiwanese 
CMs could control. This generation of opportunity looks like a trickle-down effect of 
competition on the top of the value-chain hierarchy. However, this functional upgrading 
should not be overemphasized. Local firms may encounter a modularity trap in which they 
become more and more captive to platform developers in technologies. In terms of functions 
                                                              
13 Zenithink’s tablet computers ranked at the second of world-wide costumer likelihood in 2011 according to a 
recent survey done by iSuppli., see: http://lowendmac.com/inews/11ios/0829.html#8 
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and products, they indeed upgrade. But in technological capabilities, they do not. Moreover, 
the marketing capabilities of local firms are still greatly lagging behind global lead firms. 
How many local firms can survive in future market shake out remains unknown. 
6.4.3 Synthesizing resources under the shadow of FIEs: Jingtuo Automatic 
In contrast to Midea or CZC, many of the local electronics firms may not be able to 
increase bargaining power or bypass the control of FIEs. But they may leverage the power 
relations with FIEs by nurturing more mutual interests with them. The rest of this section 
draws upon the case of Jingtuo to illustrate a scenario of incremental upgrading within captive 
coupling and how asymmetrical power relations can be smoothed by nurturing better synergy. 
Jingtuo Automatic Equipment Ltd (Jingtuo) was established in 2000 in Shenzhen to 
manufacture lower-cost soldering machines for substituting expensive imported machines 
which cost 1 million yuan each at that time. In term of quality and function, Jingtuo’s 
soldering machines were not competitive against imported machines from global leading 
manufacturers (e.g. ERSA). But Jingtuo grasped a market niche by offering the machines at 
40% of the international prices.  
The rise of the local computer industry and shanzhai manufacturers in the PRD 
generated a huge demand of low-cost soldering machines which sustained the rapid growth of 
Jingtuo. Initially, the performance of Jingtuo’s machines was unstable, while Jingtuo 
overcame this weakness by providing timely and intensive after-sale maintenance. Proximity 
to local market served as a crucial asset underpinning the growth of Jingtuo. As noted by the 




Collocation with our customer makes our products accepted by the market. Indeed, our 
products got many problems at the beginning, like operation halts or disordering 
temperature control. But our technician crews stand by 24/7 and can arrive at the 
factories in time. Even when our machines are operating quite well, I may bring some 
sellers and engineers together to visit the customers to see what we can improve or what 
they expect us to do. In doing so, we earned our reputation and collected a lot of useful 
feedbacks from our local customers (Interview 100908, on 8th Sep 2010 in Shenzhen).  
  
In the early 2000s, Jingtuo attracted the interest of Flextronics (Zhuhai) and developed 
captive coupling with Flextronics. After relocating major business units into Zhuhai, 
Flextronics had a strong imperative in cost reduction and they needed to replace thousands of 
soldering machines within every 3 to 5 years. A qualified and low-cost supplier was needed 
and Jingtuo was selected. As a designated key supplier with certain priority, Jingtuo was 
required to provide specialized-design machines according to rapid-changing product ranges 
in Flextronics. In return, Flextronics provided certain technological assistances and 
co-innovation opportunities for Jingtuo in product development. Synergy was well fostered 
based on long-term mutual interests. Jingtuo considered Flextronics as an important stepping 
stone to entry the global EMS industry, while Flextronics preferred Jingtuo’s flexibility in 
engineering designs and efficiency in cost reductions. As told by a vice president of 
Flextronics:  
 
Our international suppliers [ERSA] mainly provide standardized machines with a few 
revisable functions. But Jingtuo works much more flexible. They are willing to revise the 
whole designs to fit our demands. We just tell them what we want and what the others can 
do. Sometimes we work together to figure out how we can improve the machines better, 
which saves us a lot of time and human costs. We now use quite a lot of machines from 
Jingtuo, apart from some high-end products in which we still use Siemens and ERSA’s 
machines (Interview 100514, on 14th May 2010 in Zhuhai).14 
 
Based on the synergy with Flextronics, Jingtuo has innovated and developed four series 
                                                              




of machines in reflow soldering and wave soldering by which Jingtuo earned its reputation in 
the global EMS industry as a low/middle-end machine provider. The revenue of Jingtuo in 
2009 reached 400 million yuan. By 2010, Jingtuo held 30 patent rights and ten sets of 
software copyrights on the basis of only 80 technicians. 
Local contexts have played a critical role in spurring the innovation and upgrading of 
Jingtuo. To many electronics Shanzhai manufacturers in the PRD, the major concern was to 
make products cheaper and faster. Jintuo kept hearing complaints from local customers about 
the complexity of IC designs and the limited capability of soldering processing lines. Hence 
Jingtuo was inspired to innovate with a dual-track machine to satisfy diverse and flexible 
demands of local customers in 2008. The dual-track machine could process two types of 
product simultaneously within a single production line.  
Shanzhai manufacturers became the lab for Jingtuo to experiment the machine. Jingtuo 
initially sold the dual-track machines at half price to local manufacturers for testing. After 
rounds of revisions and adjustments, the dual-track machine was recommended to Flextronics. 
Eventually, the dual-track machines were patented and adopted by Flextronics and other EMS 
manufacturers. This product upgrading even pressured ERAS to develop a similar machine. 
But it was sold outside China so as to avoid being deemed as a follower or triggering IPR 
disputes with Jingtuo. 
In order to maintain the synergy and pursue its own upgrading goal, Jingtuo has paid a 
lot of attentions in lowering tension with Flextronics. All requirements from Flextronics were 
strictly enforced in Jingtuo. Although Jingtuo also sold machines to Foxconn which was a key 
competitor of Flextronics, Jingtuo’s relationship with Foxconn was based on market 
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transaction and did not develop any close partnership (such as technological collaboration) as 
the one with Flextronics. In the mid-2000s, Jingtuo was encouraged by local customers to 
upgrade into a small EMS provider. But it would turn Jingtuo into a new competitor of 
Flextronics. In order to maintain the synergy with Flextronics, Jingtuo gave up this upgrading 
strategy. As its Vice President said: 
 
We can earn more profit by upgrading into an EMS supplier. Even many local 
entrepreneurs encouraged us to do so because they were tied of being controlled by 
Taiwanese CMs. But we decided not to do that because it would harm our relationship 
with Flextronics. We need this industrial name card and the learning opportunities in the 
global market in a long term. (Interview 100908, on 8 Sep 2010 in Shenzhen) 
 
Instead of pursing functional upgrading which will challenge Flextronics, Jingtuo turned 
to pursue sectoral upgrading. It has started to invest in developing photovoltaic equipment for 
the domestic market in 2009. This equipment shares some technological similarity with 
soldering machines which Jingtuo are familiar with. The new customers of photovoltaic 
equipment do not overlap with Jingtuo’s original clients. Therefore, this sectoral upgrading 
did not raise much tension toward the existing coupling relations of Jingtuo. The only 
problem Jingtou has to face is that the sunk costs of developing photovoltaic equipment are 
much higher than soldering machines. Whether Jingtuo will successfully fulfill this sectoral 
upgrading is yet to be known. 
To sum up, the case of Jingtuo exemplifies how a local firm in the PRD can achieve 
upgrading in two steps: (1) deepening captive coupling with FIEs with more synergy; (2) 
synthesizing various assets to increase bargaining power and identify more upgrading 
opportunities, such as cost advantages, local markets, proximity to customers, and a 
competent regional supply network and so on. This synthesis provides a reasonably good 
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opportunity for local firms to leverage the power of FIEs and implement upgrading. 
6.5 Conclusion: identifying the alternatives 
On the mechanisms of upgrading in the electronics industry, previous studies tend to 
believe that modular governance has determined inter-firm power relationships and the effect 
of knowledge diffusion. Hence, it seems reasonable that indigenous innovation would 
possibly be the only option for latecomer upgrading. Since TNCs would not offer advanced 
knowledge, local firms better make it by their own efforts. I regard this strand of discussions 
as a stereotype of latecomer upgrading. It appreciates neither the dynamics of power relations 
and synergy within inter-firm relationship, nor the institutional-spatial conditions that 
influence governance power. Once new mutual interests or the fragility of governance power 
is identified, power relations could be reshaped, despite that the pattern of strategic coupling 
may remain the same. 
Understanding latecomer upgrading in this way, we can recognize many alternative 
pathways of regional development beyond the stereotypes of being a humble follower or an 
active innovator. Empirical investigations in this chapter have verified this point. Generally, 
this chapter offers a different story along three dimensions. 
First of all, the PRD did not own promising regional assets in accordance with previous 
studies, such as strong state intervention, intensive indigenous innovation, regional innovation 
systems or associational economies (Cooke and Morgan, 1998; Douglass, 1994; Lazonick, 
2004; Zhou and Wei, 2011). Instead, this study found that upgrading in the PRD’s electronics 
industry was driven by captive coupling whereby local firms were highly dependent on FIEs 
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in providing rapid changing technologies and up-to-date information of market demands. This 
captive coupling led to substantial product and process upgrading in the PRD. But the 
dependence of local firms on TNCs was reinforced simultaneously. Regional functional 
upgrading was realized to a significant degree. The PRD was upgraded from a processing or 
sub-contracting base to a global integrated manufacturing center. But the major contribution 
of this upgrading came from FIEs. During this process, the technological capacities and 
performance of local firms were improved, but apparently were still lagged behind FIEs. 
Second, drawing upon several detailed case studies, this chapter has illustrated that the 
trajectory of upgrading is neither pre-determined by the pattern of global governance, nor 
restricted by the stereotypes of upgrading that highlighted innovation. Instead, it is subject to 
dynamic synergy within captive coupling and is constantly reshaped by changing mutual 
interests and firm strategies. The pattern of captive coupling has yet to be changed and FIEs 
still exert strong and strict control based on their modular governance of local firms. But FIEs 
cannot stop local firms in seeking upgrading potential within the broader and changing 
institutional-spatial conditions. In the PRD’s electronics industry, local firms have managed to 
utilize various emerging assets to increase their bargaining power. 
Third, my study finds three local strategies as alternative pathways of local upgrading in 
the PRD’s electronics industry. Local firms may increase bargaining power and earn more 
learning opportunities from foreign firms, such as those home appliance firms in Shunde; 
local firms can also bypass the control of foreign firms by utilizing opportunities embedded in 
competitive dynamics within GPNs, such as the case of CZC in Shenzhen; finally, local firms 
may gradually upgrading by fostering more mutual interests with foreign firms and lowering 
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tension within captive coupling, such as the cases of Jingtuo and Flextronics (Zhuhai). All 
these strategies point to the potential in the formation of cooperative coupling in future, but it 
is yet to be fully realized at the regional level. In contrast to the electronics industry, 







Chapter 7 Local upgrading in the apparel industry: from captive 
coupling to cooperative coupling 
 
7.1 Introduction 
Chapter 6 has demonstrated the formation and persistence of captive coupling in the 
PRD’s electronics industry. This chapter aims to reveal a different scenario of strategic 
coupling and the corresponding outcomes of local upgrading in the apparel industry. 
Although clothing products are mostly low in value-added and unsophisticated in 
technologies, the apparel industry serves virtually as the initial step of industrialization and 
even an important part of survival for latecomer economies (Dicken, 2007). It is also 
considered as a primary industry that transfers upgrading opportunities from developed 
countries to developing economies during the process of globalization (Gereffi, 1999; Gereffi 
and Korzeniewicz, 1994a). However, there is a bottle-neck for latecomer firms to conduct 
functional upgrading from OEM into ODM/OBM in this industry, because global buyers 
discourage this upgrading to prevent the emergence of new competitors (Bair and Gereffi, 
2001; Humphrey and Schmitz, 2002b; Schmitz, 2004). Latecomer firms are thus kept at bay 
and suffer high competitive pressures, because they are making undifferentiated products and 
can be quite easily substituted by lower-cost producers (Hill and Fujita, 1996; Ozawa, 2005). 
Situating in this context, local functional upgrading in the apparel industry seems to be 
rather difficult. However, this study finds that the apparel industry in PRD has undergone a 
different trajectory of local upgrading. After three decades of development, the region has 
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achieved functional upgrading to a certain degree. It has become a global manufacturing hub 
and a domestic design and fashion center, rather than just a “world factory” full of sweat 
shops and low-skilled labor. This achievement goes beyond the explanations in previous 
studies. To address this dynamics, this chapter focuses on three issues in the PRD’s apparel 
industry: (1) the progress of local upgrading and changing driving forces; (2) the formation 
and evolution of strategic coupling; (3) power dynamics and local strategies during the 
evolution of strategic coupling. 
This chapter is organized into five sections. The next section interprets recent dynamics 
in the global apparel industry and critiques the potential of local upgrading in contemporary 
literature. After a brief review of the national institutional context, the third section analyzes 
the formation and evolution of strategic coupling driven by multi-scalar forces in the PRD. 
Drawing on two industrial-specialized towns (Humen and Xintang), the penultimate section 
addresses how the improvement of local capabilities and changing institutional-spatial 
conditions enable local firms to reshape their power relations with FIEs and global buyers. 
Key findings and theoretical implications are discussed in the last section. 
7.2 Local upgrading in the apparel industry 
The apparel industry is primarily concerned with the design, manufacture, distribution 
and retail of clothing products. In order to be consistent with the statistical term in China, the 
apparel industry in this chapter refers to clothes, underwear, footwear, headgear, processed 
feather and other related products. It does not include textile, fabric and machinery sectors. 
Generally, its technological and capital entry barriers are much lower than those in the 
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automotive and electronics industries. While production technologies are increasingly 
standardized, the competiveness of the apparel industry is more premised on the capabilities 
of design marketing and branding which are deeply embedded in popular culture, fashion 
trends and geographically variegated consumer preferences (Aspers, 2010). 
7.2.1 Global tendencies in the apparel industry 
In the past half century, the key episode of the apparel industry is a process of global 
shift from old-established manufacturing hubs located in West Europe and North America to 
newly developing regions in Asia, Mexico and Eastern Europe (Dicken, 2007). The United 
States and European Union, as well as Japan became the largest import markets. Most of the 
developing countries became exporters within globally dispersed production networks under 
the governance of Multi-Fibre Agreement (MFA, 1974-2005) and Agreement of Textile and 
Clothing (ATC).1  The largest regional production network was constructed among East 
Asian NIEs. 
During ATC and post-MFA period, the global trade of the apparel industry has 
consolidated on a smaller number of large apparel exporters (Frederick and Gereffi, 2011). In 
1995, the 15 largest exporters accounted for 79% of the world export total. In 2009, the share 
of the top 15 increased to near 87%.2 Together with Hong Kong, China became the largest 
exporter. Its share of exports grew from 22% in 1995 to 41% in 2009, representing an 
increase of export value from $33 billion to $123 billion.3 Following China, the other 
developing countries (Bangladesh, India, Vietnam, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Pakistan and 
                                                              
1 During 1995-2005, MFA was in a ten-year transition period under the Agreement on Textile and Clothing. 
2 The WTO data at: http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/its2009_e/its09_toc_e.htm 
3 World Trade Report 2010 from World Trade Organization, International trade and tariff data. 
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Cambodia) were increasing their export shares at the same period. Nevertheless, some other 
developing countries lost their market shares, such as countries in North and Central America, 
South Asia (e.g. Thailand and Philippines) and Central Europe (e.g. Romania and Poland). 
While many East Asian late-comers have achieved substantial industrial growth, whether 
industrial upgrading has occurred and contributes significantly to regional development is still 
unclear. 
Recent studies in China’s apparel industry have shown the occurrence of industrial 
upgrading. As Frederick and Gereffi (2011) has argued, China has been a clear winner with 
significant technological upgrading according to its performance in global exports, the 
amount of imported machines, and the improvement of product quality, capacity and diversity. 
Meanwhile, Mexico and Latin American countries are losing competitiveness because these 
regions lack integrated production networks, clusters and sufficient investments in logistic 
facilities, machines and so on. Apart from the advantage of lower production costs, China’s 
apparel industry has also developed some non-cost-based competitiveness in timeliness and 
consistency. This competitiveness is supported by world-class distribution networks 
coordinated by intermediary trading firms from Hong Kong, Taiwan, and South Korea 
(Frederick and Gereffi, 2011; Robinson, 2010; Tewari, 2006). A more recent study based on 
Sino-EU merchandise trade also reveals that China’s apparel industry has been a highly 
competitive industry of this country. The index of revealed competitive advantage in textile 
products (including clothing products) was ranked at fourth among all 14 key merchandises 
from 1996 to 2008 (Li et al., 2012). However, this remarkable national industrial growth 
should not be overemphasized because the content of local upgrading is unclear. If FIEs 
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contribute to the majority of this achievement, local upgrading would be shallow and limited. 
Meanwhile, upgrading in the above studies is mainly measured by official statistics. The 
qualitative nature of upgrading, such as functional upgrading, also remains unknown. 
7.2.2 Potential of upgrading in the apparel industry 
In the apparel industry, the primary imperatives of global lead firms are to provide 
clothing products at a lower price, in a more flexible manner, and within a shorter time. 
Global lead firms premise their bargaining power not only from financial risk-taken during 
ordering and selling products, but also from expertise and lavish expenditures in advertising, 
building market channels, renting retail shops, and other operations as well (Sturgeon and 
Lester, 2004a). These competences enable global lead firms to have dominant power 
(normally buying power) over their suppliers. Due to the very substitutable nature, suppliers 
suffer pressures and have to improve their performance through upgrading, because other 
lower-cost producers keep entering global markets and intensifying competition. 
During the process of global industrial shift, developing regions are chosen as sites for 
industrial relocation from industrialized regions. Because technologies in the apparel industry 
are less sophisticated, local firms can gradually upgrade through learning by doing (Gereffi 
and Korzeniewicz, 1994a; Hudson, 1989; Kim, 1993; Ozawa, 1991). In order to maintain 
precise product definition and to avoid supplier failures, global lead firms have incentives to 
help local technological improvement. This effort nurtures substantial product and process 
upgrading in local suppliers, such as the rise of East Asian apparel firms (Gereffi, 1999; 
Humphrey and Schmitz, 2002b; van Grunsven and Smakman, 2005). These latecomer firms 
were upgraded from simple subcontractors into OEM suppliers as the strategic partners of 
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global lead firms, such as the Pou Chen Group and the Feng Tay Group from Taiwan in the 
sport wear industry. Some of them also grew up as intermediary trading firms coordinating 
subcontractors located in multiple developing regions, such as Itochu from Japan and the Li & 
Fung Group from Hong Kong (Gereffi, 1999; Hobday and Perini, 2005; Lüthje, 2004; Yeung, 
2007b).  
While product and process upgrading is possible during the global industrial shift, 
functional upgrading in latecomer economies is rather limited according to the GVC literature. 
This is because local functional upgrading will challenge the position of global lead firms. 
Hence it tends to be restricted, constrained, and even deliberately blocked by global lead 
firms which have strong governance power over their suppliers (Bair and Gereffi, 2003; 
Humphrey and Schmitz, 2002b, 2004). In the view of Gereffi (2001b:1620), “the main 
leverage in buyer-driven industries is exercised by marketers and merchandisers at the design 
and retail ends of the chain”. The changing trend of modern consumption, the alleged 
‘consumer fetishism’, also reinforces this asymmetry of power relations between buyers and 
suppliers. This trend increases the difficulty of latecomer firms in mastering core knowledge 
(e.g. fashion design and branding). Such knowledge is intensively contextualized in an 
immense variety of consumer demands which are subject to complex social and cultural 
preferences including consumers’ desire to express their tastes, social status, identity and 
lifestyles through their choices of clothing (Appadurai, 1990; Aspers, 2010; Tokatli and Omur, 
2010). Global lead firms reinforce their governance power through taking advantage of this 
industrial feature, such as the strategies of specializing in marketing and logistics, creating 
socialized values of brands, and spending lavishing budgets in advertising to make ‘brand 
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bully’ over branded late-comers and so on (Arvidsson, 2005, 2007; Klein, 2002). 
Following the logic of the above studies, local functional upgrading would be extremely 
difficult. However, these studies have been too deterministic and neglected the potential of 
local upgrading grounded in broader institutional-spatial contexts. There are two critical 
points needed to be recognized. 
First, core knowledge in the apparel industry may not necessarily be confined within 
global buyers. Different from the electronics industry, production technologies in the apparel 
industry are less technological sophisticated and more standardized. Latecomer firms would 
not have great difficulties to approach production technologies. Global buyers have no intent 
to confine the diffusion of production technologies because they do not rely on manufacturing 
capabilities to sharpen their competitive edges. Global buyers have strong expertise in the 
skills of marketing and branding, but it is hard for them to block the diffusion of this 
knowledge. Latecomer firms can approach these skills through various learning channels, 
such as public research institutes, associational economies, educational training programs, 
professional service providers and trans-regional communities of designers or talents (see my 
review in Chapter 2). Therefore, latecomer firms do not necessarily depend on global buyers 
for absorbing market knowledge from them. The problem is that latecomer firms need a 
critical mass (market and time) to accumulate profits, practice skills and train designers so 
that they can internalize the skills of understanding, capturing and commercializing rapid 
changing fashion trends and consumer preferences. 
Second, markets are not a universally globalized field that is fully occupied by global 
lead firms. Previous studies tend to oversimplify markets as a uniform place controlled by 
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global buyers which play as a gate keeper. In fact, there are diverse market niches for 
latecomer firms to explore, particular to those firms are located in a country with a huge 
domestic market. By identifying new market niches, especially the domestic market which 
may be less demanding and less regulated, latecomer firms may reduce dependence on global 
buyers and conduct functional upgrading. Indian and Turkish apparel firms have provided 
some positive cases in which local firms realized functional upgrading through exploring 
domestic and Russian markets (Tewari, 2008; Tokatli, 2003, 2007; Tokatli and Kizilgun, 
2004). Specific to local firms in the PRD, regarding to the market size of China and the 
liberalizing domestic environment, they do have an opportunity to practice functional 
upgrading. Moreover, local firms may improve their production capabilities and develop 
some non-cost-based advantages, such as competent supply networks, regional learning 
networks and domestic distribution channels. The combination of these conditions may 
incentivize international buyers/traders to cooperative with local firms. 
By recognizing these points, power relations between global buyers and local suppliers 
are possible to be reshaped. Local firms would have some alternative strategies to leverage 
the power of global buyers. They can diversify learning channels to reduce dependence on 
global lead firms. They also can nurture more synergy by venturing new market niches with 
international buyers. The next two sections draw on the case of the PRD’s apparel industry to 
demonstrate this potential. 
7.3 Development and upgrading in the PRD’s apparel industry 
This section starts by reviewing the national context and the formation of captive 
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coupling in the PRD. I then trace the progress and features of industrial upgrading. The main 
analysis focus rests at the evolution of coupling on the basis of the relational framework 
proposed in Chapter 3. 
7.3.1 National contexts of the apparel and textile industries 
Before the opening reform in 1978, SOEs and COEs in China had dominated the apparel 
industry through nationalization. But the apparel industry achieved little progress in 
upgrading due to rather limited usage of modern machines and other production technologies 
(Hua, 2008). After the reform, export-oriented development in the this industry was highly 
encouraged by the central government in order to provide mass employment and accumulate 
foreign currency reserves (Jiang, 2009). Key strategies were marketization, promotion of FDI, 
and structural adjustment in which SOEs withdrew from the apparel industry and created 
space for private and foreign firms. The central government turned to focus on coordinating 
two issues: rationing export quotas according to the regulation of MFA; and leveraging 
export-rebate rate.4 The rate was frequently adjusted as an infant industrial policy to offset 
negative impacts from global markets (Jiang, 2009). It was raised to 16% for helping 
domestic firms overcome the negative consequences of the global financial crisis in 2008. 
The reform of marketization was expanded further in 1992. The disallowance of vertical 
integration in fiber-textile-apparel-retail chains was removed and various market regulations 
were set up for providing a competitive domestic market environment (Gu and Yang, 1999; 
Hua, 2008). For the first time, international branded-name retailers were allowed to enter into 
                                                              
4 China set up the infant policy for the textile and apparel industries based on a floating rebate rate 
based on export values.  
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China5. These foreign branded firms spurred the growth of the domestic market and also 
provided a benchmark for local firms to learn. 
While SOEs withdrew from the apparel industry, they consolidated in the textile industry. 
They received tremendous state investments in upgrading machines and equipment. From 
1985 to 1997, Chinese SOEs invested over $1 billion annually in importing advanced 
textile-processing equipment (Chandra, 1998). During the 2000s, China was the largest global 
recipient of circular knitting machinery (both single and double jersey), electronic flatbed 
knitting machines, shuttle-less looms, open-end rotors, and short-staple spinning machines 
(Frederick and Gereffi, 2011: 84). Although these SOEs largely do not locate in the PRD, the 
technological upgrading of these textile SOEs does help domestic apparel firms reduce 
dependence on foreign firms in raw material procurement. 
7.3.2 Formation of captive coupling 
As the above elaboration has indicated, the apparel industry in the PRD was sharing a 
similar context with the electronics industry at the beginning of the reform. The difference is 
that local authorities were the key actors in promoting foreign investments in the apparel 
industry (Chen and Pu, 1999). Prefectural and provincial governments preferred constructing 
industrial parks for higher value-added industries such as the electronics and chemical 
industries. Due to huge technology and market gaps, captive coupling was form in the apparel 





5 The early pioneers were Giordano (Hong Kong), Nike (US.), Stefanell (France) and Esprit (Hong 
Kong) in 1992; Adidas (German), Mexx (Holland) and Jeanswest (Hong Kong) in 1993; and Liz 
Claiborne (US.) and Benetton (Italy) in 1994 (Gu and Yang, 1999: 14). 
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Figure 7.1 Captive coupling in the PRD’s apparel industry in the 1980s 
 
Source: compiled by author. 
 
Synergy was fostered between the global imperative of industrial relocation and the local 
initiative of industrialization whereby the ‘front-store-back-factory’ pattern was developed 
and dominated by Hong Kong apparel firms (see Chapter 5). Substantial industrial growth has 
been achieved during the 1980s. In 1991, the total industrial output of the apparel industry 
reached 73 million yuan which was mainly contributed by EPEs. During the 2000s, most of 
the EPEs were restructured into FIEs or local private enterprises. By 2008, EPEs only 
accounted for less than 1% of both industrial value added and export values in this industry 
(GDPBS, 2009). In 2009, the total output value of the apparel industry had reached 125 
billion yuan. Meanwhile, its export value reached $13.5 billion which accounted for 4.8% of 
the world total exports. This amount exceeded the total exports of many latecomer economies 




Figure 7.2 Global top exporters of clothing products in 2009 
 
Source: World Trade Organization, International Trade Statistics 2009, at: 
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/its2009_e/its09_toc_e.htm. 
 
7.3.3 Characteristics of upgrading and the catching-up of local firms 
After decades of rapid industrialization, upgrading in the apparel industry has been 
significantly achieved in the PRD (see my summary in Table 7.1). In terms of functional 
upgrading, many local firms have been upgraded from export processing firms into OEM 
suppliers and then further into ODM and OBM suppliers. According to records in Guangdong 
Apparel Industrial Association (GAIA) and Guangdong Apparel Designer Association 
(GADA), more than 60% of local firms which attended Canton Fair6 have provided ODM 
business for global markets since 2007. There were over 2,000 local firms which officially 
registered their own brands in GAIA by 2009. Most of them created more than one brand. By 
2010, 18 local firms were entitled the National Famous Trademarks7 in China. Each of these 
18 firms had an annual turnover over 1 billion yuan and at least owns 1000 retail stores in the 
                                                              
6 Canton Fair is held biannually in Guangzhou every spring and autumn, with a history of 53 years since 1957. 
The Fair is a comprehensive one with the longest history, the highest level, the largest scale, the most complete 
in exhibit variety, the broadest distribution of overseas buyers and the greatest business turnover in China. see: 
http://www.cantonfair.org.cn/en/ 
7  National Famous Trademarks are authorized by China State Ministry of Industry and Commerce. Firms with this 
certificate will enjoy more superior privilege in institutional supports, particularly in IPR protection than other 


























China market.8 As one of the largest local branded firms, Yishion has franchised 4,000 stores 
and established 500 outlets in China and another 22 countries. The design capabilities of the 
apparel industry have also been upgraded. Hundreds of foreign firms have established design 
and brand-development centers in the PRD in collaboration with local partners. By 2010, 
there were 860 registered designers in GADA. About 100 of them have been awarded the 
Guangdong Top Designers. 13 of them were entitled the China Top Designers. They regularly 
launch personal design shows in China and 6 of them have launched personal design shows in 
Paris, New York and London in the past decade.9 
 
Table 7.1 Upgrading in the apparel industry in the PRD 
Types of upgrading Contents 
Function  Processing & assembly (1980s)  OEM (1990s)  ODM (2000s)  
OBM (domestic  international) 
Channel / Network  truncated subcontracting base  global manufacturing center (4% of 
the world export in 2010) 
 Re-export through Hong Kong  World-class logistic infrastructure 
 domestic wholesale hub  domestic fashion design center 
Product  low value added  higher value added 
 simple types  diverse, all product ranges, particularly in sport wear, 
underwear, women wear, jeans and leather ware; 
Process  Hand-made, low efficient machines the most advanced production 
lines in domestic environment 
 Vertically integrated Clusters 
 Mass production  more flexible and specialized 
Source: author’s fieldwork. 
 
Besides functional upgrading, product and process upgrading is also achieved apparently. 
As shown by Table 7.2, from 1991 to 2009, the IVA of apparel firms increased dramatically 
from 5.2 billion yuan to 38.8 billion yuan. IVA per enterprise increased by seven folds and 
                                                              
8 The competitiveness of Guangdong Apparel Industry in 2010, at 
http://www.gdfz.org/?action-viewnews-itemid-4575. 
9 Sources: interview with the vice chairman and an officer of GAIA on 31 May 2010, in Guangzhou; official 
website at: http://www.gdfz.org/. 
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IVA per employee also grew up with four times. In contrast, the number of employee per 
enterprise increased a bit firstly and then declined after 2005. This trend indicates that the 
production efficiency of firms and labor were both improved significantly and this 
achievement did not result from massive usage of labor. In 2009, the normal lead time of 
clothing-sample confirmation in the PRD has been shortened into 20-30 days. This lead time 
was higher than the national average standard which was about 30-40 days (IARE, 2010b). 
 
Table 7.2 Indicators of upgrading in the apparel industry in the PRD 
Year No. firms IVA IVA-E IVA-L NEE 
unit billion million thousand person 
1991 1138 5.2 4.6 16.9 269 
2001 1513 12.3 8.2 21.3 382 
2005 1992 20.7 10.4 30.1 360 
2009 2656 38.8 14.6 45.6 333 
Notes: currency is Chinese yuan at constant 2000 price. IVA-E= industrial value-added per enterprise; 
IVA-L= industrial value-added per Employee; NEE = number of employee per enterprises. All data 
refer to enterprises have an annual turnover over 5 million yuan. 
Sources: Guangdong Statistic Yearbook 1992, 1996, 2000, 2006, 2010.  
 
While the electronics industry in the PRD has been led by FIEs, local (private) firms in 
the apparel industry have caught up and overtaken FIEs as the leader of the region. The 
watershed roughly appeared around 2000 (see Figure 7.3). By 1999, FIEs still contributed to a 
major share with more than 67% IVA and 75% export value in the region. However, local 
firms subsequently outperformed. From 1999 to 2008, in terms of IVA, local firms increased 
by more than 40 times and exceeded FIEs in 2008. In terms of export value, local firms 
increased by 26 times and matched closely the contribution of FIEs in 2008. But SOEs and 






Figure 7.3 Value creation of firms in PRD’s apparel industry 
 
Notes: currency is billion yuan at constant 1999 price. PE refers to private enterprises. Others refer to 
COEs and enterprises with annual turnover lower than 5 million. 
Sources: The national economic census conducted in 2004 and 2008; Guangdong Industrial Census 
Yearbook 2000. 
 
Figure 7.4 Performance of firms in PRD’s apparel industry 
 
Notes: currency is yuan at constant 1999 price. PE refers to private enterprises. Others refer to COEs 
and enterprises with annual turnover lower than 5 million. Data at PRD level are unavailable. 
Regarding that the output of the apparel industry in the PRD accounted for more than 75% of the 
whole province throughout the 2000s, provincial level data were used to represent the PRD roughly. 
Sources: The national economic census conducted in 2004 and 2008; Guangdong Industrial Census 
Yearbook 2000. 
 
A further comparison illustrates that local firms have developed their competiveness with 
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smaller sizes and more efficient performance (see Figure 7.4). Between 1999 and 2008, the 
number of local firms mushroomed with a ten-time increase, but the labor intensity of local 
firms declined (see part A and B in Figure 7.4). During the same period, FIEs had doubled 
their firm number and had a four-time increase of employees. This phenomenon led to a better 
performance of local firms in comparison with FIEs. From 1999 to 2008, the gap of IVA per 
enterprise between FIEs and local firms was almost bridged. Moreover, the IVA per employee 
of local firms remarkably increased from 26,000 yuan to 52,000 yuan, while the IVA per 
employee of FIEs decreased from 35,000 yuan to 30,000 yuan. This trend implies that local 
firms have been upgraded from a captive follower into a competent competitor. 
7.3.4 From captive to cooperative coupling 
The above analyses show that local upgrading has been achieved to a substantial degree, 
particularly during the 2000s. Examining changing multi-scalar forces and 
institutional-spatial contexts, this chapter argues that this local upgrading is produced by the 
formation of cooperative coupling between the PRD and the apparel GPNs. Cooperative 
coupling refers to a situation that local (latecomer) firms in a region develop a complementary 
relationship with foreign firms in GPNs (see section 3.4.1 in Chapter 3). 
The formation of cooperative coupling can be reflected by the changing types and 
numbers of firms. By 1999, the majority of apparel firms comprised about 1000 FIEs. More 
than 60% of them were from Hong Kong, Taiwan and Macao. More than half of them were 
wholly foreign-owned enterprises (GDPBS, 2000a, b). But this configuration was reshaped 
during the 2000s. By 2008, among 4700 apparel firms, 66% of them (3100) were joint 
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integration and upgrading into CMs (OEM suppliers). For instance, the Hongying Apparel 
Group from Foshan has been serving as a key supplier for two Taiwanese CMs (Pou Chen and 
Feng Tay) since the 1990s. By learning from them for years, Hongying mastered the 
capabilities of supply chain management and vertically integrated production. It then 
constructed its own supply networks and upgraded into a CM as a competitor of Pou Chen 
and Fend Tay. Hongying currently has been the strategic partner of many global brands such 
as Lee, Woolrich, Harley Davidson, Chicco, Energie and so on.10 With the growth of local 
CMs like Hongying, the PRD presently has become a global supply base for a wide range of 
global lead firms, like Nike, Adidas, Rebook and Puma in the sport wear industry; Levis, 
Tommy-Hilfiger and Ralph Lauren in the leisure wear industry; as well as some luxury brands 
like Prada, Gucci and Armani. 
At the regional scale, a regional innovation system is emerging with the growing body of 
associational economies since the 1990s through a bottom-up process. The first regional 
industrial association in the PRD was found by 25 local private firms and five industrial 
associations in towns in 1990. It was recognized by the provincial government as GAIA two 
years later. GADA was also established subsequently. After that, more than 80 industrial 
associations have been established among all cities and industrial-specialized towns in the 
PRD by 2005. The key efforts of these industrial associations are to organize fashion festivals, 
trade fairs and design competition within the PRD, such as Guangdong International Fashion 
Week and the Top-Ten Designer Competition of Guangdong11. Since 2000, these activities 
have attracted thousands of producers, global buyers, international designers and traders to 
                                                              
10 Source: interview with an anonymous supplier of Hong Ying Apparel on 25 June 2010 in Foshan. 
11 Source: the above data come from interviews with the vice chairman of the GAIA on 31 May 2010 in 
Guangzhou and the chairman of Humen Apparel Industrial Association on 9 July 2010 in Dongguan. 
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the PRD annually. Moreover, these associational economies actively built up collective 
learning networks by organizing various learning groups, public lectures, training programs, 
enterprise fieldtrips and international business trips and so on. By devoting tremendous efforts, 
these associational economies helped local firms bridge knowledge gaps in marketing and 
design. The CEO of Watermark Co. Ltd who is also one of the National Top Ten Designers 
told me that: 
 
Normally it needs ten year to bring up a qualified fashion designer. A good designer 
needs a time to learn and a place to practice for years. In my view, the PRD should be 
one of the best locations for developing indigenous fashion designers in China. 
Obviously, we cannot compare the PRD with Paris, New York, Tokyo or Hong Kong. 
But at least, firms, industrial atmosphere and fashion events here provide us a chance. 
We can know the peers, present our works and learn from each other without going 
abroad necessarily (Interview, 100525, on 25th May 2010 in Guangzhou). 
 
Her sentiment was echoed by the vice chairman of GAIA: 
 
It should be summarized that the most important contribution of our work is the 
construction of such an information-sharing and fashion-exhibition platform. It provides 
an opportunity for local entrepreneurs, designers and professionals to learn, cooperative 
and compete with each other. All these prosper the growth of the industry, particularly in 
the segments of design, exhibition and branding (Interview100531, on 31 May 2010 in 
Guangzhou).  
 
The above two quotations articulate the important role of these associational economies 
in diversifying learning channels for local firms. A collective learning platform is gradually 
formed and helps local designers accumulate knowledge and practice what they have learned 
through various fashion events within the PRD. For instance, the Guangdong Fashion Festival 
in June 2010 gathered hundreds of global buyers, domestic lead firms and local firms, as well 
as designers to show their newest designs and learn from the peers. In the opening ceremony 
of the Festival, a few global buyers from Europe exhibited some of their conceptual designs, 
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especially the ones for China market; domestic lead firms showed their new designs in the 
coming seasons; some local firms hosted thematic shows together such as jeans products or 
woman underwear. The newly awarded top designers also exhibited their personal shows 
during the festival. Some outstanding colleges and schools in apparel designs also hosted 
graduation exhibitions respectively in which several excellent students were employed by 
corporate participants after the festival. These fashion events serve as various types of 
temporary relational clusters that facilitate local learning processes and benefit the 
proliferation of local apparel firms, traders, suppliers and designers at the regional scale. 
Apart from regional innovation systems, the domestic market is another crucial emerging 
asset that facilitates the formation of cooperative coupling. This asset enables firms to sell 
own-branded products in a more flexible and lower-cost manner (see case studies in section 
7.4). Today, China has become an arena of global competition rather than simply a global 
factory in the global apparel industry (Ghosh and Rao, 2010; Ma, 2010; Yu, 2008). In 2010, 
44 billion pieces of clothing products were produced by firms within China. Meanwhile, the 
domestic market sale reached 1.4 trillion yuan (not include import values).12  
Figure 7.6 Changing market structure in the apparel industry in the PRD 
 
Notes: All enterprises have an annual turnover over 5 million yuan. FIE = foreign invested enterprises; 
PE = private enterprises. 
Sources: National economic census 2004 and 2008; Guangdong Industrial Census Yearbook 2000. 
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Figure 7.6 shows that the important influence of the domestic market on firms in the 
PRD. Since 2004, the domestic market has accounted for more than 60% of local private 
firms’ outputs. FIEs were also attracted to increase the share of the domestic market from 24% 
in 1999 to 43% in 2008. 
At the local scale, the PRD firms have managed to strengthen their capabilities and 
power on the basis of two important regional assets: dozens of product-specific clusters and a 
huge domestic market. Although foreign firms are not excluded to access these assets, local 
firms have socio-cultural advantages in utilizing these assets. Through an agglomeration 
effect, the PRD has developed 24 industrial-specialized towns by 2010. Different from the 
electronics industry, local firms are playing a dominant role in all these towns. Most of the 
towns are product-specific clusters, such as jeans in Xintan and Junan towns, woman wear in 
Chanshan and Humen towns and underwear in Dali town (see Figure 7.7). Serving as local 
integrated production networks, these clusters enable local firms to conduct flexible 
production or industrial specialization with certain collective efficiency. The owner of Xinyi 
Group is the chairman of Yanbu Underwear Industrial Association. He exemplified this point 
by telling me that: 
 
Yanbu now is called the ‘China Sexy Town’ according to our scale of production 
volume and good reputation in the lady underwear products. This industry was 
developed initially by a Hong Kong firm. Now the town becomes led by six local 
[private] spinoff firms from that Hong Kong firm. We got at least 150 competent local 
firms which have created owned brands for domestic markets. About ten of them have 
explored international markets…My firm almost can source all materials without going 
out of the town. There are also professional companies helping me to sort out some 
technological or design problems. More interestingly, we [the six key enterprises] often 
subcontract to each other for casting the time limit of orders (Interview 100530, on 
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must be compulsorily relocated. For instance, all dyeing factories in Xintang towns were 
forced to leave because their licenses were ceased soon after the township government 
declared to enforce the policy. Simply manufacturing firms without owned brands, design 
functions or strategic partnership with global buyers were also suggested to relocate. As 
estimated by the vice chairman of GAIA, about eight to ten hundreds apparel firms were 
moved out from the PRD within the past two years. Many local firms rushed to create their 
own brands and develop marketing partnerships with global buyers in order to fulfill the 
‘upgrading’ requirement set by regional policy makers. 
The case of Xinyi Group can exemplify the tension and power dynamics during this 
policy shift. As the leader of local industrial association and a local corporation group with 
eight subsidiaries, Xinyi has strong corporate power and is supposed to be in an advantage 
position in bargaining with local authorities. However, the institutional power of local 
authorities overrode corporate power. The township governments argued that the apparel 
industry was not as promising as the electronics and other high-tech industries. By enforcing 
the policy imperative from provincial governments, the apparel industry was still suggested to 
be relocated to designated industrial parks outside the Yanbu industrial cluster where Xinyi 
was located. The owner of Xinyi Group reflected the risk of relocation and his struggle to 







Even though I am the chairman of the local industrial association and the owner of four 
local brands, my factories have been suggested to move to Shaoguan which is more than 
hundreds mile away from Here [Yanbu town]. Moving to there will be a nightmare to my 
business. I even cannot find enough skilled workers to operate my machines, let alone 
the logistic problem of material procurement. I did try to argue but my voice was ignored. 
Hence I did a calculation carefully in front of local cadres. I showed them that I was 
producing more value added than many electronics firms here and contributed more 
taxation and wages to local economies. Only in so doing, they agreed to let me stay. It 
looked funny, but that was the true story (Interview 100530, on 30th May 2010 in 
Yanbu). 
 
In order to bargain with township governments, Xinyi also mobilized collective power 
by organizing a group of local entrepreneurs to lobby with the governments. Eventually, the 
headquarters, offices and key factories of these local firms were allowed to stay in Yanbu 
town, but their unbranded suppliers or subcontractors have to move out so as to vacate more 
land resources for new investments. This result was acceptable because these local firms did 
not need to relocate to designated industrial parks which were hundreds miles away, but were 
allowed to relocate to the peripheral areas in the PRD, such as Sanshui town in Foshan city or 
other towns in Zhaoqing city. 
7.4 Upgrading dynamics: changing rules of the game 
On the basis of cooperative coupling, power relations between local and foreign firms 
are changing in the PRD’s apparel industry. On the one hand, local firms reduce dependency 
on global buyers in terms of technologies and markets. On the other hand, they have certain 
autonomous power in selecting partners and partnerships. Sustained by the improvement of 
indigenous capabilities and the emergence of new regional assets, local firms are able to 
develop more synergy with foreign partners and achieved functional upgrading eventually. 
This section exemplifies this change based on two cases of industrial towns: Humen town in 
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Dongguan City and Xintang town in Guangzhou City. 
The common thread of these two cases is that local firms tend to adopt a synthesized 
strategy through developing domestic and global markets simultaneously. In global markets, 
local firms strengthened their OEM/ODM business for learning state-of-art fashion trends and 
accumulating sufficient profits. Local firms used the domestic market as a low-cost 
experimental field and practice design and marketing skills. In doing so, they realized 
functional upgrading in the form of brand creation. It went through a step-by-step marketing 
process: wholesaling – dealership leasing – franchising – systematic marketing and branding. 
Meanwhile, global buyers were further attracted to the PRD because of the growing-up local 
supply capabilities and the large market size of China. More synergy was thus developed 
within cooperative coupling. 
Institutional conditions between the cases are a bit difference. Local firms in Humen 
more relied on domestic markets in the beginning and were backed up by pro-active local 
authorities. In contrast, Xintang firms more depended on international markets and received 
limited supports from associational economies. More recently, they suffered pressures from 
the new industrial policy. To overcome this problem, Xintang firms deepened their 
embeddedness in GPNs and strengthened their bargaining power. Specifically, they adopted a 
multi-tasking strategy that performed multiple functions and certain technological 
cutting-edges for global buyers. The case in Humen reflects the influence of regional assets 
and local institutions on upgrading, while the case in Xintang articulates the importance of 
local entrepreneurship and upgrading opportunities embedded in GPNs. 
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7.4.1 Humen town: creating fashion China 
Located at the West bay area of Dongguan city, Humen was merely a small fishing-based 
town before 1978. Based on the effort of pro-active local authorities, the first EPE in China, 
Taiping Handbag Factory, was established in Humen. The demonstration effect of this factory 
made Humen industrialized quickly. By the end of the 1980s, Humen had established about 
600 EPEs in the apparel industry. In 2007, Humen agglomerated 350,000 workers employed 
by 2,000 apparel firms (Yu, 2008:6). By 2010, its total sale value of the apparel industry 
reached $2,200 million and its export value grew to $600 million.13 There were over 2,000 
local brands registered in Humen in which four were entitled as National Famous Trademarks 
and 22 were entitled as Provincial Famous Trademarks.14 In fact, 1/3 of them were newly 
created due to the pressure of the ‘dual-transformation’ strategy. This problem is reflected by 
a chief officer of the Foreign Economy and Trading Office of Humen: 
 
As Humen has been a National Industrial Town, we did not have serious pressures 
under the new challenging policy. However, the apparel industry was still deemed as a 
low value added industry. So we must do something. We thus shut down all EPEs if 
they did not covert into a FIE or a normal enterprise in due call. We also encouraged 
local firms to establish an owned brand so that we could argue with the governments 
with some good reasons at least. Nevertheless, we still got about 50 sound brands in 
domestic markets and a couple of them in international markets. That earns the 
industrial reputation for Humen (Interview 100709, on 9 July 2010 in Humen). 
 
The essence of Humen’s accomplishments is a combination of a vertically integrated 
cluster, a pro-active local state and a domestic wholesale center. The vertically integrated 
production network comprises about 2000 manufacturers, 400 local suppliers and 50 
                                                              
13 http://www.humen.gov.cn/hmnewsread.asp?newid=32910 




professional-service providers (Li, 2011a; Yu, 2008). This kind of agglomeration economies 
also exists among other clusters within the PRD. 
Besides establishing the first EPE in China, local authorities (Humeng township 
governments) have devoted tremendous efforts in fostering a supportive institutional 
environment within the town, such as providing fiscal incentives, organizing business trips 
and trade fairs, constructing educational systems and a knowledge-sharing platform and so on. 
These efforts helped local firms in bridging knowledge gaps with global buyers particularly in 
supply chain management, production and design. The most important effort was the 
development of local wholesale economies. Originally, Humen had merely several street 
bazaars selling smuggled electronics and clothing products from Hong Kong. In 1986, funded 
by local authorities, Humen commercial committee established the first apparel wholesale 
market in the PRD named as Fumin.15 It soon attracted hundreds of retailers and became a 
famous domestic trading center. In the mid-1990s, the committee aggressively privatized the 
Fumin market into a business group which still kept a close relationship with local authorities 
for receiving financial and institutional supports. By 2010, the Fumin Group was restructured 
into a modernized share-holding corporation owning 9 commercial buildings which 
accommodate 5000 shops in Humen (see Table 7.3). Encouraged by Fumin, 31 textile/apparel 









15  It means making people rich. 
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Table 7.3 Organization of the Fumin Group 
Subordinates Contents 
Fumin International Trade Town Currently 1000 shops, 
6000 shops in maxima 
Fumin Fashion Town 1500 shops 
Fumin Underwear market About 500 shops 
Fumin Business Pedestrian Street  
Fumin Drapery Market 600 shops 
Fumin Footwear and Leatherwear Market About 500 shops 
Fumin Accessory Wholesale Center About 800 shops 
New Fumin Accessory Wholesale Center Currently 200 shops, 1000 
shops in maxima 
Fumin Agricultural Product Wholesale Market About 200 shops 
Fumin Fashion News Magazine, monthly 
Fumin Commercial center Professional consultancy 
Fumin Fashion Net Official Internet Website 
Sources: author’s fieldwork and Fumin Group official website at http://en.fumin.com/index.asp. 
 
By attracting thousands of traders and buyers, Humen’s wholesale economies benefited 
local firms with two advantages. First, the arrival of international buyers allowed local firms 
to develop new coupling relations and decouple with Hong Kong traders. Second, local firms 
could reduce the dependency on global buyers by exploring the domestic market at a low cost. 
In the wholesale markets, Humen’s local firms sold copy-cat products, imperfect products and 
the surplus products from their OEM orders by putting a different trademark (Yu, 2008). This 
local context enabled local firms to accumulate sufficient profits and practice their skills in 
design, marketing. Over time, these local firms started to invest in brand creation and hired 
professional designers to develop their own fashion styles. Eventually, some local firms 
realized functional upgrading and established their brands in the domestic market. This 







In those days [the 1980s], domestic demands exceeded supply totally. Once you could 
make clothes, people would buy them. After years, some foreign buyers appeared in 
Fumin markets and delivered order to us. Their orders were large and more profitable. 
Hence we quitted from the EPE partnership and worked for global buyers. By copying 
the designs from OEM orders, we made clothes quickly and sold them in Fumin. But 
soon, we were told that we could not do so anymore since it was illegal. We did some 
changes. We still copied the designs but made some revision on our own efforts. Since 
our products were partly designed by our own already, we decided to brand them. After 
years, we have learned a lot from buyers and our name also became famous in Humen. 
We then formally set up marketing and branding departments (Interview 100824, on 24 
Aug 2010 in Dongguan). 
 
The development of Yishion, the largest local OBM enterprise in Humen, demonstrates a 
step-by-step process of functional upgrading in brand creation. Yishion was derived from an 
EPE in the early 1990s. It subsequently decoupled with the Hong Kong partner and upgraded 
into an OEM subcontractor. Yishion did not suffer a lot from this decoupling because most of 
the sunk costs were borne by the Hong Kong partner. Meanwhile, by taking advantage of 
local wholesale market, Yishon sold their branded products before 1997. In 1999, Yishion 
withdrew from the wholesale market and articulated into domestic retail markets by leasing 
out the brand to dealers in hundreds of towns and counties. This strategy aimed to avoid direct 
competition with global lead firms in the main cities of China. Based on the dealership, 
Yishion sold their products in a large number of areas in China, though marginal profits were 
low. After years of profit accumulation, Yishion increased investments in branding and 
marketing by employing Pop stars in their new advertisements. Meanwhile, Yishion ceased 
dealership and started to construct retail networks (franchised stores). Around 2003, Yishion 
ventured into prefectural and capital cities to compete with branded lead firms. After 
accumulating enough profits, Yishion begun establishing owned outlets for sharpening its 
corporate image. This low-cost strategy helped Yishion earn a critical time for implementing 
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functional upgrading. In 2005, Yishion ventured into international markets in Middle East by 
replicating the same strategy in China: wholesale market – dealership - franchised stores. 
Based on the efforts of local authorities, the formation of clusters and the prosperity of 
wholesale economies, cooperative coupling has been developed in Humen. In production 
governance, most of the local private firms currently are providing OEM and ODM services 
simultaneously. They are able to manage international supply chains and their products are 
qualified according to international industrial standards. 
In design and branding, Humen has been not only a manufacturing node within the 
apparel GPNs, but also upgraded into a design and branding center in China. This upgrading 
was archived by strengthening the endogenous design capacities of the apparel industry. Apart 
from recruiting designers from colleges and schools in the PRD, many local also directly 
hired experienced designers from domestic and global lead firms or design companies. For 
instance, Yishion hired a chief design from H&M as well as two top designers in China. 
Another example comes from Suosha. This local firm has specialized in middle-end women 
dress. It has established four retail stores in Paris and hundreds of franchised stores in the 
central cities of China. The owner of Suosha is one of the top designers in Humen. In order to 
explore international markets, she hired a designer from a French sound brand during a 
business trip organized by local authorities in 2004. The designer was attracted by the 
industrial and market potential in the PRD. The registered number of designers in the 
Designer Association of Humen increased from 400 in 2004 to more than 1,000 in 2010 (Yu, 
2008:51). These designers actively attend various business events and training sessions 
organized by local authorities. New and young designers are keen in participating in the 
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Humen International Fashion Design Competition every year. Once they win the competition, 
they will be sought and hired by local firms. 
To summarize the Humen case, market opportunities, local supply capabilities, pro-active 
authorities and wholesale economies have helped local firms move away from captive 
coupling. It is the combination of these institutional-spatial conditions that sustains the 
functional upgrading of local firms in Humen. 
7.4.2 Xintang town: deepening embeddedness 
Located 50 kilometers away from the North of Humen, Xintang town is hosting about 3 
thousand firms specialized in jeans products in which 1/3 are FIEs, comprising about 200,000 
workers. In 2009, its apparel industrial outputs reached $3.2 billion in which $1.5 billion 
came from export value. These amounts accounted for 30% the total exports of jeans products 
in China (Guo and Wang, 2010:12).16 There are 1200 brands registered in Xintang, including 
one National Famous Trademarks and four Provincial Famous Trademarks. An integrated 
local production network has been developed covering the segments of textile cutting, dyeing, 
sewing, washing and patterning. In the past five years, about 60 thousand sets of machines 
were installed in Xintang, such as high-speed tow dyeing machines, multi-wefts rapier 
weaving machines, and automatic jeans-washing lines.17 
Different with Humen, pro-active local authorities were interested in the electronics and 
automotive industries and provided rare supports for Xintang’s jeans industry. Local 
wholesale economies did not come to exist in Xintang until 2006. Therefore, local jeans firms 
focused on utilizing social ethnic ties, local entrepreneurship and opportunities embedded in 
                                                              




GPNs in their pursuit of upgrading. 
The economic take-off of the Xintang town was initiated by a local entrepreneur who 
introduced his Hong Kong relative to establish the first EPE in the town in 1986. The relative 
relocated 40 sewing machines from Hong Kong to the EPE. Cooperating with another 11 
countrymen, the entrepreneur loaned from local village committees and recruited rural 
workers for extending the production scale of the EPE. Through this example effect, more and 
more Hong Kong relatives and businessmen were introduced to Xintang. Local entrepreneurs 
also mushroomed simultaneously. Xintang was gradually specialized in jeans products and 
led by Hong Kong firms (Zhu and Li, 2004). Since the 1990s, local entrepreneurs directly 
established trading agencies in Hong Kong for receiving orders from global buyers. This 
effort enabled local firms to bypass the market control of Hong Kong firms which had little 
power to block this local effort. The owner of Changjiang Clothing and Wash Ltd has told the 
vulnerability of Hong Kong firms’ power:  
 
After a couple of years, we figured out that making jeans was not so difficult. So why 
we still needed to work for Hong Kong men. We [the 11 entrepreneurs] soon decided to 
set up a trade office in Hong Kong directly. We mobilized our villagers to tell their 
relatives overseas that they did not need to go to Hong Kong anymore. They just came 
to Xintang to deliver orders directly. We could provide competent goods with a lower 
price already (Interview 100427, on 27 April 2010 in Xintang). 
 
Local entrepreneurs are the key drivers in developing cooperative coupling. All of the 
eleven entrepreneurs have provided OEM services for global buyers since the 1990s. They 
gradually specialized in different segments or products for avoiding internal competition. 
Some of the entrepreneurs chose to specialize in dyeing, printing and washing segment for 
strengthening the supply base of Xintang. Some of them consolidated cooperative partnership 
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in a few group of global buyers and strengthened their production capabilities. Hence they got 
more learning opportunities from global buyers on the basis of mutual trusts and industrial 
reputations. Some of them collaborated with global buyers to venture into the domestic 
market. Particularly, some local firms adopted a strategy of multi-tasking by shaping 
technological edges and cooperating with a wide range of buyers. This strategy helped local 
firms develop design and marketing capabilities in functional upgrading. These local 
enterprises have become the mainstay of Xintang’s apparel industry, such as Conshing, 
Zengzhi and Golden Rhino. Their patterns were imitated by many other local firms. This 
chapter uses the case of Conshing to illustrate the local trajectory of upgrading. 
Conshing has been upgraded into an ODM/OBM company integrated with some textile 
processing segments in the jeans industry.18 In its pursuit of upgrading, it adopted two 
strategies to leverage the power of global buyers and bargain for more upgrading 
opportunities. First, it developed technological cutting edges in jeans washing technics and 
green production. Conshing built up the largest jeans-washing center in the PRD with about 
150 sets of automatic machines and 100 skilled washing talents. In order to improve 
production environment, Conshing certificated with the ISO 9001 in 2002, the ISO 14001 in 
2003 and the GOTS19 in 2005. It heavily invested 30 million yuan in constructing an internal 
sewage disposal system which recycled 99% wastewater. Conshing further invited 
Novezymes, a famous Danish biochemical corporation, to set up a collaborative laboratory 
for developing some high-end solutions in jeans washing and wastewater processing. In doing 
                                                              
18 Source: interview with a vice CEO of Conshing on 2 July 2010 in Xintang, Guangzhou. 
19 The Global Organic Textile Standard (GOTS) is recognized as the leading processing standard for textiles made 
from organic fibers worldwide. It defines high level environmental criteria along the entire supply chain of 
organic textiles and requires compliance with social criteria as well. 
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so, Conshing’s jeans products were qualified in a wide range of environment criteria and 
international industrial standards. This advantage enabled Conshing to have certain 
bargaining power in selecting partners, rather than be passively selected and controlled by 
global buyers. For instance, Conshing frequently bargained for using its own components, 
materials and designs, instead of procuring designated materials provided by the buyers. In 
other words, Conshing has better control over its production/supply chain management, 
comparing with many other local apparel firms in the PRD. 
The second strategy was to cooperate with partners in different positions within GPNs 
for developing ODM/OBM capabilities. Since the 2000s, Conshing has actively worked for 
first-tier global buyers which have well-known branded names such as Polo, LEE, 
Abercrombie & Fitch, Hollister, GUESS and Express. These buyers tended to enforce stricter 
governance in supply chain management with fixed profit margins. Under this control, 
Conshing earned less than supplying some unknown-branded firms or international traders. 
But Chonshin insisted on this partnership for learning state-of-art fashion trends and 
improving industrial reputation. Meanwhile, Conshing strategically worked with second-tier 
global buyers which were developing both China and international markets, such as Vera 
Moda, Only, Jack & Jones, Texwood and Clride.N. Empowered by strong technological 
competence, Conshing bargained with these second-tier buyers for increasing ODM content 
and providing joint-learning programs, such as organizing field trips in China or attending 
international fashion salons. Mutual interests were thus developed because these buyers were 
also interested in China markets and would like to know more. 
After years of accumulation, Conshing established its owned brand ‘Conshing Jeans’ in 
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China after 2000. The new brand did not create much tension to Chonshing’s customers. 
Conshing provided detail assessment reports about the market positioning of its new brand. It 
also invited customers to visit factories regularly for securing their copyrights. This effort 
earned a good reputation for Conshing and lowered tension within the partnership. In 2006, a 
Hong Kong-based customer of Conshing invited a France design institute and actively 
cooperated with Conshing for venturing the domestic market. A new brand (Hitwon) was 
created and positioned in a specific market niche in Chonshing’s product range. In sum, 
Conshing fostered much synergy with global buyers through synthesizing various resources 
within GPNs. This effort has helped it realize functional upgrading (from OEM to ODM and 
brand creation) without creating much tension in cooperative coupling. 
7.5 Conclusion: the evolutionary nature of strategic coupling 
While previous studies hold a pessimistic view of local functional upgrading in the 
apparel industry, this chapter offers an alternative reading on the basis of the case of the PRD. 
Local firms in the region have managed to move away from captive coupling, overtake FIEs, 
and eventually achieve functional upgrading to a certain degree. But this progress should not 
be overemphasized. Local firms were mostly concentrated in low- and middle-end markets. 
Only a few of them were able to articulate their own brands in international markets, such as 
Yishion. Meanwhile, local firms are still significantly lagging behind global lead firms in 
marketing, branding and logistics. 
A key contribution made by this chapter is the demonstration of the evolution of 
coupling from a captive form into a cooperative form. This chapter finds that associational 
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economies, product-specific clusters and the huge domestic market are all important 
institutional-spatial conditions that sustain the formation of cooperative coupling. The 
combination of these conditions enables the PRD to become a powerful player at the lower 
end of the apparel GPNs. Cooperative coupling matters because it endows local firms more 
autonomy in selecting partners and upgrading strategies. It also allows local firms to foster 
more synergy with their foreign partners; and eventually reduces the asymmetry of power 
relations. These power relations are different from the ones in captive coupling. Local firms 
are coupling to foreign firms for advanced knowledge and co-development, rather than just 
for profits to survive. Foreign firms gradually treat local firms as strategic partners, while not 
as subcontractors/suppliers. However, not all institutional conditions are playing a positive 
role to local firms. The new regional upgrading policy has posted great challenges towards 
local apparel firms because it did not intend to upgrade the apparel industry, but intend to 
replace it with the higher value added ones. This critical regional policy has raised tension to 
a certain degree.  
This chapter has identified the variety of local upgrading strategies beyond the limited 
options offered in the GVC literature and development studies (e.g. collective action and 
innovation). The cases of Humen and Xitnang towns exemplify that the more capable are 
local firms in channeling knowledge or synthesizing assets, the more possibly will they 
achieve upgrading. This chapter has revealed the potential upgrading opportunities embedded 
within GPNs. This effort sheds light on alternative pathways of achieving industrial 
upgrading and regional development. All these findings resonate with the central argument of 
this thesis that the dynamic outcomes of local upgrading is subject to the evolving pattern of 
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Chapter 8 Reciprocal coupling and industrial upgrading in the 
automotive industry: the balance of interplay 
 
8.1 Introduction  
The previous two chapters have illustrated two different scenarios of local upgrading. 
The electronics industry is generally led by FIEs in the form of captive coupling throughout 
three decades of development. In the apparel industry, upgrading was initially led by FIEs 
while local private firms took over the role of FIEs in the 2000s. During this process, the 
pattern of integration in the latecomer region and GPNs has changed. In this chapter, my 
investigation of local upgrading in the automotive industry demonstrates another scenario. A 
specific type of coupling - reciprocal coupling - is developed between global lead firms 
(automakers) and SOEs which is underpinned by strong state interventions. The balance of 
power relations of these two key actors serves as a critical variable that determines the content 
and extent of local upgrading in the automotive industry. 
Scholars in the literature of industrial governance have argued that the automotive 
industry is subject to both captive and modular governance. Automakers play a dominant role 
due to high asset specificity and the complexity of inter-firm knowledge transactions. Auto 
part suppliers are required to provide competent manufacturing works so as to comply with a 
wide range of parameters and criteria set by automakers (Gereffi et al., 2005; Gereffi and 
Korzeniewicz, 1994b; Schmitz, 2004; Sturgeon and Biesebroeck, 2011; Sturgeon et al., 2009). 
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This pattern of governance posts great challenges to latecomer firms who have to be 
constantly qualified as suppliers. It would be extremely difficult for latecomer firms to catch 
up and upgrade into an automaker, particularly when the global automotive is currently 
dominated by a few giant automotive groups such as General Moto, Ford, Toyota, 
Volkswagen, Daimler-Chrysler and Nissan-Renault. Scholars in this camp tend to believe that 
the market and technology gaps between latecomer firms and lead firms are rather large and 
almost unbridgeable. But what if the primary markets are domestic rather than foreign? 
Different with the governance literature, some recent geographical studies have argued 
that strong national interventions can serve as a source of crucial power to counteract the 
control of global lead firms and then foster domestic upgrading (Barnes and Kaplinsky, 2007; 
Harwit, 1995; Hudson, 2002; Liu and Dicken, 2006; Pavlínek, 2003; Sit and Liu, 2000). The 
logic is that pro-active states may alter the pattern of knowledge diffusion by exchanging their 
possessed territorialized assets with advanced technologies possessed by lead firms 
(automakers). The development of China’s automotive industry has provided such a case in 
which this latecomer country utilizes its huge domestic market to bargain with lead firms for 
more knowledge sharing and technological co-development. This process was termed as 
‘obligated embeddedness’ in Liu and Dicken (2006)’s study which revealed the importance of 
firm-state relations in fostering domestic industrial development. However, interactions in 
such a firm-state relation and its consequences to local upgrading are still unclear. How will 
lead firms strategically react to strong national intervention? What if the upgrading of local 
firms proposes new challenges to lead firms? This chapter attempts to provide an answer to 
this point by focusing on local upgrading in such a firm-state nexus. 
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Specific to the China’s contexts, the appearance of pro-active states is a crucial factor 
that reshapes the pattern of integration between domestic firms and global automakers. 
According to my conceptualization in Chapter 3, this integration represents a form of 
reciprocal coupling through which actors develop partnerships for exchanging technology and 
market resources possessed by each actor. In the case of the PRD, it specifically refers to a 
circumstance in which automakers are complied with specific criteria from the central 
government so as to get access to the China market. Situated in such a context, this chapter 
focuses on two issues: (1) the interplay between SOEs, local suppliers and lead firms within 
the coupling; (2) the mechanism of upgrading, power dynamics and strategic responses result 
from this interplay. The overall attempt is to argue that local upgrading in the PRD’s 
automotive industry is contingent on the balance of power relations between the coupled 
firms, rather than on the sole governance power in either lead firms or pro-active states. 
To accomplish this aim, this chapter is organized into four sections. The next section 
interprets global industrial tendencies and current debates in the automotive industry. It 
demonstrates how reciprocal coupling was developed in the automotive industry in China by 
Chinese central government, regional SOEs and global automakers. The third section is the 
core of this chapter which elaborates on the changing fortunes of Guangzhou automotive 
industry on the basis of a comparative case study: the failure of Guangzhou-Peugeot joint 
venture; and the contemporary success of Guangqi-Honda joint venture. This case study 
shows that strong state intervention could bring in rapid industrial growth but did not 
guarantee successful industrial upgrading. It exemplifies the importance of a balanced power 
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relationship in nurturing local upgrading. The end of this chapter summarizes main findings 
and theoretical implications. 
8.2 Upgrading in the automotive industry: global governance imperatives or 
national initiatives 
The global automotive industry is predominantly “an industry of very large corporations, 
which has increasingly organized their activities on transnationally integrated lines. In so 
doing, they engage very closely – sometimes collaboratively, sometimes conflictually – with 
national governments” (Dicken, 2007:278). The significance of this industry rests in its scale 
in terms of input/output, employment, revenue and its linkages to many other manufacturing 
industries and services. This section begins with an overview of ongoing global tendencies 
and the organizational pattern of the automotive industry. The implications to industrial 
upgrading are analyzed in relation to the governance pattern and the political economy within 
GPNs. This effort helps us understand why reciprocal coupling is possible to be developed in 
the automotive industry. 
8.2.1 Industrial governance in the automotive industry 
The automobile industry is an industry in which assemblers and suppliers construct 
complex production networks at a global scale. The automotive industry stands in stark 
contrast to the apparel and electronics industries which are high-volume and 
consumer-orientated manufacturing. In the contemporary process of global industrial shifts, 
the global organization of vehicle production has three general tendencies which have 
important geographical implications to upgrading. 
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First, the automotive industry is characterized by an enduring organizational 
convergence of automakers. Through waves of mergers, acquisitions, and equity-based 
alliances in the 1990s and the 2000s, global markets were dominated by twelve lead firms 
from six countries: the United States, Germany, France, Italy, Japan and South Korea 
(Sturgeon et al., 2009). By 2010, top 10 automakers accounted for 72% of the world sales of 
motor vehicles.1 This trend reinforces the governance power of automakers which have 
developed strong capabilities to orchestrate GPNs that span multiple production regions. It 
further spurs the innovation of vehicle platforms which enable a single series of vehicle 
model to be globally produced among differentiated markets. Moreover, leading automakers 
have blunted efforts to establish the sort of industry-level technical and business process 
standards. This standardization benefits automakers by raising technological entry barriers 
and imposing more asset specificity on their suppliers. But the available platform solution 
also provides a short-cut for latecomer firms to adopt a vehicle platform without investing in 
its prototype development. 
The second tendency is that the political economy of this industry is increasingly 
influential and gradually develops the global fragmentation and variegation of production 
systems among different regions and countries. Each locality feeds a few assembly plants that 
manufacture certain vehicle models for a regional or national market. This tendency of ‘build 
where they sell’ is caused by market saturation in developed countries, the sensitivity to logics 
costs, and more importantly by political pressuring in both host and home countries 





2011). Due to the large scale of industrial organization and economic multiplier effects in jobs 
and revenues, the automotive industry is often treated as a ‘must develop and retain industry’. 
In both developed or developing countries, substantial state interventions are devoted for 
avoiding the risk of political backlash when the value of imported vehicles becomes too large 
and threats the survival of domestic producers (EIU, 1997; Liu and Deng, 2003; Sturgeon and 
Florida, 2004). This tendency explains why automakers in North America do not concentrate 
all their production plants in Mexico, despite of lower operation costs. 
The third tendency is the imperative of regionalization of production networks at a 
global scale. The inter-firm transactions of technologies in automotive industry are diverse, 
complicated and hard to be codified. Automakers require intensive interactions and 
co-development with their suppliers within a manageable geographical distance (Frigant and 
Layan, 2009; Gereffi et al., 2005). The prevalence of technology modularization helps 
automaker reduce geographical dependency, but a strong partnership between assemblers and 
first-tier suppliers is still developed in this industry. Since the mid-1980s, global suppliers 
have emerged through the acquisition of firms with complementary assets and geographies so 
as to resonate the globalization of assembly plants. As automakers set up final assembly 
plants in new locations and try to leverage common platforms over multiple products and in 
different markets, they request suppliers (normally first-tier ones) to offshore with them. This 
strategy causes a process known as the ‘follow sourcing’ of global suppliers (Humphrey, 2003; 
Humphrey and Schmitz, 2000; Sturgeon et al., 2008). The prevalence of just-in-time (JIT) 
system and lean production systems reinforces the imperative of follow sourcing because 
these systems require closer cooperation between assemblers and suppliers to main a quick 
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production beat with the least inventory (Hudson, 2002; Imai, 1997; Lung et al., 2004; 
Sturgeon and Lester, 2004b). Therefore, an imperative of the regionalization of production 
networks is developed which gives rise to opportunities for local firms (in latecomer regions) 
to participate in. The formation of regional production networks provides a large number of 
channels for knowledge spillover whereby local firms can learn knowledge about entire 
production systems instead of a single processing segment. 
8.2.2 Knowledge sharing: when automakers meet state intervention 
Figure 8.1 Structure of the automotive global production network 
 
Source: Figure 1 in Sturgeon et al. (2008:304). 
The tendencies above constitute the complex economic geographies of the automotive 
industry. The automotive GPNs tend to be organized regionally and nationally with bulky 
final assembly plants. Lead firms in these GPNs are often surrounded by a large number of 
part/model-specific suppliers to ensure timely delivery (e.g. engines, transmission and seats). 
Lighter/generic parts are produced at a distance to take advantage of scale economies and 
lower production costs (e.g. batteries and tiers). These regionalized production networks are 
258 
 
not isolating within the region, but interconnected through various global pipelines in a nested 
and non-linear structure (see Figure 8.1). 
Technologies of assembly and auto-part manufacturing tend to be entrenched within 
these regionalized networks, but are exclusive to outsiders particularly among the networks 
constructed by Japanese automakers (Ahmadjian and Lincoln, 2001; Cusumano, 1985). 
Although local firms have been plugged into GPNs, they are often marginalized outside the 
core of the networks and only achieve some trivial upgrading in processing less-sophisticated 
components (Freyssenet and Lung, 2000; Kotabe et al., 2003; Sturgeon and Florida, 2004). 
How can local firms identify a better position within these networks? According to the 
industrial governance literature, opportunities are limited due to the overwhelming 
governance power of lead firms (automaker and their key suppliers). The governance power 
of automakers mainly derives from three sources: (1) technological capabilities in 
parameter-setting with high asset specificity; (2) capabilities in systematic integration and 
coordination (3) regulatory advantages based on industrial standardization (Frigant and Layan, 
2009; Humphrey and Schmitz, 2000; Schmitz, 2007; Sturgeon and Biesebroeck, 2011; 
Sturgeon et al., 2008). Local firms would meet extremely hard difficulties in bridging 
technological gaps if they do not heavily invest in improving technological competence. 
Moreover, technological lock-in will be developed due to high asset specificity. Local firms 
face heavy transaction costs if they switch over the partnership. This problem hinders them to 
look for new upgrading opportunities. 
In this predicament of local upgrading, recent geographical studies have offered an 
alternative view that state intervention can serve as a crucial political force in leveraging the 
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governance power of automakers. Supported by this state intervention, many latecomer firms 
are able to plug into the automotive GPNs without the necessity of fully developing their 
technological capabilities (Barnes and Kaplinsky, 2007; Liu and Dicken, 2006; Pavlínek, 
2003). Specific to the automotive industry, latecomer economies may raise the barriers of 
market access and tariffs and bargain with lead firms for a better partnership, such as more 
knowledge sharing or additional technological assistances. To achieve this partnership, 
latecomer economies must possess sufficient scarce assets that attract the interests of lead 
firms to accept the deal. The more scarce assets do latecomer firms possess, the more 
bargaining power will they have (see Chapter 3). 
While the importance and effectiveness of state intervention is a key to understand 
contemporary dynamics in the automotive industry, there are two unclear issues needed to be 
examined. First, how will lead firms respond to these state interventions? This question is 
critical because their response will determine the content and extent of knowledge sharing 
which have a strong influence to local upgrading. Second, how can local firms implement 
functional upgrading without raising tension to their foreign partners? This issue is crucial 
because it ensures the stability of coupling partnership. It should be noted that there are dark 
sides of state interventions, such as protectionism, industrial discriminations, and inefficient 
investment (Huang, 2002; Lin, 1999; Pack and Saggi, 2006). There are failures cases of state 
interventions in promoting the automotive industry, such as Indonesia and Malaysia (Harwit, 
1995; Humphrey and Memodovic, 2003; Liu and Yeung, 2008). 
Taking these two issues into account, this study argues that local upgrading in the 
automotive industry is subject to the balance of power relations between latecomer economies 
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(firms and states) and lead firms in reciprocal coupling, rather than merely a matter of state 
power or firm power. With a balanced power relation, synergy will be developed to foster 
knowledge diffusion and reproduction within the partnership. Synergy within reciprocal 
coupling is more than mutual interests (such as synergy mentioned in Chapter 6 and 7), but is 
also related to the committed benefits between actors who exchange possessed assets 
respectively. However, if state power overrides lead firms’ power, lead firms would adopt a 
short-term strategy as a response. They may deliberately block knowledge diffusion and 
become resistant to further cooperation. If local upgrading incurs tension and local firms fail 
to lower the tension, lead-firm partners would also constrain knowledge sharing to defend 
their positions. If tension lasts overtime and local upgrading fails, decoupling will happen. 
The concept of ‘obligated embeddedness’ is insufficient to explain this tension, because the 
literal meaning of it tends to privilege the influence of state power at the expense of lead firms. 
This study thus prefers the concept of reciprocal coupling to describe the pattern of 
integration, as it emphasizes the balance of interactions between firms and non-firms actors. 
8.2.3 Formation of reciprocal coupling in China’s automotive industry 
In China, reciprocal coupling happens in the way that automakers comply with specific 
regulatory criteria set by China’s central government as an exchange to get access to domestic 
market. The criteria include ownership structures, local content and technological agreements. 
Meanwhile, Chinese partners accept the requirements of corporate governance, supply chain 
management proposed by automakers. The formation of reciprocal coupling in China reflects 




From 1958 to 1984, China pursued indigenous innovation for developing domestic 
automotive industry due to political reasons. But technological gaps between China and the 
global automotive industry was enlarged during this period. Japan and Korea had grown up 
sharply through coupling with global lead firms since 1960s (Dyer and Chu, 2003; Kim, 1998; 
Liang et al., 2010; Liu and Deng, 2003). China’s domestic automotive industry was seriously 
lagging behind. 
Reciprocal coupling was developed around 1984 when China decided to restructure the 
domestic automotive industry and cooperated with global automakers. Preparing for the 
coupling, the central government merged SOEs among different provinces into a pillar group2 
for increasing the capability of a single SOE. A directive of the State Guidance of Car Price 
and Product was then established in 1984. Under the directive, joint ventures were 
encouraged between SOEs and global automakers. All product ranges and vehicle prices were 
governed and allocated by the central government (Jiang, 1999). The directive was revised 
into an industrial policy in 1994 (NDRCSC, 1994; see table 8.1). Three specific criteria were 
consolidated for fostering knowledge transfer and local upgrading. First, to avoid monopoly 
and ensure competition, all automakers had to establish joint ventures with Chinese SOEs, but 
were only allowed to couple with two SOEs maximally. Second, all SOEs must have an 
equity share not less than 50% in joint ventures. Minimal local content of production was 40% 
with a tariff rate of 30% on components. Third, all joint ventures were encouraged to establish 
R&D centers funded by the central government. 
 
                                                              
2 In1988, the central government designated six SOEs as the ‘Three Big & Three Small’ group. Projects beyond 
these groups generally would not be approved. They are FAW, Second Auto Work (renamed as Dongfeng in 
1990) and Shanghai Auto Work; the three small are: Beijing Auto Work, Tianjin Xiali Corporation and 
Guangzhou-Peugeot joint venture. 
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 FIEs are allowed to develop set up maximally two joint ventures with 
a designated Chinese partner.  
 With a few exceptions, Chinese partners will be one of the pillar 
enterprises in the ‘Three Big & Three Small’ group*, and will own no 
less than 50% of equity share. 
Localization 
requirement 
 minimal local content of production is 40%, while tariff rates on 
components are subject to the level of local content (ranging from 50% 
to 20%);  
 Introducing a new car model or an engine project must meet the 
minimal volume of vehicle production (ranging from 10,000 to 
200,000); car models invented before 1990 are not allowed to be 
introduced;  
 the SKD or CKD patterns of component production are disallowed. 
Local R&D 
requirement 
 R&D activities are encouraged with preferential financing policies in 
bank loan, treasury capitalization and stock funding; minimal R&D 
expenditure is required when applying national subsidizes for 
upgrading; all joint venture must establish at least one R&D center in 
due call. 
Notes: The group of pillar enterprises was subsequently extended into a three-layer system comprising 
2-3 core auto groups, 6-7 second-tier auto assemblers and 8-10 motorbike makers. SKD: 
semi-completely knock down; CKD: completely knock down. 
Source: NDRDSC, 1994. 
 
The overall strategy of the 1994 policy was to ‘exchange domestic market with foreign 
technologies’ in which the domestic automotive industry was protected as an infant industry 
(Lu and Feng, 2005; Wang, 2003). As a response, foreign automakers invested 50% of equity 
stake which was the same as Chinese partners so as to ensure full access to managerial rights 
in the joint ventures. Meanwhile, as requested, foreign firms were allowed to establish wholly 
own suppliers. A reciprocal partnership was thus generated, as commented by a director of 







The policy was welcomed at that time. In the beginning of 1990s, key automakers have 
noticed the potential of China markets due to its significant growth, and particularly, 
the previous succeed of the Shanghai-VW joint venture. Moreover, China also had 
abundant cheap labor. That was crucial to all big automakers when North America and 
Europe markets were increasingly saturated… On the issue of technological transfers, 
automakers were not worried about so much because localized production systems 
were fully under their control (Interview 100519, on 19th May 2010 in Guangzhou). 
 
Reciprocal coupling was reinforced through further liberalization after the accession of 
China into the WTO in 2001. The state guidance of price and product control was abolished. 
The restriction of tariffs and import quota was tapping off gradually. In 2004, the 1994 
industrial policy was revised for spurring more domestic upgrading with three key 
adjustments (NDRCSC, 2004). First, the joint ventures were required to develop new car 
models specific for the China market with a proprietary brand. SOEs in the pillar group must 
develop at least one proprietary-branded car model before 2010. This requirement directly 
spurred local functional upgrading in brand creation and model development (local R&D for 
developing new models). Second, after-sale and service markets were open to foreign firms. 
This strategy was meant for indirectly upgrading the marketing capabilities of SOEs by 
intensifying domestic competition. Third, to all firms, the average fuel consumption of 
vehicle must reduce 15% before 2010 and new car models with energy-saving or new-energy 
technologies were encouraged with less restriction. This requirement was for stimulating 
technological upgrading. These changes indicated that the strategy of coupling was gradually 
shifted from: ‘exchanging domestic markets with foreign technologies’ into ‘co-developing 
new technologies for domestic markets’. 
This form of reciprocal coupling was proved to be effective in booming China’s 
industrial growth. Figure 8.2 shows that the growth of Chinese automotive industry has 
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accelerated since 1984, speeded up after 1994, and significantly soared after 2001. By 2010, 
26 joint ventures were established which involved most of the global leading automakers (see 
Table 8.2). Meanwhile, due to market liberalization, automakers in China have increasingly 
faced fierce domestic competition. The existing provincial federalism intensified market 
competition because each SOE was embedded in their respective regional/provincial markets 
under certain local protection (Brandt and Thun, 2010; Li and Zhu, 2010; Liu and Yeung, 
2008). The fierce competition can be reflected by Table 8.3 which presents that the China 
market was regionally fragmented in 2009. In terms of production volume, none of the joint 
ventures had a share more than 5%. None of the TNCs (owning more than one joint venture) 
accounted for more than 10%. This competitive pressure spurred the joint ventures to upgrade 
their product ranges and production efficiency so as to make more vehicles with a cheaper 
price and better quality. However, regional protectionism constrained SOEs to launch 
large-scale projects in vehicle model and platform innovation. In the PRD, Guangzhou Auto 
Industrial Group (GAIG) hardly received funds and investments from the central government 
and could only rely on limited supports from provincial and municipal governments (Li and 
Zhu, 2010; Liang et al., 2010). 
 
Figure 8.2 Annual output of volume and growth rate in China’s automotive industry 
 



































































































1983 Beijing Jeep 
(Daimler-Chrysler) 
605.21 50 Beijing 
1984 SAIC - VW 335.4 50 Shanghai 
1985 GAIG - PSA(Peugeot) 156 74 Guangzhou 
1991 FAW - VW 1857 60 Changchun 
1991 Jinbei - GM 230 50 Shenyang 
1992 Dongfeng - PSA (Citroen) 1202 73 Wuhan 
1992 Hainan-Mazda 80 75 Hainan 
1993 Chang'an - Suzuki 190.85 51 Chongqing 
1998 GAIG - Honda 139.76 50 Guangzhou 
1998 Sichuan - Toyota 67 50 Chengdu 
1999 Nanjing - Fiat 362 50 Nanjing 
1999 Shanghai - GM 1521 50 Shanghai 
2000 Dongfeng - Nissan 2000 50 Wuhan and 
Guangzhou 
2000 Tianjin - Toyota 100 50 Tianjin 
2001 Chang'an - Ford 98 50 Chongqing 
2001 Dongfeng-PSA(Peugeot) 152 50 Wuhan 
2002 Beijing - Hyundai 400 50 Beijing 
2002 Huachen-BMW 110 50 Shenyang 
2002 Dongfeng-Yueda - Kia 
(Hyundai) 
90 50 Yancheng 
2003 Dongfeng - Honda 98 50 Wuhan 
2004 GAIG - Toyota 560 50 Guangzhou 
2004 Jianghuai-Hyundai 780 50 Hefei 
2006 Chang'an& Ford - Mazda 60 50 Chongqing 
2009 Chery-Fiat-GAIG 182 50 Wuhu 
2010 BYD-Daimler 100 50 Shenzhen 
2011 Changan-PSA 80 50 Shenzhen 
Note: the joint ventures only refer to passenger car. 







Table 8.3 China’s vehicle sales in 2009 
Ranking Name Sale volume Location Region 
1 Shanghai-VW  728  Shanghai East 
2 Shanghai-GM  708.4 Shanghai East 
3 FAW-VW  669.2 Changchun North East 
4 Beijing-Hyundai  570.3 Beijing North 
5 Dongfeng-Nissan  519 Guangdong South 
6 Chery 466.5 Tianjin North 
7 BYD  445.1 Guandong South 
8 FAW-Toyota  417.3 Sichuan West 
9 Guangzhou-Honda  365.6 Guangdong South 
10 Geely 329.1 Anhui East 
11 Chang’an-Ford-Mazda 316.1 Hainan South 
12 Shenlong-PSA  270 Hubei Center 
13 Dengfeng-Kia  241.4 Hubei Center 
14 Tianjin FAW  212.2 Tianjin North 
15 Dongfeng-Honda  210.6 Hubei Center 
16 Guangzhou-Toyota  209.6 Guangdong South 
17 Changcheng 155.2 Hebei North 
18 Chang’an-Suzuki  150.1 Chongqing West 
19 Huachen 134.7 Liaoning North East 
20 Jianghuai 123  Anhui East 
Notes: Unit = thousand vehicles; passenger vehicles only. 
Source: Yang, 2010. 
 
8.3 Industrial upgrading through reciprocal coupling: the changing fortunes of 
GAIG 
The development of China’s automotive industry has presented an upgrading trajectory 
in which the domestic market and industrial policies were used for developing reciprocal 
cooperation with global lead firms. The automotive industry in the PRD was involved because 
GAIG was selected in the national pillar group in 1984. The industry was initially developed 
in the mid-1980s based on the establishment of Guangzhou-Peugeot joint venture. Currently 
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This section does not go into analyzing these operational variables in great detail, but 
focuses on the general pattern of collaboration between Guangzhou SOEs and Japanese 
automakers. The common thread of the cases is that reciprocal coupling leads to substantial 
industrial growth, while not necessarily leads to significant upgrading subsequently. In the 
case of Guangzhou-Peugeot, coupling was formed under strong intervention of state 
institutions, but Guangzhou-Peugeot failed to achieve the balance of interplay due to an 
unequal equity structure, mismatched interests and contested responsive strategies. This 
problem generated high tension within the joint venture. As the local SOE failed to reconcile 
the tension, industrial upgrading was inhibited over times and eventually led to the failure of 
the joint venture. By learning from it, Guangqi-Honda devoted a great deal of efforts in 
maintaining the balance of power relations and developing synergy, such as keeping an equal 
equity/managerial structure, complying with the foreign partner’s governance, fostering 
mutual interests in product development, and exploring new market niches to avoid 
competition in functional upgrading. These efforts lead to significant local upgrading at both 
the local and regional scales. 
8.3.1 Rise and fall of Guangzhou-Peugeot 
Similar to the electronics industry, the automotive industry in the PRD hardly had any 
industrial base in the early 1980s. After the opening reform in 1978, China’s central 
government allowed Guangdong Province to establish a joint venture project with foreign 
firms. The motivation of the central government was to balance domestic regional inequality 
and improved industrial development in Southern China. As the provincial capital, 
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Guangzhou government grasped this opportunity and developed partnership between GAIG 
and Peugeot from the French PSA Group. Originally, the central government only allowed 
Guangzhou-Peugeot to manufacture light trucks for preventing direct competition with other 
key SOEs (e.g. First Auto Work, Dongfeng Group and Shanghai Auto Work). But provincial 
and municipal governments strongly requested the permission to manufacture passenger 
vehicles. This central-local mismatched interest was finally reconciled at the expense that 
Guangzhou-Peugeot needed to rely on self-finance without any additional support from the 
central government. 
Strategic coupling between GAIG and PSA was formed with the establishment of a joint 
venture in 1984 (see Figure 8.4). At that time, the State Guidance of Car Price and Product 
only set up national criteria in ownership structure, the type of vehicle model and the volume 
of production. It had no criteria about technological sharing. The coupling of 
Guangzhou-Peugeot did not reach a reciprocal stage due to mismatched interests and 
imbalanced power relations. In the terms of capital investment, GAIG bore more 
responsibilities and risks. GAIG had to provide full investments in capital, infrastructures and 
facilities, while Peugeot invested in the forms of technological licensing and training. In terms 
of technologies, the gap between two partners was quite huge. GAIG had little industrial base 
and there were no regional supply networks. Local SOEs in the automotive industry hardly 
had experience in organizing modern production systems. Having concerned about these 
conditions, Peugeot decided to install two manual production lines in the joint venture, though 
automation production lines had been prevalent in Peugeot’s production networks. Moreover, 
Peugeot insisted on introducing the 505 car model which was going to exit the Euro market at 
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that time. Base on Peugeot’s strategy, GAIG was situated in a disadvantaged position with 
limited power in production management and product development. Under the pressure of 
self-finance, GAIG insisted on holding a major share so as to defend its governance power. As 
a result, Chinese partners occupied a larger equity share of 74%3, while the share of French 
partners was just 26%. 
 
Figure 8.4 Reciprocal coupling of Guangzhou-Peugeot joint venture 
 
Source: compiled by author. 
 
Tension was generated within the partnership under asymmetrical power relations and 
mismatched interests. The highly asymmetrical ownership structure disappointed Peugeot 
which in turn took a conservative and short-term strategy as a response. This strategy caused 
serious tension that inhibited the upgrading of product models and local production network. 
On the one hand, Peugeot refused to construct local supply networks and implemented the 
CKD (complete knock-down) strategy in component procurement. This strategy was meant 
for offsetting its disadvantage position in equity structure. Because all components were then 
                                                              
3 In equity share, Chinese partners held 46% from the GAIG, 20% from the Citic Auto China, and 8% from China 
International Finance Ltd. French partners held 22% from PSA-Peugeot and 4% from Paris Banque Nationale. 
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purchased from and distributed by a designated trader which was virtually a subsidiary of the 
PSA Group, PSA reaped huge profits from the component procurement of the joint venture. 
Apart from the CKD strategy, Peugeot denied GAIG’s suggestion and postponed introducing 
new car model, the 405 series, as a reservation for further renegotiation. GAIG was highly 
disappointed but had little power to bargain with Peugeot due to its weak indigenous 
capabilities. The disappointment further reinforced tension because GAIG decided not to 
reduce its equity shares in the joint venture. Tension was also raised among the workforce of 
Guangzhou-Peugeot. Chinese workers considered themselves as the major party and should 
own larger decision-making power. However, the French managerial teams were fully in 
charge of production management in the joint venture which made workers in production 
lines quite unhappy. Labor and managerial disputes happened now and then. In a word, 
tension was generated but both party of the joint venture did not reconcile it. This problem 
was told by the chief of technology division of Guangqi-Honda: 
 
GAIG looked like a provider of capital and Peugeot was a technology provider. This 
kind of cooperation was not good, because there was a lack of harmony. Whatever 
Guangzhou-Peugeot was profitable or not, they [Peugeot] were earning profits [from 
the components]. I may exaggerate the situation, but they did seem to get nothing to 
lose in the joint venture…Surely there were other reasons that led to our failures, but I 
think this problem [synergy] was one of the keys. We were both too short-sight 
(Interview 100526, on 26 May 2011 in Guangzhou). 
 
Due to the tension, reciprocal coupling was not truly developed in Guangzhou-Peugeot. 
Coupling did lead to the significant industrial growth of Guangzhou-Peugeot, but industrial 
upgrading was not accompanied. From 1985 to 1994, the annual production volume of 
Guangzhou-Peugeot increased from 5,000 to 25,000. Before 1990, Peugeot 505 model was 
highly welcomed by Chinese consumers due to increasing domestic demands and lacking of 
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competitors in the domestic passenger-vehicle market. But after that, the 505 model gradually 
lost market shares and was beaten by Santana from VW. In 1995, Guangzhou-Peugeot 
suffered from over inventory with an amount over 8,000 vehicles in warehouses. This 
problem put the joint venture in debt seriously.4 
The 505 model was losing competitiveness due to two reasons. First, without product 
upgrading, VW’s Santana series turned out to be a better option for Chinese consumers, 
because it had better performance at a lower price. Second, without upgrading production 
systems, the 505 model met a bottle neck of cost reduction. The CKD strategy and manual 
production lines put the 505 model at bay. Tariffs imposing on components made the 505 
model had a much higher production cost than Santana. The later one was using locally 
manufactured components and assembled by automated production lines. 
When the market share of the 505 model declined sharply, after rounds of renegotiation, 
PSA decided to introduce the 405 series to take back the market lost. However, 
Guangzhou-Peugeot had missed the window of industrial opportunity due to changing 
institutional environment. According to the new industrial policy in 1994, the 405 series could 
only be introduced by satisfying two requirements: (1) the production volume of the 505 
model must reach 30,000; (2) the local content of the 505 model must reach 40%. Regarding 
to the problem of over inventory and the CKD strategy, it was an impossible mission for 
Guangzhou-Peugeot to achieve these requirements within a short time. In 1997, 
Guangzhou-Peugeot collapsed with the divestment of the French PSA Group. The entire joint 
venture was sold to Honda at a price of one franc. 
                                                              




There were many problems leading to the failure of Guangzhou-Peugeot, such as the 
wrong market strategy of PSA or the weak capability of GAIG, but the lack of synergy within 
Guangzhou-Peugeot should be the key. Although reciprocal coupling was developed, the 
partnership was not truly reciprocal. PSA held a conservative and short-term strategy due to 
its disadvantaged position in the equity share. GAIA did not have sufficient competence to 
conduct product and functional upgrading on its own efforts. Both parties did not devote 
positive efforts to lower tension. Therefore, local upgrading was impeded and the joint 
venture failed when market and institutional environment changed. 
8.3.2 Resurgence through the success of Guangqi-Honda 
Guangqi-Honda was established between GAIG and Honda in 1997 to replace Peugeot. 
In 2004, GAIG established another joint venture with Toyota in 2004 as Guangqi-Toyota. 
These two joint ventures are both manufacturing passenger vehicles. In 2005, GAIG was 
restructured into Guangzhou Auto Ltd. Co. (GAC).5 By learning from Guangzhou-Peugeot, 
GAC devoted a great deal of efforts in fostering the balance of the interplay for nurturing 
synergy. Guangqi-Honda currently has grown into one of the best joint ventures in China’s 
automotive industry (Li and Zhu, 2010). The decoupling of Guangzhou-Peugeot did not have 
much negative impacts to the newly recoupling between GAC and Honda. The sunk costs and 
institutional burdens of Guangzhou-Peugeot were low because Peugeot did not invested a lot 
in constructing local supply networks. It just installed two manual production lines in the joint 
venture which had already been obsoleted in the mid-1990s. Therefore the problem of 
                                                              
5 GAC also established another two joint ventures: Guangqi-Hino in 2007 in Guangzhou making commercial 




technological or institutional lock-in also did not appear. GAC was also willing to refresh its 
knowledge base with the up-to-date advanced technologies from its new partner – Honda. 
 
Fostering synergy 
The reciprocal coupling of Guangqi-Honda is shown in Figure 8.5 in which more 
balanced power relations are formed compared with the ones in Guangzhou-Peugeot. 
Grounded in the new national industrial policy and the imperative of upgrading from 
provincial governments, GAC strongly demanded three elements of the new partner that was 
selected to replace Peugeot. First, the new joint venture must develop local supply networks 
to meet the national criteria of local content (40%). Second, the new partner must gradually 
introduce new vehicle models that were synchronizing with global markets (particularly the 
Europe and the US markets). Third, co-development and innovation was compulsory in the 
new joint venture. These strong initiatives were reflected by comments from the division chief 
of the production department of Guangqi-Honda:  
 
The most important lesson of Guangzhou-Peugeot was that we must construct local 
supply networks to take advantage of low production cost here. Otherwise, we cannot 
reduce production costs as much as our competitors do in China. Meanwhile, we need 
to introduce the best models, because other competitors in China market were doing so. 
Moreover, co-development was very important because it was a foundation of 
long-term prosperity and we never want to repeat our failure with Peugeot again 











Figure 8.5 Reciprocal coupling of Guangqi-Honda joint venture 
 
Source: compiled by author. 
 
GAC was able to bargain for these requirements by possessing two regional assets: (1) 
the national industrial policy in 1994 (see Table 8.1); (2) a huge regional market in South 
China that had not been saturated and the only assembly plant (Guangzhou-Peugeot) had just 
quitted. There was a niche of the scale of GAC. It was just a new and small SOE without 
heavy institutional and labor burden. These reasons made GAC an interesting partner to 11 
global lead firms such as BMW, Mercedes-Benz, Opel, Fiat, Hyundai, Toyota and Honda. 
Honda was finally selected because it had the strongest initiative to cooperate with GAC and 
was willing to meet the demands of GAC. Compared with Honda, Toyota did not have such a 
strong initiative to cooperate with GAC, because it was simultaneously negotiating with Fist 
Auto Work (FAW). Toyota considered FAW as a much more promising Chinese partner than 
GAC at that time. 
The initiatives of GAC were satisfied by the Japanese style of management in organizing 
GPNs. The JIT system has a strong imperative of localization and regionalization in 
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constructing in situ supply networks (Cusumano, 1985). Honda’s lean production system is 
famous for its incremental upgrading on the basis of on-spot technological improvement 
known as Gemba Kaizen (Imai, 1987; Imai, 1997). More importantly, in contrast to PSA, 
Honda regarded China as an extremely important market. This attitude was embedded in 
Honda global marketing strategy. While Honda’s global market shares were relatively small 
compared with other Japanese automakers at that time, Honda decided to use China market as 
a strategic resource to sustain its long-term competitiveness in the global market. The 
motivation of Honda was revealed by a Chinese director of Guangqi-Honda:  
 
Comparing with other global lead firms, Honda is a relatively late-comer in the global 
market. It was hard for Honda to compete in the US or Europe markets which have 
been largely occupied by giant automakers like GM, VW, Ford and even Toyota. But in 
the China market around 1997, there were a lot of opportunities for Honda to grasp, 
particular in South China market. Honda had ambition to win the China market against 
other gain automakers. Therefore, Honda took a very pro-active and friendly attitude 
during the negotiation with GAC and made it count (interview 21th May 2010 in 
Guangzhou). 
 
Balancing power relations & the SFR strategy 
The above matched interests serve as a fundamental force in nurturing a reciprocal 
relationship between GAC and Honda. Based on this relationship, GAC and Honda tried 
various efforts to ensure a balanced power relation so as to foster product and process 
upgrading within the joint venture – Guangqi-Honda. 
In order to avoid creating tension in ownership structure, GAC and Honda took up 50% 
of equity share respectively and invested the same amount of capital ($140 million) in 
Guangqi-Honda. In managerial structure, the managerial team was made of Chinese and 
Japanese evenly with certain labor division. At the top level, they were two general managers 
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representing two sides of the partnership. At the department level, Chinese directors were 
mainly in charge of marketing, human resource, administration and procurement. Japanese 
directors were in charge of production management and technical supports. In knowledge 
sharing, Honda’s lean production system was fully replicated into the joint venture. Japanese 
engineering took up several key positions in operating the system, while Chinese workers 
were fully trained and constituted the majority of work force. The transplant of JIT system in 
North America had received strong local resistance from the existing Fordism system 
(Kenney and Florida, 1992; Kenney and Florida, 1994; Mair et al., 1988). However, the 
installation of JIT system in Guangzhou did not meet such resistance, because it was 
welcomed by provincial/urban governments and manufacturing workers who were desire to 
manipulate modern technologies. 
In product development, Guqnagqi-Honda Automotive Research Institute (GHARI) was 
set up in which Honda was responsible for basic R&D and engineering designs and GAC was 
in charge of product localization and body designs. In order to avoid tension in technological 
leakage, GHARI is wholly owned by Guangqi-Honda in which technological introduction and 
transfer is coordinated and supervised upon the satisfaction of both parties. GHARI was also 
the first R&D institute set up by joint ventures in China at that time. Intensive knowledge 
sharing was led by Honda for reducing technological gaps between GAC and Honda. But in 
marketing, the situation was reversed. GAC played an active role and Honda worked closely 
with GAC’s experts for understanding the China market, collecting information, and 
constructing distribution channels. Based on this collective endeavor, Guangqi-Honda 
managed to introduce competitive vehicle models to China almost every year from 2002 to 
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2010 (see Table 8.4). These models were quite welcomed and Guangqi-Honda’s market share 
increased from 5% in 2000 to 14% in 2009. Guangqi-Honda sold about 3.5 million units of 
vehicles in 2009 (Li and Zhu, 2010: 86). 
 
Table 8.4 Product introduction of Guangqi-Honda 
Years Products Type Prices(thousandyuan) 
1998 Accord 6 Middle  250-350 
2002 Odyssey 2 MPV 230-290 
2003 Accord 7 Middle  230-350 
2004 Fit Economic 90-130 
2005 Odessy 3 MPV 230-290 
2006 City Economic 100-150 
2007 Accord 8 Middle 200-330 
2008 Everus SUV concept car 
2009 Odessey 4 MPV 230-290 
2010 Crosstour High  400-430 
2011 Everus Economic 70-100 
Note: Honda’s SUV series is allocated in Dongfeng-Honda in Wuhan, the geographical center of 
China. 
Sources: author’s survey and the official website of GAC, at: http://www.ghac.cn/. 
 
Honda enforced a specific strategy to ensure sustainable market and product 
development. The strategy comprised three principals: small input, fast output, and rolling 
development (SFR strategy). Small input meant that the development of Guangqi-Honda fully 
depended on the initial investment. No additional loan was allowed. Fast output was meant 
for making investment cycles as short as possible. Starting with a small volume (10 thousand 
vehicles) of production with one production line, Guangqi-Honda was able to recovery the 
initial investments, and then further invested in new production lines and facilities with the 
accumulated profits. In doing so, rolling development was accomplished in the sense that all 
accumulated profits were invested for follow-up development. 
The underlined motivation of the SFR strategy was to prevent the joint venture being 
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driven by ambitious local authorities which tended focus on extending the scale of production. 
Guangzhou and Guangdong governments did try to offer more investments and persuaded 
Guangqi-Honda to speed up the extension of its production scale more quickly. But all 
attempts were declined according to the SFR strategy. In 2010, GZ-Honda extended its annual 
production volume from 360, 000 to 480,000. All the current assets (0.9 billion yuan) came 
from self-accumulation.6 In short, this SFR strategy ensured the independence of the joint 
venture which reinforced synergy and maintained the stability of reciprocal coupling. 
Within such reciprocal coupling, Guangqi-Honda has achieved product, process and 
functional upgrading to a significant degree. In product upgrading, Guangqi-Honda totally 
introduced 11 vehicles models to the China market (see Table 8.4). Although most of these 
models were innovated and transferred from Honda’s GPNs elsewhere, the arrival of them 
significantly helped GAC absorb Honda’s advanced skills including product designs, model 
development, and the processing technologies of the introduced models. These technologies 
were also transferred to GHARI for conducting product localization and developing new 
models. Moreover, the introduction of these vehicle models fostered regional supply networks 
in which Chinese suppliers were trained to manufacture more sophisticated auto parts, thus 
achieving product upgrading regularly. 
The progress of process upgrading is indicated by the improvement of the lean 
production system, PPM rate 7 , JIT delivery and cycle time. These efforts made 
Guangqi-Honda as one of the best assembly plants in Honda’s GPNs. On the basis of Gemba 
Kaizen, Honda paid a lot of efforts in training Chinese workers in the ways of regular training 
                                                              
6 http://auto.ifeng.com/roll/20100601/328185.shtml 
7 It refers to the number of disqualified part per million. For instance, 100 ppm means there are 100 disqualified 
products among 1 million manufactured products. 
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courses, annual study groups, and overseas specialized training sections and so on. Hundreds 
of Chinese workers were trained every year for manipulating the lean production system. In 
this way, Guangqi-Honda kept having high performance in PPM rate among its peers. In 1999, 
when the normal PPM rate in China was about 1,500 to 3,000, Guangqi-Honda had managed 
to keep a three-digit PPM rate. By 2003, when introducing the Accord 7 to China, 
Guangqi-Honda had maintained the PPM rate within a two-digit level which was the average 
level in Honda’s GPNs. In 2010 when introducing the first luxury vehicle model (Crosstour) 
to China, Guangqi-Honda amazingly reached a top-level record in its GPNs by maintaining 
the PPM rate at 12. This standard was also enforced among regional supply networks in the 
PRD while suppliers were allowed to have a lower criterion of PPM rate (12 ~ 20). 
Apart from improvement in the PPM rate, the JIT system was also gradually upgraded. 
Guangqi-Honda initially set up its standard inventory at 15 days. The standard was 
subsequently reduced into 10 days in 2001, 5 days in 2006 and recently 1.5 days in 2010. 
Meanwhile the cycle time of assembling a single vehicle was reduced from about 65 seconds 
in 1998 to 53 seconds in 2005. In 2010, the cycle time was improved to 49.3 seconds, hitting 
the top record among all assembly plants of Honda.8 From 1998 to 2010, production lines in 
Guangqi-Honda were significantly renovated at least four times and upgraded from 
single-line production to mixed-lines production.9 
   Functional upgrading was also fulfilled through the efforts of GHARI in developing a new 
vehicle mode. In 2008, GHARI innovated with the Everus series which was specific for the 
China markets. In order to avoid tension between the joint venture and the Honda Group, 
                                                              
8 Data are from interview with the director of sourcing department of Guangqi-Honda on 21th May 2010 in 
Guangzhou. 
9 Mixed line production: manufacturing different vehicles in the same production line. 
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Everus was set as an appropriate brand under Guangqi-Honda which did not belong to the 
Honda Group (see Table 8.4). The Everus series had three indigenously-developed models by 
2010. Combined with Japanese and Chinese technologies, the creation of the Everus is a 
win-win deal of functional upgrading for both GAC and Honda. To GAC, it identified a new 
market niche and released the economic and political pressures of GZ-Honda. This point is 
reflected as the quotation below: 
 
GZ-Honda was getting near to a bottleneck of cost reduction, since the average of local 
content of GZ-Honda’s product was about 85% now. We also faced the task of creating 
new proprietary brands. Therefore, innovating new product was the best solution for 
both of us. That was why we convinced Honda to innovate new vehicles with us. 
(Zhang Fangyou, President of GAC, interview by the magazine of Automan on 20th, 
May, 200810) 
 
To Honda, it was the ‘best solution’ because the joint venture could adopt more 
local-made auto parts without necessity of revising or complying with Honda’s global 
standards. The brand creation of Everus was a way of lowering tension between GAC and 
Honda. Putting Everus within Honda’s brand range would take a long and complicated 
procedure to get approval from the Honda Group. GAC was also unwilling to do so because it 
had great contributions in the innovation of Everus. Similarly, Honda did not allow Everus to 
be wholly owned by GAC. 
In order to prevent technological leakage in developing Everus, Japanese partners took 
charge of platform development, modularization and systematic engineering, while Chinese 
partners were responsible for marketing research, body design and external trimming. 





participation observation, learning by doing and knowledge spillover from Honda. GAC 
finally developed a sufficient group of talents for establishing a proprietary brand two years 
later (see sub-section 8.3.3). Guangqi-Toyota was established in 2004 and generally went 
through a similar trajectory with Guangqi-Honda. 
8.3.3 Industrial upgrading in regional supply networks and GAC 
The above elaborations show the importance of synergy and balanced power relations in 
maintaining reciprocal coupling and fostering industrial upgrading in the joint ventures. A 
further question is whether local Chinese suppliers and GAC have also achieved upgrading. 
Drawing on my interviews with 14 automotive firms in Guangqi-Honda regional production 
network, this study finds that industrial upgrading among the supply network has been 
occurring. As shown in Figure 8.6, process upgrading was the most significant among all 
types of upgrading, which achieved a value of 2.36. Product upgrading was following with a 
value of 2.21. The extent of functional upgrading was moderate with a value of 1.71. The 
evident product and process upgrading is driven by the supply network management 
conducted by Guangqi-Honda which is known as the ‘single-point supply’ (SPS) strategy. 
Because local R&D activities are encouraged, functional upgrading is achieved to a certain 
degree. Sectoral upgrading is rather insignificant because these suppliers are specialized in 
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to the stability and punctuality of suppliers. Hence Guangqi-Honda has incentives to help 
suppliers upgrade their technological capabilities. Since 1998, about 40 local firms have been 
assisted and ‘upgraded’ into the first-tier suppliers of Guangqi-Honda and Guangqi-Toyota.11 
At least 3 to 4 hundreds of local firms were upgraded into the second or third-tier suppliers of 
the joint ventures. As a result, the joint ventures managed to achieve a high level of local 
content which helped them reduce production costs continuously. As showed in Figure 8.7, 
the level of local content of the joint ventures was much higher than the national criteria of 
40%. 
 
Figure 8.7 Local content of Guangqi-Honda and Guangqi-Toyota (%) 
 
Source: author’s fieldwork. 
 
The high level of local content implies that Honda and Toyota did not isolate knowledge 
diffusion from its GPNs, but have devoted significant efforts in fostering a regional 
production network in the PRD. The increasing domestic competition has reinforced this 
localization tendency. This point can be reflected by the division chief of procurement 
department of Guangzhou-Toyota: 
 
Today [in China markets], the national requirement of 40% local content is 
meaningless, because if your local content is less than 60%, your cars cannot be sold 
out due to higher production costs. Though tariffs and import quotas are liberalizing, 
                                                              









the tendency of localization is unstoppable since we have so many global leaders 
competing with us in China. The more localization of production, the cheaper the car 
will be (Interview 100601, on 1 June 2010 in Guangzhou). 
 
When Honda and Toyota transplanted their suppliers to Guangzhou, GAC took 
advantage of the SPS strategy and established dozens of joint ventures with these transplanted 
suppliers, such as Guangzhou-JFE (auto body sheet), Guangqi-Toyota Engine, 
Guangzhou-Chuo Seik (wheel), Guangzhou-Showa (damper), Weigao-Stanley (electronic 
parts), Guangzhou-Mitsuba (magnetic motor), Guangzhou-TSK (car seat), and 
Guangzhou-NHK-UNI (spring) and so on. Meanwhile, some local firms quickly caught up 
and been upgraded into the first-tier supplier of Guangqi-Honda and Guangqi-Toyota, such as 
Haifeng Machinery and Zhongxin Plastic. Surprisingly, this strategy of joint-venturing key 
suppliers did not raised tension towards Honda, but was welcomed by Honda and its Japanese 
suppliers. Synergy of the establishment of these joint ventures was not underpinned by the 
national directive because it did allow the suppliers of auto-assembly plants to be fully 
foreign owned. However, Honda’s suppliers would like establish joint ventures for saving 
start-up costs and more importantly reducing costs in labor managements. Within these joint 
ventures, labor departments and labor unions are normally supervised and governed by 
Chinese managerial teams which are considered to be more competent than Japanese 
managerial teams. Hence, apart from the factory of gear box and some other key components, 
many of the first-tier suppliers of Guangqi-Honda were joint ventures. The subsequent 
development proved the validity of this synergy because most of the labor strikes and disputes 
tended to happen in wholly foreign owned production plants, rather than joint ventures.12 
                                                              
12 Information about labor strikes and disputes come from the interview with the division chief of the production 




Functional upgrading of GAC: integrated innovation 
While upgrading occurred in regional supply network, GAC has achieved product and 
functional upgrading. GAC has constructed various linkages to absorb and transfer 
knowledge from the joint ventures to itself. In a formal manner, GAC sent a large number of 
study groups to the joint ventures annually for learning the operation of Honda’s lead 
production system and the TPS (Toyota production system). Comprising about 10 to 15 
technicians, each group was sent to different production segments for two weeks or one 
month. The groups were requested to develop at least one upgrading proposal for improving 
the efficiency of production system.13 Informally, GAC rotated Chinese engineers between 
the two joint ventures and the subsidiaries of GAC. When GAC set up Guangzhou 
Automotive Engineering Research Institute (GAERI) in 2006, 80% of its technicians (about 
300 people) originally worked in GZ-Honda and GZ-Toyota.14 By absorbing knowledge for a 
decade, GAC implemented functional upgrading in 2010 by launching a proprietary brand 
termed as Trumpchi. 
There was a critical challenge to GAC: how to achieve functional upgrading without 
creating tension to Guangqi-Honda and Guangqi-Toyota.15 It would be no doubt that GAC 
has learned a lot from the joint ventures and the launch of appropriate-brand products will 
give rise to new competitions between GAC and the joint ventures. GAC must avoid any 
dispute about intellectual property rights involved in the product development of Trumpchi. 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
confidential. 
13 Sources: two interviews with the vice directors of production department in the joint ventures in Guangzhou on 
21 May, and 1 June 2010. 
14 From a public interview with the director of GAERI: http://auto.xinmin.cn/rollnews/2010/09/04/6649866.html 
15 There are various difficulties to approach to relevant data to this issue. Most of the information about the 
appropriate brand of GAC was kept as confidential. 
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GAC also had to avoid direct market competition between Trumpchi and Honda/Toyota’s 
incumbent product ranges in the China market. In order to secure the synergy with Honda and 
Toyota, GAC adopted a strategy of integrated innovation by using non-Honda/Toyota 
technologies. The new model of Trumphchi resulted from a combination of multiple sources 
of technologies which were intensively revised through indigenous efforts. GAC licensed the 
platform technologies (e.g. decking and engine) of Alfa Romio 166 from Fiat Group and 
purchased gearbox technologies from Aisin. Nevertheless, GAC revised suspension system 
and engine so as to transfer the executive car (Alfa Romio 166) into a family sedan. Apart 
from these core technologies, GAC devoted great efforts in developing electronic systems, 
internal trim, external appearance and a new body design. All these efforts helped GAC avoid 
the potential disputes of intellectual property rights with Honda and Toyota. Moreover, in 
terms of market positioning, the price of Trumpchi was set between 120,000 and 190,000 
yuan, whilst the major market segments of the joint ventures’ products were either lower than 
150,000 yuan or higher than 200,000 yuan. Hence, tension was reconciled to a significant 
degree because the market segment of Trumpchi bypassed the key markets of the joint 
ventures. 
The strategy of integrated innovation did help GAC create the first own brand without 
harming reciprocal coupling in the joint ventures. But it should be noticed that the functional 
upgrading of GAC should not be overpraised, because there is not much innovation in the 
new model. Most of the key components and technologies were purchased or licensed from 
other firms. It means that GAC has not been innovative yet. In 2011, Trumpchi sold 18,000 
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vehicles merely accounting for about 0.1% of the domestic market sales.16 The future of this 
brand is yet to be told. 
To sum up this section, the comparative analysis between Guangzhou-Peugeot and 
Guangqi-Honda has demonstrated how important a balanced interplay in reciprocal coupling 
is. It nurtures synergy, ensures the sustainability of reciprocal coupling, and leads to various 
outcomes of industrial upgrading. The upgrading is not confined within the joint ventures, but 
is diffused in a broader regional production network in which local firms benefited indifferent 
ways. 
8.4 Conclusion: the balance of interplay 
As the last empirical chapter, this thesis here investigates into local upgrading in the 
automotive industry in the PRD which is driven by reciprocal coupling between global 
leading automakers and Chinese SOEs. This chapter finds that reciprocal coupling tends to 
occur in four conditions: strong national interventions, strong global governance imperatives, 
small market gap while large technological gap. It has shown that either corporate governance 
power or state power alone is insufficient to explain local upgrading in the automotive 
industry in China. This chapter affirms that possessing huge domestic markets is a crucial 
precondition of developing reciprocal coupling. It serves as a crucial regional asset for local 
firms to increase their bargaining power under state interventions. In this way, local firms 
would be able to leverage the governance power of lead firms. However, local firms should 





This chapter argues that the formation of reciprocal coupling would bring in significant 
industrial growth, but does not guarantee that industrial upgrading will be accompanied. If the 
coupled parties fail to nurture synergy and reconcile tension, upgrading will be inhibited. 
Therefore, the balance of interplay becomes a crucial factor that produces synergy and 
nurtures industrial upgrading subsequently. It can be reflected by the relationships in equity 
structure, profit/technological sharing, mutual interests, responsive strategies, the status of 
tension and the power strength of each party. There is no fixed pattern or one-off solution to 
achieve the balance of interplay which virtually is a dynamic and mutually constituted 
process.  
The investigation of two joint ventures in the PRD has verified the key argument of this 
chapter. The case of Guangzhou-Peugeot has demonstrated a negative example of reciprocal 
coupling in which industrial upgrading was hindered due to the lack of synergy, mismatched 
interests and unwelcome responsive strategies. Without local upgrading, reciprocal coupling 
failed when institutional and spatial conditions changed over time. In contrast, the case of 
Guangqi-Honda has illustrated a positive example in which reciprocal coupling is sustainable 
on the basis of balanced power relations and various efforts in maintaining the balance. The 
efforts of lowering tension within the joint ventures are proved to be crucial in fostering 
synergy and supporting the functional upgrading of GAC. All these efforts lead to significant 
upgrading at both local and regional levels. However, the achievements of upgrading should 
not be overstated. The functional upgrading of GAC is virtually a corner-cut strategy with 
limited content of indigenous innovation. The technological and marketing capabilities of 
local firms are still lagging behind global automakers seriously. 
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Chapter 9 Conclusion 
To many developing regions, export-oriented industrialization has become a well-known 
strategy for promoting industrial growth. But whether local firms in these regions can catch 
up with TNCs is still in question. What is the scope for local strategies so that a latecomer 
region can be upgraded and improve its competiveness? This study has probed into industrial 
changes and dynamics in the PRD to look for the answer. This final chapter summarizes main 
findings in the beginning and then articulates key contributions which response to the 
GVC/GPN literature and development studies. In the third section, policy implications are 
discussed in relation to the key contributions accordingly. In the penultimate section, a 
reflexive assessment of this thesis is conducted for reflecting the accomplishments and 
limitations of this study. This reflection leads to an extended research agenda and some 
prospects towards the future of the PRD. 
9.1 Strategic coupling and industrial upgrading in the PRD: summary of 
findings 
The central focus of this thesis is how strategic coupling between latecomer regions and 
the global economy affects local industrial upgrading. My motivation derives from 
dissatisfaction with the contemporary literature of GVC and regional development in 
explaining industrial upgrading in the PRD. This thesis asks two critical questions: how do 
different ways of strategic coupling between local firms in the PRD and foreign firms in 
GPNs affect local upgrading? What do institutional and spatial conditions matter during the 
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process of local upgrading? The existing literature has yet to offer pertinent and cogent 
answers to these questions (Chapter 2).  
In order to fill in the theoretical gaps, this thesis has conceptualized the relational 
features of industrial upgrading and developed a four-fold typology of strategic coupling as an 
explanatory variable to the dynamic outcomes of local upgrading. It includes captive, 
cooperative, reciprocal and absorptive coupling, referring to different patterns of the global 
integration of the PRD. The formation of strategic coupling is contingent on the configuration 
of knowledge gaps and power relations between local firms and foreign firms. However, this 
configuration is not static but evolutionary. This thesis advocates that local firms are critical 
actors in the nexus of firm-state-territory relations. They take advantage of institutional and 
spatial contexts by mobilizing various resources (assets) embedded in those contexts. In doing 
so, they manage to leverage the governance power of foreign firms and implement upgrading 
without harming synergy within strategic coupling. 
Having addressed the research questions and conceptualization in Chapter 2 and 3, this 
thesis has examined the achievement of industrial upgrading and the evolution of strategic 
coupling in the PRD from 1978 to 2010, drawing upon multiple methods of intensive and 
extensive field research (Chapter 4). Table 9.1 summarizes the main findings of this study at a 
regional level (Chapter 5). Table 9.2 summarizes the variety of coupling and its consequences 
to upgrading in three industries (Chapters 6 to 8). The overall findings exemplify the causal 





Table 9.1 Characteristics of industrial upgrading in the PRD: A summary 
Category Features and main findings 
Before 1978  Agricultural backwater 
 Limited industrial base 
Formation of 
Captive coupling 
in the 1980s 
 Global: seeking for low-cost producers, industrial relocations 
 National: marketization & export-oriented industrialization 
 Regional: liberalizing institutional environment 
 Local: power decentralization and local initiatives 
 Abundant labor and land resources 
 Captive to Hong Kong firms under export-processing manufacturing
Evolution of 
captive coupling 
during the 1990s 
and 2000s 
 Articulating into global markets and directly trading with developed 
economies 
 Reducing dependency on Hong Kong 
 Reducing dependency on export-processing trades 
 Disintegration of the front store-back factory model 
 Rapid catching up of local private firms 
Regional 
upgrading 
 From component processing into full-package manufacturing / OEM
 From a truncated processing base to a leading global manufacturing 
center supported by thousands of firms which form regional supply 
networks 
 Intensive upgrading in product ranges 
 Significant improvement in manufacturing capabilities, production 
efficiency and international competitiveness 
 Regional sectoral upgrading: moving into more value-added sectors 




 FIEs made up major contributions to the regional prosperity 
 FIEs have been playing a dominant role in both value creation and 
distribution 
 SOEs had the best efficiency, but totally lost influence in the regional 
economy 





 Local: increasing indigenous capabilities and inter-firm cooperation 
 Regional: growing body of regional supply networks and 
associational economies 
 National: the emergence of huge domestic markets 
 Global: increasing competitive dynamics in global production 
networks 






Table 9.2 Variety of strategic coupling and the dynamics of local upgrading: A summary 
Industries  Features and mechanisms Local strategies 
Captive coupling 
in the electronics 
industry 
 Upgrading from a truncated processing 
base into a global manufacturing and 
assemble center 
 Evident product and process upgrading, 
while functional upgrading was limited; 
 High asymmetrical power relations with 
certain synergy 
 Absent of strong state supports and less 
significant associational economies; 
 Intensive localization of FIEs 
 FIE dominated industrial 
clusters/parks/districts 
 Local firms upgraded through being 
captive to FIEs 
 Synthesizing the assets of 
domestic markets and 
supply networks: the case 
of Shunde 
 Identifying opportunities 
in GPNs: the case of CZC 
 Deepening captive 
coupling with more 






 Significant functional upgrading 
 Evident product and process upgrading 
 Upgrading into a global manufacturing 
hub and a domestic design and fashion 
center 
 Moderate power relations with various 
mutual interests 
 Absent of state supports 
 Helpful associational economies 
 Increasing outsourcing of foreign firms 
 Local firms took over the dominate role 
of FIEs 
 Synthesizing domestic and 
global markets 
 Constructing local supply 
networks, embedded into 
regional learning platforms
 Based on pro-active local 
states and wholesale 
economies: the case of 
Humen 
 Based on ethnic networks 
and local entrepreneurship: 






 Significant product and process 
upgrading 
 Evident functional upgrading 
 A growing-up domestic auto assembling 
center 
 Strong state intervention and pro-active 
regional governments: exchanging 
markets with technologies 
 Joint ventures played a dominant role 
 Balanced power relations enhanced the 
reciprocity in the partnership 
 Maintaining the balance of 
power relations and 
lowering tension within 
the joint ventures: the case 
of Guangqi-Honda 
 Integrated innovation as a 
corner-cut strategy: the 
case of GAC 
 Being quick followers: 
local suppliers 
Source: author’s fieldwork. 
 
By tracing the post-reform industrial development in the PRD, this thesis has found that 
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the upgrading trajectory of the PRD cannot be explained by the developmental state literature, 
because a developmental state did not come to exist in the PRD. Instead, the region was 
merely mediated by China’s central government under the strategies of market liberalization 
and export-oriented industrialization (Chapter 5). After three decades of rapid industrial 
growth, the PRD achieved substantial upgrading in terms of corporate performance, 
international competitiveness, regional industrial structure and functional improvement. The 
PRD has transformed from a truncated processing base into one of the leading global 
manufacturing centers composed of a large number of competitive firms located in dozens of 
industrial clusters/districts/parks (see Figure 6.2, Figure 7.7 and Figure 8.3).  
Although some studies have praised the accomplishments of industrial growth in the 
PRD (Enright et al., 2005; Yeh et al., 2006; Yu and Zhang, 2009), the achievements of local 
upgrading were still blurred. This study has found that FIEs have been playing a dominant 
role in the output of IVA and exports throughout the past three decades, particularly in the 
electronics industry (Chapter 6). In a word, local upgrading is not as significant as regional 
upgrading (see Table 9.1). 
This thesis has shown that the initial upgrading of the PRD was led by the pattern of 
captive coupling in which rapid product and process upgrading was realized by foreign 
investors (Chapter 5). Local firms were captive to foreign investors as low-end processers 
with littler power and space to achieve functional upgrading. This observation resonated with 
previous studies that advocated the important role of Hong Kong firms and the influence of 
market liberalization in the PRD (Li, 1997; Lin, 1997; Sit and Yang, 1997; Xu and Li, 1990; 
Yang and Sit, 1995). 
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Further investigations have revealed that the captive coupling has been evolving since 
the 1990s (see Table 9.1). A large amount of EPEs were replaced by FIEs and the 
front-store-back-factory model was disintegrated. Meanwhile, the PRD were directly 
articulated into global markets by trading with many developed countries. Patterns of foreign 
trades changed in which the portion of ordinary trade increased from 20% in 1990 to near 50% 
in 2009. In statistical terms, the key drivers of the regional economy have delineated a 
divergent trajectory. While FIEs still played a dominant role, local private firms have caught 
up with them quickly, particularly in the apparel industry (Chapter 7). SOEs totally lost 
influence at the regional scale, but highly consolidated in a few industries, such as the 
automotive industry which was strongly supported by the central government (Chapter 8). 
This is a valuable finding because previous studies tend to treat the PRD as a uniform entity 
without differentiating the influences of different types of firms. This thesis has also identified 
that private firms have already performed better than FIEs from Hong Kong and Taiwan after 
2005. This critical finding articulates a different view in contrast to previous studies that keep 
emphasizing the powerful roles of Hong Kong and Taiwanese firms in the PRD (Liao and 
Chan, 2009; Yang and Liao, 2009; Yeh and Xu, 2006). All these trends imply that the PRD 
has been moving away from captive coupling formed since the 1990s. What types of coupling 
is the PRD evolving into? This study has argued that situation varied among different 
industries (see Table 9.2). 
Chapter 6 investigated into the electronics industry which was the most important 
industry in the PRD in terms of industrial output and export value. It was too difficult for 
local firms to bridge technology and market gaps with FIEs. Hence, the PRD’s local firms 
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tended to be further captive to FIEs as local suppliers (see the cases of Shijie town, Shilong 
town, and the industrial parks of Flextronics and Foxconn). Captive coupling was thus 
developed, persisted and reinforced. FIEs kept dominating industrial clusters and localizing 
their vertically integrated production systems in the PRD. This captive coupling yielded 
evident industrial upgrading but local firms were lagged behind FIEs to a significant degree 
(Table 6.3 and Table 9.2). Local firms grew up into small firms with higher efficiency under 
the shadow of FIEs. This observation agrees with the governance literature which asserts that 
local upgrading tends to be defined by FIEs (Bair and Gereffi, 2003; Humphrey and Schmitz, 
2000, 2002b). However, drawing upon case studies, Chapter 6 has demonstrated that local 
upgrading strategies in the PRD’s electronics industry are not as the GVC studies have 
predicted (e.g. launching joint action) or the development state literature has advocated (e.g. 
close firm-state relations and indigenous innovation). In contrast, local firms managed to 
leverage the control of FIEs by taking advantage of emerging regional assets and competitive 
dynamics in GPNs. In so doing, local firms increased their bargaining power, such as the 
home appliance firms in Shunde; or bypassed the control of foreign firms, such as CZC in 
Shenzhen; and also fostered more mutual interests with foreign firms to reduce the asymmetry 
of power relations, such as the cooperation between Jingtuo and Flextronics (Zhuhai). All 
these local strategies pointed to the potential formation of cooperative coupling in future. The 
overall findings in the electronics industry exemplify the first proposition of this thesis that: 
the deeper local firms become captive to TNCs, the faster will upgrading be facilitated 
(Chapter 3). 
While local firms are still captive to foreign firms in the electronics industry, Chapter 7 
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has articulated how cooperative coupling has been developed in the apparel industry. Due to 
lower technological entry barriers, local firms in the apparel industry caught up with FIEs and 
eventually took over the role of FIEs (see Figure 7.3 and Figure 7.4). During this process, 
local firms moved away from captive coupling and developed cooperative coupling with 
foreign firms. In cooperative coupling, the PRD’s apparel industry has upgraded into a global 
manufacturing hub and a domestic design and fashion center, rather than just a “world factory” 
full of sweat shops and low-skilled labor (see Table 7.1 and Table 9.2). 
Further examinations of Chapter 7 have verified that the growing body of the domestic 
market, product-specific clusters and regional supply networks are important assets in local 
upgrading. The combination of these institutional-spatial contexts enabled the PRD to become 
a powerful player at the lower end of the apparel GPNs. The overall findings of this chapter 
exemplify the second proposition of this thesis that: in cooperative coupling, the more 
complementarity and mutual interests are developed, the higher is the potential of local 
upgrading (Chapter 3). This proposition could revise the prediction of the GVC literature 
which argues that local functional upgrading is less possible in the apparel industry (Frederick 
and Gereffi, 2011; Gereffi, 1999; Gereffi, 2002; Gereffi and Memedovic, 2003). The cases of 
industrial clusters in Humen and Xintang illustrate that local firms can synthesize various 
assets to achieve functional upgrading. Instead of challenging the power of global buyers, 
these local firms can develop further cooperation with global buyers for co-venturing the 
China market (see Table 9.2).  
Assisted by some specific local institutions, such as wholesale markets, trade fairs and 
liberalizing environment, local firms did not meet great difficulties in decoupling with EPEs 
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and East Asian intermediate firms from Hong Kong and Taiwan. Currently, local apparel 
firms are improving their absorptive capacities by utilizing the regional innovation system 
and strengthening their design capabilities. There is great potential for local firms to 
developer absorptive coupling with global buyers in the apparel industry in future. However, 
recent industrial policy shifts have produced certain tension by attempting to relocate this 
industry out of the PRD. This action caused negative effects to regional production networks 
and local firms have mobilized corporate and collective power to bargain with the 
institutional power of governmental agencies for keeping their production networks in the 
PRD. 
Drawing upon the automotive industry, Chapter 8 has addressed the question that how 
reciprocal coupling can be developed and retained overtime. In the PRD, the growth of this 
industry was highly related to the joint ventures between SOEs and global automakers which 
were established based on the national strategy of ‘exchanging domestic markets with foreign 
technologies’. This chapter has verified that reciprocal coupling can be developed in four 
conditions: strong national interventions, strong global governance imperatives, a small 
market gap and a large technological gap. Previous studies have failed to explain the 
formation and mechanism of reciprocal coupling because they overlook influences from state 
institutions and regional assets where the industry was embedded (Humphrey and Memodovic, 
2003; Sturgeon and Biesebroeck, 2011; Sturgeon et al., 2008). Examining two important joint 
ventures in the PRD’s automotive industry, this thesis has argued that reciprocal coupling 
does not necessarily lead to local upgrading which is contingent on a balanced power 
relationship in the coupling. 
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The case of Guangzhou-Peugeot presents a negative example of reciprocal coupling in 
which upgrading is hindered due to mismatched interests, lacking of synergy and unwelcome 
responsive strategies. In contrast, the case of Guangqi-Honda illustrates a positive example in 
which reciprocal coupling is sustainable with continuous synergy with a balance power 
relationship. Guangqi-Honda devoted a great deal of efforts in maintaining the balance of 
interplay in terms of equity structure, management participation, labor training and the mutual 
interests of co-development. Specific strategies were adopted for lowering tension within the 
joint venture. These efforts helped Guangqi-Honda and its supply networks achieve 
substantial upgrading in the 2000s (see Table 9.2). This comparative case analysis verifies the 
third proposition of this thesis: the more balanced are power relations in reciprocal coupling, 
the more synergy is there for upgrading. 
To conclude, this thesis has verified that local upgrading in the PRD does not result from 
the pre-determined patterns of industrial governance or merely a matter of state power or lead 
firm power in defining the content of upgrading as well (see critiques in Chapter 2). Instead, 
local upgrading is led by the evolutionary patterns of strategic coupling which are subject to 
specific configurations of knowledge gaps and dynamic power relations. Overtime, changing 
institutional-spatial conditions serve as a critical factor which enables local firms to leverage 
the governance power of foreign firms in different ways. 
In the specific case of the PRD, this study has found that institutional-spatial conditions 
are changing over times. At the global scale, the imperatives of foreign firms have changed at 
the global scale. Foreign firms are not only interested to outsource/offshore 
sophisticated-manufacturing works to the PRD, but are also attracted by the booming China 
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market. At the regional scale, the developmental strategies of regional governments are 
evolving. Some strategies have further liberalized institutional environment (e.g. electronics); 
some have turned to provide direct supports (e.g. automobile), while some have raised 
industrial barriers so as to stimulate local upgrading in a radical manner (e.g. apparel). At the 
local scale, the capabilities of local firms increase based on the indigenous efforts of learning 
by doing and knowledge absorption from their foreign partners.  
These changing conditions sustain local firms to decouple and recouple with their 
foreign counterparts and lead to the formation of various types of coupling. In the specific 
case of the PRD, the process of decoupling and recoupling did not meet great barriers because 
strong institutional and technological lock-in has yet to be developed within such a 
compressed developmental period. Local firms are able to leverage the power of their partners 
by frequently deploying three strategies: diversifying knowledge channels; utilizing new 
regional assets (domestic assets and indigenous supply networks); and identifying industrial 
opportunities embedded in GPN competitive dynamics. These are changing multi-scalar 
forces that reshape the outcomes of upgrading in the PRD. 
9.2 Contributions 
The key contribution of this thesis is the synthesis of insights in both geographical and 
non-geographical studies for reinterpreting local upgrading in the PRD. Indeed, economic 
geographers have tackled the issue of upgrading in an implicit way. Some recent efforts of the 
GPN studies have led us to appreciate the engagement of multi-scalar forces in producing 
regional industrial growth (Coe et al., 2008a; Yeung, 2009a). But these studies have yet to 
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articulate the influence of strategic coupling on local upgrading. Moreover, the typology of 
strategic coupling per se remains fuzzy. Non-geographical studies have elaborated on the 
mechanisms of industrial upgrading. Nonetheless, these studies, particularly the GVC 
literature, tend to narrow the analytical scope within the pre-determined patterns of industrial 
governance (Bair, 2005; Gereffi et al., 2005; Staritz et al., 2011). Hence the geography of 
upgrading in these studies is ambiguous. They have ignored the institutional and spatial 
contexts where causal mechanisms, power relations and the strategies of upgrading are 
enacted. 
The theoretical effort of this thesis has attempted to make a dialogue between these two 
strands of literature. Specifically, this thesis has reconnected the missing links by answering a 
question: how strategic coupling affects local upgrading under changing institutional-spatial 
conditions. It has offered a more realistic account to the mechanism of industrial upgrading. 
This section summarizes three specific contributions responding to different strands of 
literature. 
9.2.1 A geographical interpretation beyond the GVC approach 
This thesis has incorporated state actors and institutional influences which are generally 
absent in the GVC studies into central analyses. This attempt offers a geographical 
interpretation of knowledge diffusion and asymmetrical power relations within value chains. 
This effort is more capable of explaining the current dynamics of upgrading. 
Scholars in the GVC literature believe that upgrading is driven by the patterns of 
industrial governance because the patterns define the ways of knowledge diffusion along 
value chains (Bair, 2005; Gereffi et al., 2005; Pietrobelli and Rabellotti, 2011). The variety of 
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governance patterns is subject to the codification of knowledge, the complexity of inter-firm 
transactions and the supply-base capabilities. Because lead firms possess advanced 
knowledge and define industrial parameters, they have dominant power over their suppliers 
(local firms). According to my analyses, this conceptual causality is over determinant. It 
seems that the ways of knowledge diffusion is fixed and the power of lead firms is essential. 
This thesis has questioned this view by asking why firms share knowledge and what would be 
other possibility. 
Basically, knowledge is shared by firms which possess and have the ability to control the 
knowledge on the basis of anticipated costs and benefits. In other words, firms share 
knowledge for rent, such as technological licensing, setting industrial standards, or investing 
in credit and trust in business networks. This rent can be returns of profits in formal or 
informal forms, direct or indirect ways (Allen et al., 1983; Appleyard, 1996; Arora, 1995; 
Schrader, 1991; von Hippel, 1988). Therefore, when taking institutional-spatial conditions 
into account, the essential view of knowledge diffusion should be revised. First, if we situate 
local upgrading in a GPN while not a value chain, the channels of knowledge diffusion are far 
more diverse than inter-firm linkages (Bunnell and Coe, 2001; Trippl et al., 2009). Second, by 
possessing certain scarce resources, local firms or regional institutions may offer non-cost or 
non-profit returns for TNCs and attract them to share more knowledge (Liu and Dicken, 2006; 
Scott and Storper, 2003; Storper, 1997a). Third, local firms may take advantage of 
multi-tasking by serving different functions within the same GPNs. This effort helps them 
identify more upgrading opportunities, particularly in the competition between global lead 
firms in the top hierarchy of value chains (Lüthje, 2004; Yeung, 2009a). This thesis has 
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verified these possibilities with various cases and substantial analyses in the last three 
empirical chapters (see Table 9.2). These cases have shown that local firms may leverage the 
governance power of foreign firms through increasing indigenous bargaining power, 
bypassing the power or develop more synergy with their foreign partners. In doing so, this 
thesis partly offers a geographical interpretation of the value chain governance. 
9.2.2 Whither a typology of strategic coupling for the GPN framework? 
Another key contribution made by this thesis is the conceptualization of the typology of 
strategic coupling. This effort resonates with Yeung (2005:37)’s avocation of “theorizing 
sufficiently the nature of relationality and its manifestation through power relations and 
actor-specific practice”. It would be able to transcend previous works in the ‘relational turn’ 
of economic geography which tend to be restricted in interpreting various themes of 
social-spatial relations. As a preliminary attempt, this thesis has conceptualized the typology 
and causal effects of strategic coupling. This attempt is not novel but a reconceptualization of 
the earlier works in the GPN literature (Coe et al., 2004; Yang, 2009; Yang et al., 2009; Yeung, 
2009a). The previous three-fold typology of strategic coupling is a bit fuzzy and internally 
incoherent (Chapter 3). It is insufficient to develop analysis on power dynamics in that 
typology. Therefore, this thesis further develops the typology of strategic coupling as a 
supplement to the GPN literature. 
According to my conceptualization, the formation of coupling is subject to the changing 
configuration of knowledge gaps and power relations. When local firms in a region manage to 
reduce knowledge gaps or to reconfigure power relations with their foreign partners, the 
pattern of coupling will evolve. This evolution leads to the dynamics outcome of upgrading. 
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This conceptual work adds critical and important values to the analytical framework of the 
GPNs. By consolidating analytical focuses on knowledge gaps and power relations, the GPN 
approach would be able to avoid the problem critiqued by Sunley (2008) that being trapped 
by involving immense network relations and related factors. This typology also can 
incorporate the analyses of value chain governance into the GPN framework. By analyzing 
the evolution of strategic coupling, we are able to interpret how inter-firm governance power 
can be reshaped in a nexus of firm-state-territory relations in which each party mobilizes 
possessed resources to leverage the power of the other party. In the case of the PRD, my 
empirical examinations have exemplified the existing variety of strategic coupling (see Table 
9.2). These results as well as the case studies have proved that the fourfold typology of 
strategic coupling is a feasible framework for explaining upgrading in latecomer regions. 
9.2.3 Alternative strategies of local upgrading beyond development studies 
This thesis contributes to development studies by identifying many strategies of local 
upgrading. As reviewed in Chapter 2, previous studies have provided four important strategies 
for latecomer economies to catch up: being a quick follower of TNCs, seeking supports from 
a developmental state, investing in indigenous innovation and launching joint actions (Clark 
and Kim, 1995; Giuliani et al., 2005; Hobday, 1995; Schmitz, 1999, 2004). Apart from the 
first strategy which was affirmed in the electronics industry, the rest three strategies were not 
pertinent in the case of the PRD. In fact, these advocated strategies in development studies 
might become stereotypes in some degree. 
The role of development states in East Asia has been changing with some rise and fall 
(Beeson, 2004). In recent dynamics, East Asian lead firms tend to deepen their articulation in 
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GPNs rather than seeking for helps from developmental states, such as the upgrading of 
Huawei in the PRD (Fan, 2011). Field investigation of this study has notified that a 
developmental state was absent in the PRD. Conversely, the RPD continuously underwent 
market liberalization throughout three decades of development. Statistic evidence in Chapter 
5 has reported that innovation in the PRD was happening but not significant. This finding 
resonates with Viotti (2003)’s view that many latecomer economies actually adopt a strategy 
of learning rather than innovation. The field observation has informed that local firms in the 
PRD did not launch substantial joint actions or collective movements against foreign firms. 
There were merely some local collective initiatives in establishing industrial associations and 
seeking fiscal subsidies from local authorities. These findings critically imply the 
insufficiency of development studies in explaining the PRD’s local upgrading. 
Drawing upon three industrial-specific chapters, this thesis has articulated three 
alternative strategies: diversifying knowledge channels at the local scale (e.g. Jingtuo and 
Conshing); utilizing emerging assets at the regional or national scales (e.g. Yishion and GAC); 
and taking advantage of competitive dynamics at the global scale (e.g. CZC). The first and 
third strategies depend on local entrepreneurship in identifying opportunities and also require 
local firms to articulate deeply into GPNs. The second strategy is critical, because these assets 
only become available in recent development. For instance, the huge China market did not 
exist to most of firms in the 1980s. It was originally small in size and regionally fragmented. 
Though there was a large population, the household incomes of domestic consumers were 
limited in the earlier stage of development. Under the export-oriented strategy, EPEs did not 
have right to access the domestic market. Similarly, regional supply networks were 
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unavailable initially. The growth of these supply networks has been largely attributed to the 
localization efforts of FIEs since 1990s. In short, these assets are emerging and increasingly 
valuable. 
This thesis has also contributed to the literature of the regional development of China in 
some respect. Although the relations between regional development and the globalization of 
China have been revealed, the actual content and extent of upgrading is still blurred in 
previous studies (Wei, 2000, 2007; Wei et al., 2007; Wei and Liefner, 2012; Zhou and Wei, 
2011). This thesis has made an attempt to measure local upgrading rather than taking 
upgrading as granted by rapid industrial growth. Meanwhile, the empirical works of this 
thesis have resonated with previous studies and highly appreciated the importance of global 
integration to China’s regional development, such as the influence of globalization and FDI 
(Young and Lan, 1997), the knowledge transfer and spillover from global pipelines 
constructed by FIEs (Yeung et al., 2006), the impacts of strategic coupling (Yang, 2009), the 
rescaling process of local firms in articulating into the global economy and so on (Lin, 2009b). 
In line with these studies, this thesis has taken one step further by focusing on the variety of 
global integration and its impacts to local upgrading. This effort leads readers to appreciate 
the changing patterns of regional development in China and how some China-specific 
contexts, such as the marketization reform, liberalizing business environment and the huge 




9.3 Policy implications 
Looking forward, this thesis can provide a great deal of regional policy options for 
latecomer upgrading and regional development. The most significant policy implication 
would be the emphasis that policymakers should choose a right way of global integration – an 
applicable pattern of strategic coupling. The implication is important because it reminds 
policy makers to appreciate multi-scalar forces, synergy and the dynamics of power relations 
in shaping regional industrial upgrading. In a latecomer region, policymakers should pay 
sufficient attention in assessing the features of GPNs both firms and structures with which the 
region would like to couple. They need to understand the position within GPNs where the 
region may be situated, rather than select an industry they would like to promote. Meanwhile, 
policymakers should also critically assess their possessed regional assets and the strategic 
needs of TNCs within GPNs. Without this positioning work, regional policymakers would not 
be able to designs suitable policies and build up corresponding regional capabilities for TNCs. 
As a critical value added, this thesis suggest that both firms and governmental agencies 
to pay sufficient attention to the tension and synergy within strategic coupling. Dunning (1991: 
315) has rightly observed that “the world is continually throwing up new challenges and 
openings for multinational companies; and because of this, countries that wish to attract such 
institutions into their midst will have to abide by the rules of the game and provide them with 
the right kind of investment climate”. Nonetheless, few state institutions explicitly integrate 
their actions designed to affect the costs and benefits of TNCs’ relocation activities into their 
general economic policies. Many host countries have yet to pay sufficient efforts to identify 
the balance between the ownership-specific advantages of TNCs as perceived by the host 
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countries and the locational advantages of host countries as perceived by the TNCs (Dunning 
and Lundan, 2008; Dunning, 1998). The GVC studies have strongly suggested local firms in 
developing countries to insert into global value chains as a quick strategy of catching up. 
Many practical toolkits have been summarized such as the triple-C policy framework1, 
building local innovation system or encouraging collective private initiatives (Humphrey and 
Schmitz, 1996; Humphrey and Schmitz, 2008; Schmitz, 2004). These suggestions by and 
large are similar to the ones proposed in the new regionalism literature in economic 
geography (Chapter 2). However, these suggestions lack of a bilateral thinking to how mutual 
interests between the regions and foreign firms can be matched in a better way. To this point, 
this thesis suggests policymakers to pay attention in mediating and fostering the ‘right’ 
regional assets for developing better synergy within the coupling. There is no panacea or 
universal solution to this problem. But bearing the question in mind would help regional 
policymakers develop a more feasible policy framework. 
By proposing a typology of coupling, this thesis provides some pragmatic options for 
regional policymakers to consider the trajectory of upgrading. In the East Asian contexts, 
regions have developed strategic coupling with GPNs in different ways. A few regions have 
more or less developed absorptive coupling with GPNs. Local firms in those regions either 
directly couple with global lead firms, like Taipei–Hsinchu region; or have developed into 
domestic/international lead firms in their own right, such as Seoul Metropolitan Area. There 
are many other regions like the PRD in which the majority of local firms have yet to develop 
strong organizational and technological capacities, such as the Yangzi River Delta and the 
                                                              
1 In the triple C of local industrial policy framework, customer-oriented, collective and cumulative are proposed as 
key features of effective approaches for fostering local development. 
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Bohai Rim region in China, Bankok region in Thailand or the Hanoi-Mekong Delta in 
Vietnam. These regions are still under tremendous pressures on cost-based competitions from 
themselves or other continents. What can regional policy makers do to help local firms 
develop absorptive coupling in future? The thesis provides two optional pathways which can 
be pursued simultaneously in different industries. 
The first option is to develop cooperative coupling with GPNs by helping local firms 
reduce technological gaps with foreign firms. To achieve this goal, governmental agencies can 
heavily invest in innovation to improve indigenous competence; or facilitate the formation of 
local supply networks for strengthening integrated-manufacturing capabilities; or focus on 
building a regional production platform to reap the economies of scale. The second option is 
to pursue reciprocal coupling. For this purpose, polices can be designed to identify or nurture 
a specific type of regional asset, such as domestic markets, associational economies or 
infrastructures. These efforts increase the bargaining power of local firms which have 
locational advantages by possessing the assets. Apart from these strategies, governmental 
agencies can also devote some general efforts, such as encouraging inter-firm cooperation 
(not a specific collective moment), building up a public learning platform, or simply helping 
local firms find suppliers and customers. These helps can create more linkages for local firms 
to diversify their knowledge channels. Last but not the least governmental agencies can foster 
local entrepreneurship by providing more institutional supports rather than allocating all the 
supports for foreign firms. By then local firms would be more capable in synthesizing 
regional assets and identifying industrial opportunities in GPNs. 
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9.4 A self-assessment 
This section develops a self-assessment to assess the main accomplishments and 
limitations of this thesis in three dimensions: methodology, theory and empirical findings. In 
terms of methodology, this thesis has deployed multiple methods that go beyond the 
dichotomies between qualitative and quantitative, primary data and secondary data, or 
intensive and extensive approaches. This methodological synthesis has sustained my field 
survey for articulating the historical and ongoing process of local upgrading at regional, 
industrial and firm levels. Good response rate of the informants supported this thesis in 
covering three major industries in the PRD and claiming the validity of its findings. But there 
are still two limitations which could be improved in future.  
First, while empirical observations have revealed the importance of dynamic power 
relations and synergy in producing upgrading, a precise measurement of synergy is still absent. 
This study has elaborated on synergy on the basis of qualitative methods and case studies, but 
it did not measure precisely to what extent synergy may affect the outcomes of upgrading and 
the evolution of coupling. Indeed, this thesis has missed this opportunity to address this 
critical causality between synergy and upgrading. However, the central focus of this thesis is 
in the process of upgrading, not just about measuring the extent and degree of upgrading. This 
imprecision is regarded as acceptable.  
Second, this thesis has developed a good coverage of examining industrial upgrading at 
both a regional and industrial levels. This work provides a solid ground for testing and 
demonstrating different propositions listed in Chapter 3. However, by casting such a wide net, 
this thesis has lost some analytical depth and richness in case studies in each of the empirical 
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chapters. For instance, three sub-cases in the electronic industry (Midea in Shunde town, CZC 
and Jingtuo in Shenzhen city) should deserve more elaborations about the improvement of 
absorptive capacities, the strategies in selecting technologies to adopt or the disincentives of 
industrial upgrading. Given to the time-space constraints, this thesis would not be able to fully 
elaborate on each of the case studies. This issue will be included in my further study. 
Meanwhile, the intensive usages of interview quotation may also have a risk of misleading 
readers in considering context-sensitive interpretation as generalized mechanisms. Hence 
many of the interpretations in this thesis should be read as subjective and context-sensitive. 
In terms of theory, embedded in a critical perspective in REG, this thesis has 
demonstrated the mechanisms of local upgrading and the contextual contingencies of the 
mechanisms. Moreover, this thesis has devoted a great deal of efforts in the conceptualization 
of strategic coupling which avoids the problem of network privilege in REG. But these efforts 
may commit in making a ‘chaotic’ concept which may complicate the mechanism of 
upgrading. This thesis advocates the multiscarity of my analytical framework which involves 
three key actors from different scales: local firms, foreign firms and regional institutions. 
These actors are embedded in respective institutional-spatial contexts. The orchestration of 
three key actors and the embeddedness has made my analyses quite complicated. It is also 
difficult to distinguish the differences between coupling at an individual level (coupling 
between firms) and an aggregated level (coupling between region and GPNs). This problem is 
evident in assessing the representative level of the case studies. For instance, the conclusion 
of Chapter 6 would be wrong if the success of Jingtuo is exaggerated for representing the 
entire regional tendency. 
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The fourfold typology of strategic coupling also would be chaotic. Critical scholars may 
question that whether synergy and power relations are overlapping among different types of 
coupling. Can a firm develop multiple types of coupling simultaneously? If that possible, 
what are the implications of this multiplicity to governance and upgrading in value chains or 
GPNs? These critiques would be valid because this thesis has not reached this theoretical 
depth yet. But justifying all these issues would go beyond the scope of this study, given to the 
time-space constraint of this thesis. In this sentiment, this thesis has only provided a 
preliminary and fragmented attempt shedding light on the casual relations between strategic 
coupling and local upgrading. 
In terms of empirical findings, this thesis has provided many examples to illustrate the 
variety of coupling and how it produces upgrading in the PRD. But the study has yet to 
identify the formation of absorptive coupling in the examined industries. Correspondingly, the 
forth proposition has yet to be exemplified. Although over 100 interviews have been 
conducted, only 69 samples were collected in the questionnaire survey. This survey sample is 
too small and limited to represent upgrading for the entire PRD. The survey data does not 
have sufficient validity to verify any proposition or argument. It can only be used as a 
complementary support to my findings. This problem mainly results from the time-resource 
constraint of this study and partly from the anti-survey attitude of the PRD’s firms (see 
Chapter 4).  
More critically, among different industries in the PRD, multi-scalar forces did not exert 
influences evenly in all the cases and industries. For instance, regional forces did not play a 
significant role in the electronics industry, while local initiatives had little power to influence 
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the reciprocal coupling in the automotive industry. In other word, the analytical richness of 
this study did not present as a full multi-scalar account. But this issue should not be 
considered as a shortage. The purpose of this thesis is to deploy a multi-scalar approach to 
investigate the encountering of local, regional and global forces in strategic coupling. It is not 
necessarily to present a story evenly produced by multi-scalar forces. 
This self-assessment has reflexively informed the limitations of this thesis in 
methodological, theoretical and empirical levels. Some of the issues are beyond the scope of 
this thesis, but most of them are critical and insightful. These issues constitute the basis of an 
extended research agenda addressed in the next section. 
9.5 Research agenda in future 
The above sections have provided a detail examination on the key contributions and 
limitations of this thesis. What are the future research issues of this study? By anchoring 
multi-scalar forces as the central analysis, the first issue should be further addressed is the 
examination of influence from international industrial standards, the home-country specificity 
of FIEs and macro-regional economic arrangements. Considering these influences is an 
increasing tendency in the GPN studies (Coe et al., 2008b). Scholars have emphasized to 
incorporate international regulatory regimes or organizations, as well as labor, into the GPN 
framework so as to realize its analytical potential in geo-political economic analyses (Fichter 
et al., 2011; Glassman, 2011; Rainnie et al., 2011). For instance, case studies of this thesis can 
be extended by examining the impacts of country origin among global lead firms. The field 
survey of this study has noticed some differences among Foxconn, Flextronics and Honda in 
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constructing local supply networks and enforcing management. But empirical data so far 
cannot sustain this study to detail this issue. This nuance would be a niche for comparing the 
distinctive features among United States, Taiwanese and Japanese firms. It can critically 
contribute to the literature of internationalization of TNCs, transnationalizing 
entrepreneurship or national business systems and so on (Dunning and Lundan, 2008; Whitley, 
2000; Yeung, 2009b). 
Concerning with the issue of labor, social upgrading can be the second important topic 
for further investigation. Social upgrading is a process of improvement in the rights and 
entitlements of workers as social actors, and the enhancement of their employment quality 
(Sen, 1999, 2000). This topic is a common ignorance of the contemporary GPN and GVC 
studies. So far, neither of these approaches has well incorporated workers into the upgrading 
studies (Barrientos et al., 2010; Frederick and Pickles, 2010). One of the fundamental issues 
is the interrelation between the economic upgrading of firms and the social upgrading of labor. 
Judging by the empirical observation of this study, it would be fair to claim that firm 
upgrading does not necessarily lead to social upgrading. Sometimes, it may make the working 
conditions worse, such as pushing tougher working schedules for the upgrading of production 
system. The tragedy of suicides in Foxconn (Shenzhen) in 2010 has demonstrated the urgent 
need of examining social upgrading alongside with economic upgrading. More interestingly, 
the realm of social upgrading can be extended to a regional scale or even wider to a country 
or society. Issues of this boarder sense of social upgrading can be living standards, wage 
levels, work conditions, economic rights, gender equality, economic security, and welfare 
systems and so on. Contemporary studies have been able to provide many insights for this 
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topic, such as the literature in labor geography, corporate social responsibility, or ethical 
trading in value chain studies (Cattaneo et al., 2010; Collins, 2003; Herod, 1997; Hughes et 
al., 2007; Lund-Thomsen and Nadvi, 2010; Milberg, 2004). 
Finally, this study only represents a single developing region - the PRD. To what extent 
are the findings generalizable to other developing regions? Will the regional trajectories of 
upgrading follow the same pattern? Will the propositions of this thesis be replicable to both 
developing and developed regions? Indeed, it is necessary to extend the empirical sample of 
this study to encompass other developing regions in China, East Asia, South East Asia and 
other continents if possible. Comparing these regions among different countries or the same 
country will be quite valuable. For example, a comparative analysis between the PRD and the 
Yangzi River Delta would be insightful for examining the impacts of different national 
strategies (see Tang and Tian, 2002). More interestingly, we can analyze a single lead firm’s 
upgrading trajectory among different regions, such as Honda’s two joint ventures in China 
(Guangqi-Honda in Guangzhou and FAW-Honda in Wuhan). This kind of research would 
open up a line of critical questions related to the responses of lead firm in coupling with local 
firms in different power and institutional contexts, such as firm sizes, the extent of state 
supports, investment climate, locational advantages and supply networks and so on. 
Looking forward again, what will be fate of the PRD? Will rapid industrial growth 
continue in the 2010s? On the prospect of such a national economic frontier, there are two 
different thoughts: the optimists (Yeh et al., 2006) and the pessimists (Steinfeld, 2010). The 
critical issue here rests in the question that: whether local firms manage to find a way of 
upgrading. This study has identified the overwhelming economic power of FIEs in the PRD, 
316 
 
particularly in the electronics industry. If PRD’s industrial policies do not have major shift in 
future, the further localization of FIEs may be reinforced unfortunately. Although the 
advantage of low labor wage is reducing, there are other emerging advantages, such as 
well-built infrastructures, the growing body of supply networks, booming domestic markets 
and friendly business environment. These advantages would keep attracting more FDI to the 
PRD. If state supports are still not provided, local firms are more likely to be further captive 
to FIEs. A few of them maybe successfully leapfrog into new lead firms due to new industrial 
opportunities, right business strategies or excellent entrepreneurship. Hong Kong firms may 
play a positive role in this process by providing professional technological, financial and 
logistics services (Yeh and Xu, 2006). But this outcome is not guaranteed. 
It is also likely that local firms will prevail in some sectors, like the apparel industry, if 
the regional upgrading policy will not further disfavor it. Sustained by the booming domestic 
market, most of the local firms would have a chance to achieve functional upgrading. 
Absorptive coupling is quite possible to be developed in this industry. But a bottom neck may 
emerge when these local apparel firms try to move up from low- and middle-end markets to 
high-end markets. Local firms will definitely encounter new knowledge gaps in branding and 
marketing, especially when they enter global markets. Hence they may go back to captive 
coupling again. Overall, there is nothing fundamentally wrong with this trajectory of 
upgrading in the apparel industry. The trickiest part may come from the automobile industry. 
Any major policy change at the national or provincial governments may lead to recoupling 
among the joint ventures. Unexpected outcomes are also possible as the SOEs have yet to 
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develop strong indigenous capabilities. The corner-cut strategy did enable GAC to achieve 
functional upgrading. But this accomplishment was shallow after all.  
In the final comment, this study does not attempt to judge that the economic prospect of 
the PRD is bound to be bright or doom. Instead, it insists on arguing that the ongoing 
dynamics should be understood in relation to changing multi-scalar forces and 
institutional-spatial conditions. Local firms indeed have certain autonomy and space to find a 
way to upgrade, but the opportunity is contingent on interactions between the region and the 
global economy in future. 
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Appendix A: the survey questionnaire 
Survey of Industrial Upgrading in the Pearl River Delta (2010) 
 
Name of Enterprise：                          
Name of Informant:                           
Position of Informant:                         
 
 
I would be most grateful if you could spare some time to fill in this questionnaire. This 
survey forms part of a study of industrial upgrading in the Pearl River Delta. The questionnaire 
aims to understand your local practices of upgrading in your company and the difficulties your 
company has met during the process of upgrading. All data collected from this survey will be used 
strictly for academic purposes only. All your information will be kept confidential and will not 
disclose to the third party without your permission. 
These activities are considered as industrial upgrading: 
 Process upgrading: improving efficiency of production system or introducing superior 
technologies; 
 Product upgrading: making better products, adopting new design, adding new component 
into the products; 
 Functional upgrading: conducting/acquiring new, high value-add or superior functions such 
as R&D design, marketing, management, branding and retailing; 
 Sectoral upgrading: applying the competence acquired in a particular function to move to a 
new sector 
 
If you have any question in filling this questionnaire, please inquire the investigator 
immediately.  
 
Title: Research Project of Industrial Upgrading in the PRD 
Institutes: National University of Singapore & Sun Yat-sen University 
Investigators: Liu Yi (PhD student), Li Xun (Professor) 
Contact Number: 13538975675;  
Email：liuyi0609@hotmail.com 
 




1. When was your company firstly established in the PRD? (   )  
 
2. What is the current ownership type of your company: 
2.1 □ private owned；□ state owned; □ collective owned; □ foreign owned 
2.2 Original country of investment: ___________________ 
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3. Registered capital:       million yuan; Fixed assets:       million yuan;  
Turnover in 2009      million yuan; 
 
4. What are your main products and markets 
Main products: ___________________ 
Main market places: (e.g., the U.S.) ___________________ 
 
5. What are the relationships with main customers in your company (    ) [multiple choices] 
(1) strategic partners; (2) OEM clients  (3) affiliates (4) normal customers 
 
6. What are the relationships with main suppliers in your company (    ) [multiple choices] 
(1) strategic partners; (2) OEM partnership  (3) affiliates (4) normal suppliers 
 
7. The production patterns of your company belong to (    ) [multiple choices] 
(1 )Export processing trades; (2) OEM; (3) ODM;  (4) OBM; (5) partly outsourcing; (6)fully 
outsourcing; 
 
8. What are the relationships with governments (    ) [multiple choices] 
(1) Normal 
(2) encouraged to relocate and transform; 
(3) encouraged to further invest; 
(4) under collaborative agreements; 
(5) Others:                  
 
9. The number of employees is (    ); How of them are conducting research and development 
work (    ); 
 
10. How much did the normal labor wage of your company increase in the past five years? (  ) 
(1)< 30%；(2)30-60%；(3)60-90%；(4)>90%； 
 
11. How many industrial associations have your company joined in the PRD: (    );  
 
PRACTICES OF UPGRADING 
 
12. What are the estimated expenditures of your company in the below activities 
Technological purchase （        million yuan） 
R&D investment （        million yuan） 
Labor training （        million yuan） 
Equipment renewal （        million yuan） 






13. Using the scale provided, please assess the extent of upgrading did your company has 
achieved (the numbers in the scale range from Absent [0] to High [3]) 
0        1         2          3     
Absent     Low       Moderate     High       
 
Product upgrading （     ） 
Process upgrading （     ） 
Functional upgrading （     ） 
Sectoral upgrading （     ） 
 
14. What may be the incentives of your upgrading activities (    ) [multiple choices] 
(1)  From indigenous entrepreneurship 
(2)  From global scale（e.g. pricing, new industrial standards） 
(3)  From governments (e.g. taxation, supportive industrial policies) 
(4)  From local scale (e.g. local competitions, rising up labor wage) 
(5)  others (          ) 
 
15.What are the sources of the technologies used for upgrading (    ) [multiple choices] 
(1) Direct purchase 
(2) Indigenous innovation 
(3) Collaboration with other enterprises 
(4) Collaboration with research institutes 
(5) Transfer from mother companies 
(6) Technological licensing 
(7) Other: _________________ 
 
16.What are the sources of the capital expended for upgrading (    ) [multiple choices] 
(1) Self-accumulation                   
(2) Transfer from mother companies 
(3) Loan from local banking systems        
(4) Loan from non-local banking systems 
(5) Private equity                       
(6) Venture capital 
(7) Loan through social relations           
(8) Other: ______________； 
 
17.Using the scale provided, please assess the importance of external partners to upgrading (   ) 
0             1           2          3     








18. Using the scale provided, please assess the degree of tension within the relationships of your 
company with other firms, individual and regional institutions  
(the scale range from Absent [0] to High [3]) 
0        1         2          3     
Absent     Low       Moderate     High       
 
With labor （       ） 
With governments （       ） 
With industrial associations （       ） 
With customers （       ） 
With suppliers （       ） 
 
19. Using the scale provided, please assess the importance of supports from governments and 
institutions (the numbers in the scale range from Absent [0] to High [3]) 
0        1         2          3     
Absent     Low       Moderate    High       
 
Provide technological supports （       ） 
Provide financial subsidies  （       ） 
Provide market/business information （       ） 
Provide infrastructures （       ） 
Provide labor training （       ） 
Other public services:                （       ） 
 
PROBLEMS AND STRATEGIES IN UPGRADING 
 
20.Using the scale provided, please assess the bargaining power in the external relation of your 
company(the numbers in the scale range from Highly disadvantaged [1] to Highly advantaged [5]) 
With suppliers  （      ） 
With customers （      ） 
With governments （      ） 
 
21.What kind of factors can improve the bargaining power of your company (     ) [multiple 
choices] 
(1) Lower production costs 
(2) Leading technological advantages 
(3) Financial capabilities 
(4) Reputation in the industry 
(5) Familiarity of governmental policies 
(6) Familiarity of local market 
(7) Familiarity of cultural background 
(8) Social networks 
(9) Entrepreneurship 
(10) Others                
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22. Using the scale provided, please assess the extent of difficulty that your company has met 
during upgrading  (the numbers in the scale range from Absent [0] to High [3]) 
0            1         2           3     
Absent     Low       Moderate     High       
 
Finance （        ） 
Technology （        ） 
Human resource （        ） 
R&D （        ） 
Brand development （        ） 
Market entry （        ） 
Other （        ） 
 
23. Using the scale provided, please assess the importance of the below relations in helping your 
company during upgrading (the numbers in the scale range from Absent [0] to High [3]) 
0        1          2            3     
Absent     Low       Moderate     High       
 
Business relations  
Trading partners （        ） 
Customers/suppliers （        ） 
Industrial associations （        ） 
Business community （        ） 
Political relations  
Official relations with governments （        ） 
Personal relations with local officials （        ） 
Social relations  
Family ties （        ） 
Ethnic ties （        ） 
Religious ties （        ） 




24.Using the scale provided, please assess the change of firm-government relations in the past 
decade (   ) 
1 2 3 4 5 
More tighten  No evident change  Much more loser 
 
25.Using the scale provided, please assess the supports received from governments in the past 
decade (   ) 
1 2 3 4 5 




26.Using the scale provided, please assess the stability of business environment in the past decade 
(   ) 
1 2 3 4 5 
Much more volatile  No evident change  Much more stable 
 
27.Using the scale provided, please assess the importance of regional assets to your company (  ) 
0 1 2 3 
Not important at all A bit important Important Highly important 
 
Production costs （        ） 
Technologies （        ） 
Supply capabilities （        ） 
Governmental supports （        ） 
Associational economies （        ） 
Social/cultural advantages （        ） 
Other:                 （        ） 
 
INFORMANT PARTICULAR 









(5) 60 or above 
 
30. What is your educational background (  ) 
(1) Primary school;  
(2) Secondary school;  
(3) Senior middle school 




31. How would you describe your designation in the company? 
(1) Chairman 
(2) CEO/Managing Director/President 
(3) Executive Director/General Manager 
(4) Divisional Manager/Branch Manager 
(5) Overseas Operation Manager 
(6) Assistant Manager 
324 
 
(7) Administrative Executive 
(8) Executive Secretary 
(9) Other (please specify):               
 
---------------------End of questionnaire----------------- 
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S I N G A P O R E  
新加坡国立大学 




Research Topic: Global Production Networks, Regional Institutions and 
Industrial Upgrading in a Globalizing Region, the Pearl River Delta in China 
 
To: Midea Group 
 




Institutes: National University of Singapore & Sun Yat-sen University 
Investigators: Liu Yi (PhD student), Li Xun (Professor) 













I would be most grateful if you could accept this interview. The interview forms 
part of a study of industrial upgrading in the Pearl River Delta. It aims to examine 
your local practices of upgrading in your company and the difficulties your company 
has met during the process of upgrading. All information collected from this interview 
will be used strictly for academic purposes only and will not disclose to the third party 
without your permission. 
At the beginning of the interview, I would like to know some basic features of 
your company, such as:  
 Historical development and significant changes 
 Product characteristics, market structures and shares 
 Structure of production networks: spatial distribution of suppliers, types of supply 
chains and management. 
 Competitive advantages: cost, technologies, brand and marketing 
   The second part of the interview is composed of several key questions which are 
about the decision making process and implementation of industrial upgrading. 
Questions include the below aspects: 
 Development strategies 
 Activities for improving production and processing skills in the past five years; 
 Attempts in conducting new business and the outcomes 
 Main difficulties in upgrading and responsive strategies 
   In the third part of the interview, I would like to discuss with you about the 
business environment where your company has located in. Questions will refer to:  
 Regional assets: labor markets, infrastructures, the efficiency of governments and so 
on; 
 Supports needed from regional governments; 
 Supports needed from industrial associations. 
The interview will end with a short questionnaire including 30 questions which 
are mainly about the assessment of the progress and difficulties of upgrading. All data 
collected from this survey will be used strictly for academic purposes only. All your 
information will be kept confidential and will not disclose to the third party without 
your permission. 
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